Opinion
C/A 5:22-1852-DCC-KDW
12-05-2023
Shelton Lathal Butler, Plaintiff, v. Bryan P. Stirling; Deputy Dir Willie D Davis; Julie Tennant-Craine; Christopher Voll; Warden of Broad River Correctional Institution; John Doe Officer at Broad River; Warden of Perry Correctional Institution; and STG Board or Panel Investigative Services, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KAYMANI D. WEST UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Shelton Lathal Butler (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought this action alleging violations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter comes before the court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed May 1, 2023. ECF No. 84. On June 22, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion. ECF No. 91. On July 10, 2023, Defendants filed their Reply. ECF No. 95. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), this Magistrate Judge is authorized to review pretrial matters in cases involving pro se litigants and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
I. Factual Allegations
Plaintiff alleges that on or about November 29, 2021, while an inmate at Broad River Correctional Institution (“BRCI”), he was placed in solitary confinement without cause. ECF No. 1 at 6. Plaintiff further alleges that he was “intentionally misclassified” as a gang member and sent to Perry Correctional Institution (“PCI”). ECF No. 1 at 6. Specifically, he alleges he was transferred from the “yard cell” while housed at BRCI (which was closer to his home) to a 24-hour “lock-down cell” at PCI. Id. at 7. This transfer in housing to solitary confinement forms the genesis of his Complaint. He alleges Defendants violated his due process and equal protections rights, violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and falsely imprisoned him. ECF No. 1 at 5.
Plaintiff alleges that in April of 2019, while housed at Leiber Correctional Institution, he began the process of getting his life back together and denounced any gang affiliation prior to leaving Leiber. Id. at 7. From April 2019 until November 2021, Plaintiff alleges he was not involved in any violent or major infractions within the South Carolina Department of Corrections (the “SCDC”). Id. Plaintiff alleges that while at BRCI he was elected to serve as the “treasury” of the Inmate Representative Committee, which Plaintiff contends requires an inmate to have good behavior. Id. Plaintiff alleges that on November 29, 2021, based on a “false and misleading report” created by John Doe Officer, he was classified as needing “STG lock-up.” Id. Plaintiff alleges the change to this classification resulted from the failure to update the computer system to indicate that he was no longer affiliated with a gang. Id.
“STG” appears to stand for Security Threat Group based on the evidence within the record.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Brian Stirling owed him a duty of care that was breached by failing to properly train staff members under his authority. Id. at 9. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Willie Davis owed him a duty of care that he breached in failing to correct the injuries suffered by Plaintiff and failing to properly oversee the training of staff to abate this issue. Id. at 9-10. Plaintiff further alleges Defendant Deputy Director Julie Tennant-Craine also owed him a duty of care that she breached by her negligent acts or omissions. Id. at 10. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Christopher Voll, the Deputy Director of Police Services for the SCDC, owed him a duty of care that was breached by his failure to update records to reflect Plaintiff's current status as a non-gang member. Id. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Warden of BRCI owed him a duty that he breached by failing to properly oversee John Doe officers and to “abate false and misleading reports” that resulted in injury to Plaintiff. Id. at 11. Plaintiff alleges Defendant John Doe Officers owed him a duty, which they breached by falsifying institutional records and identifying him as a gang member. Id. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Warden of PCI owed him a duty that was breached when he failed to have a legitimate basis to put Plaintiff in solitary confinement. Id. at 12. Finally, Plaintiff alleges Defendant STG Board at PCI owed him a duty of care that the Board breached by refusing to permit his release and allow him normal privileges. Id.
Plaintiff's mother, Lisa Vereen, also purported to have certain claims against these Defendants and included those within the filed Complaint. See ECF No. 1. However, as previously acknowledged by this court, Ms. Vereen is not a party to the pending lawsuit. See ECF No. 55.
Plaintiff subsequently amended his Complaint to include an additional claim against John Doe Correctional Officers. These additional allegations were filed as an attachment to the Complaint. See ECF No. 55; ECF No. 1-1. Plaintiff alleges that after being handcuffed at PCI he was repeatedly assaulted by several officers attempting to retaliate against him for initiating complaints against the SCDC. ECF No. 1-1. Plaintiff alleges after he was attacked, he was “stripped completely naked” and placed in solitary confinement for approximately 45 minutes, which occurred after he filed this lawsuit. ECF No. 1-1.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
The court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is appropriate; if the movant carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). If a movant asserts that a fact cannot be disputed, it must support that assertion either by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials;” or “showing . . . that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248. All that is required is that “sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “Mere unsupported speculation . . . is not enough to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Ennis v. Nat'l Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 62 (4th Cir. 1995). A party cannot create a genuine issue of material fact solely with conclusions in his or her own argument, affidavit, or deposition that are not based on personal knowledge. See Latif v. The Cmty. Coll. of Baltimore, 354 Fed.Appx. 828, 830 (4th Cir. 2009) (affirming district court's grant of summary judgment, noting plaintiff's affidavit, which offered conclusions not based on his own knowledge, did not create genuine issues of material fact).
Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts that set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc.Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
III. Analysis
a. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Defendants argue that they are entitled to immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment as to any claims brought against them in their official capacity. The Eleventh Amendment provides: “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The United States Supreme Court has long held that the Eleventh Amendment also precludes suits against a state by one of its own citizens. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). This immunity extends not only to suits against a state per se, but also to suits against agents and instrumentalities of the state. Cash v. Granville Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 242 F.3d 219, 222 (4th Cir. 2001). Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to “arms of the State” and state employees acting in their official capacity. Doe v. Coastal Carolina Univ., 359 F.Supp.3d 367, 378 (D.S.C. Jan. 9, 2019). Relatedly, the Supreme Court has held that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Moreover, a state cannot, without its consent, be sued in a District Court of the United States by one of its own citizens upon the claim that the case is one that arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663.
Defendants argue that the law is therefore clear that in this case, Defendants are immune from suit in their official capacity. Plaintiff argues generally that Defendants are not entitled to immunity for “knowing violations of the law,” citing to Thorpe v. Clarke, 37 F.4th 926 (2022), a case discussing qualified immunity. ECF No. 91 at 5. However, beyond arguing generally that qualified immunity should not apply, Plaintiff does not provide a substantive argument as to claims against these Defendants in their official capacity.The undersigned agrees that the Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to Plaintiff's claims against state actors in their official capacity. Thus, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants as to Plaintiff's claims brought against them in their official capacity pursuant to § 1983.
Defendants also argue that their claims are subject to summary judgment based on the doctrine of qualified immunity. When a qualified immunity defense is raised, the courts apply a two-part test. First, the court must determine whether the facts viewed in the plaintiff's favor make out a violation of one's constitutional rights, and second, whether the violated right was clearly established at that time. Stanton v. Elliott, 25 F.4th 227, 233 (4th Cir. 2022) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 233, 231 (2009)). The Fourth Circuit employs a split burden of proof for the qualified immunity defense. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the first prong, and the [officer] bears the burden on the second prong. Stanton v. Elliott, 25 F.4th 227, 233 (4th Cir. 2022) (citing Henry v. Purnell, 501 F.3d 374, 377-78 & n.4 (4th Cir. 2007)). Here, Plaintiff does not specifically allege which violation of a constitutional right that was clearly established precludes Defendants from summary judgment based on qualified immunity. One can surmise he is referring to his placement in solitary confinement. However, for the reasons outlined in this R&R, the undersigned recommends finding that Plaintiff has not sufficiently established Defendants violated his constitutional rights.
b. Exhaustion
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's assault claim, which he included in his amendment to his Complaint, should be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to the alleged assault. Defs.' Br. at 6. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (the “PRLA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” This requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). To satisfy this requirement, a plaintiff must avail himself of all available administrative remedies. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001). Those remedies “need not meet federal standards, nor must they be ‘plain, speedy, and effective.'” Porter, 534 U.S. at 524 (quoting Booth, 532 U.S. at 739).
The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is twofold. First, it gives an administrative agency “an opportunity to correct its own mistakes with respect to the programs it administers before it is haled into federal court[.]” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992)). Second, “[c]laims generally can be resolved much more quickly and economically in proceedings before an agency than in litigation in federal court.” Id. Satisfaction of the exhaustion requirement requires “using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly.” Id. at 90 (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original)). Thus, “it is the prison's requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). Defendants have the burden of establishing that a plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 681 (4th Cir. 2005).
In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants provide the affidavit of Felecia McKie, the Agency Inmate Coordinator/Branch Chief of Inmate Grievance Branch, Office of General Counsel for the SCDC. See Affidavit of Felecia McKie, attached as Exhibit 5 to Defendants' Motion, ECF No. 84-5. Ms. McKie avers that based upon her review of Plaintiff's grievance records, there is no record of him filing a grievance related to the alleged assault that he contends occurred on or about June 17, 2022. McKie Aff., ¶ 14. Ms. McKie further avers that he did file grievances on May 20, 2022 and July 28, 2022 related to his placement in security detention. McKie Aff., ¶ 14.
In response, Plaintiff does not allege that he filed a grievance. Instead, he argues that inmates are not required to exhaust their administrative remedies in all circumstances. Pl.'s Br. at 10. As support for this contention, he cites to Perez v. Blot, 195 F.Supp.2d 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), which Plaintiff contends is analogous to the current case. In Perez, an inmate sought to avoid the grant of a motion to dismiss based on an alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies by seeking discovery as to whether he filed a formal grievance, and discovery related to what that inmate contended was his submission of less formal complaints regarding an alleged assault. Perez, 195 F.Supp.2d at 541. Relying upon the applicable grievance process outlined under New York codes, which provided for both formal and less formal grievance procedures, the court allowed the plaintiff to conduct discovery related to the complaints made to correctional officers. Id. at 547. Perez, however, considered the applicable facts with respect to the New York Department of Corrections' Inmate Grievance Program. Further, this matter is being considered at the summary judgment stage where the discovery period ended in January of 2023. Plaintiff therefore has had the benefit of a discovery period. Finally, Plaintiff has not refuted Ms. McKie's statements that he did not seek to file a grievance related to this assault. Nor does he allege he was somehow thwarted in his attempts to file a grievance related to the assault. Indeed, as pointed out by Defendants, Plaintiff filed grievances related to his security confinement in lock-up. While Plaintiff makes the vague assertion that a “substantial risk of harm existed,” he does not otherwise provide any details surrounding what this allegation means. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Defendants have met their burden to show that Plaintiff's claim related to an assault should be dismissed for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.
c. Due Process Claim
Defendants next argue that Plaintiff has failed to establish a due process violation on the part of any Defendants. Plaintiff argues that his placement in solitary confinement violated his due process rights in that he has a protected liberty interest in avoiding solitary confinement. Pl.'s Br. at 7. Plaintiff further argues that “without provocation,” despite him disavowing his connection to a gang, and despite there being no brightline rule requiring gang members to be placed in solitary confinement, he was placed there. These allegations form the basis of his claim that Defendants violated his procedural due process and equal protection rights. Id. at 8. Prior to considering Plaintiff's due process claim, it is important to clarify that the evidence within the record supports a finding that Plaintiff was placed in what is termed a restrictive housing unit. Solitary confinement is not a term used by SCDC. See White v. Brokaw, No. 9:23-0057-BHH-MHC, 2023 WL 3855389, at *1 (D.S.C. March 21, 2023). When Plaintiff references placement in solitary confinement, the record supports a finding that he is referring to his placement in RHU.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states, “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend XIV, Section 1. Prisoners are entitled to claim the protections of the Due Process Clause. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). While an inmate's rights may be diminished by the needs of the institutional environment of the penal system, a prisoner is not “wholly stripped” of the protections afforded under the Constitution while incarcerated. Id. In order to state a procedural due process violation has occurred, a plaintiff must (1) identify a protected liberty or property interest; and (2) demonstrate deprivation of that interest without due process of law. Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 2015).
Defendants attached several exhibits to their Motion that are relevant to Plaintiff's allegations that his due process rights were violated. First, Defendants provide a document entitled a “Security Threat Group Member Self Admission Form,” dated July 18, 2012. See Exhibit B attached to Defs.' Motion at ECF No. 84-3. This form reflects that on that date, Plaintiff indicated he was a member of the Bloods. See Exhibit B. Plaintiff was then transferred to PCI on November 29, 2021 and was placed into the Restrictive Housing Unit (the “RHU”). Defendants attached the “RHU Classification Committee Review,” which includes text indicating that the Committee determined Plaintiff was placed in the RHU because he was a “potential threat to institutional operations.” See Exhibit C attached to Defs.' Motion at ECF No. 84-4. The Committee Review Form also indicates that Plaintiff was initially placed in security detention in behavioral level “3.” See Exhibit C. The Committee Review Form further reflects that the Committee met on February 9, 2022 to conduct a review of his classification level. See Exhibit C. Finally, the notes on the Committee Review Form indicate that Plaintiff was under investigation for potential threats to institutional operations, as well as his suspected or validated “STG affiliation.” See Exhibit C. The Committee Review Form established the next scheduled review for May 11, 2022. See Exhibit C. The Committee Review Form dated May 16, 2022 reflects that the Committee recommended Plaintiff's classification be reduced to a level “2”; however, he was to remain in the RHU because of Plaintiff's negative behavior over the previous 90 days. See Exhibit C. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit a month later. Defendants also attached the Committee Review Form dated August 9, 2022, wherein the Committee recommended Plaintiff “follow the rules of SCDC.” See Exhibit C. This Committee Review Form indicates inmate was disciplinary free since the last review. See Exhibit
C.
Defendants argue that summary judgment is appropriate because Plaintiff has not identified a protected liberty interest. Indeed, the Supreme Court has previously recognized that the transfer of a prisoner to a different institution was found unprotected under the Constitution, even when that change resulted in a significant change in the conditions of confinement. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983); see generally See Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 828 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that a prisoner does not have a constitutional right to be housed at a particular institution or receive a particular security classification). The Fourth Circuit has also recently acknowledged that a convicted prisoner does not have an inherent, constitutionally protected liberty interest in release from solitary confinement. Smith v. Collins, 964 F.3d 266, 275 (4th Cir. 2020). In Smith, the Fourth Circuit further provided that the prisoner there needed to identify a state-created liberty interest in avoiding solitary confinement. Id. To do so, a prisoner must be able to show two things: (1) there is a “basis for an interested or expectation in state regulations” for avoiding such confinement; and (2) that the conditions “impose atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. (quoting Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d at 249-50). The atypical-and-significant-hardship analysis focuses on three factors: (1) the magnitude of the confinement restrictions; (2) “whether the administrative segregation was for an indefinite period; and (3) whether assignment to administrative segregation had any collateral consequences on the inmate's sentence.” Smith v. Collins, 964 F.3d at 269 (citing Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517, 530 (4th Cir. 2015)).
In Sandin v. Conner, the Supreme Court stated that prisoners have a liberty interest in avoiding confinement conditions that impose “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). In Wilkinson v. Austin, the Supreme Court further explained that after Sandin, the touchstone of the inquiry is not the language of the regulations; rather, it is the nature of the conditions themselves in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. 545 U.S. 209, 223 (2005).
In assessing whether Plaintiff has a protected liberty interest in release from the RHU, the undersigned, relying on Incumaa and its progeny concludes that Plaintiff has established an expectation in state regulations for avoiding solitary confinement. This is so because the evidence in the record reflects that the SCDC has a periodic review of security detention (specifically every 90 days).791 F.3d at 527. Therefore, Plaintiff has shown a basis in the SCDC regulations for avoiding segregated confinement. Thus, the inquiry focuses on whether Plaintiff has shown that the conditions in the RHU present an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. At the outset, the undersigned recognizes the allegations within Plaintiff's Complaint focus more on the circumstances leading up to his placement in the RHU, as opposed to the conditions in the RHU itself. However, Plaintiff acknowledges that he was placed in segregated confinement due to “some false and misleading report generated by John Doe Officer.” ECF No. 1 at 7. He attributes this to the failure to update records to reflect he denounced his gang affiliation, or that he was “beat out the gang affiliation since 2019,” something Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint; however, this allegation contradicts the evidence in the record indicating that, at least when he arrived to prison in 2012, Plaintiff self-affiliated with the Bloods. In other words, Plaintiff suggests that his placement in the RHU in 2019 was inaccurate; however, he does not refute the fact that he apparently still identified as a gang member when he first entered the prison system and that would have been indicated in the computer system at some point, albeit incorrectly according to Plaintiff by April 2019. Moreover, the documents provided by Defendants suggest that Plaintiff was also under investigation for potential threats to the prison's operations. That issue aside, the court focuses on the second prong analysis.
The analysis of whether conditions are “atypical and substantially harsh” as compared to normal prison life is a fact specific exercise. Incumaa, 791 F.3d at 527. When Plaintiff filed his lawsuit, he had been in the RHU for approximately seven months. Focusing on Plaintiff's allegations regarding conditions in such confinement, Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint he was denied access to the general population, and he was deprived of family contact, attorney contact, and access to the court. In his Response, Plaintiff further provides that human contact was prohibited, and like Wilkinson, he was housed in a cell with solid metal doors with metal strips that prevented conversation from cell to cell. Pl.'s Br. at 11.Plaintiff also cites to Incumaa, pointing out what conditions existed in that case, which were found to be severe. However, the record before this court does not support the same finding in this case. As to the first factor, Plaintiff does not provide the court with any evidence (or allegations) regarding the environment of the general population with which to compare the magnitude of confinement restrictions. Thus, the inability to compare conditions renders it difficult to conduct any meaningful analysis. The court acknowledges that Plaintiff did point out that he was not able to have any human contact, but that factor alone is to be expected as it is the purpose of solitary confinement. Nevertheless, in considering the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the undersigned recognizes that there are additional restrictions placed on inmates in the RHU, as opposed to the restrictions for inmates in the general population. However, the second and third factors do not weigh in Plaintiff's favor. Plaintiff provides no allegations regarding the period of administrative segregation, and the evidence provided by Defendants establishes that Plaintiff's classification was reviewed every 90 days. The reason Plaintiff remained in segregation, according to the evidence before the court, is that he would not follow the rules of the prison. As to the third factor, Plaintiff makes no allegations or provides any information regarding the impact the classification to the RHU had on his sentence. Thus, while Plaintiff correctly cites to relevant case law, and does cite to one specific example of the conditions (that is, the metal stripping prevented communication among inmates), he does not provide the court sufficient factual support with which one could determine the conditions were substantially harsh. Defendants, however, provided documents evidencing the reason Plaintiff was placed in the RHU, as well as documents evidencing that Plaintiff was subject to a periodic review, and the outcome of each review. Thus, the undersigned recommends finding that Plaintiff failed to show that the conditions of the RHU imposed an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life and therefore Defendants should be granted summary judgment as to Plaintiff's due process claims.
In Wilkinson, the Supreme Court noted that the prison where that plaintiff was incarcerated, the state of Ohio's “supermax” facility, had solid metal doors with metal strips along the bottom and sides to prevent communication among inmates. 545 U.S. at 214. Additionally, all meals are taken alone in cells and opportunities for visitation are rare. Id.
d. Equal Protection Claims
Defendants next argue to the extent Plaintiff's allegations state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, those too should fail. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits States from denying persons “the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, Section 1. It keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently “persons who are in all relevant respects alike.” Fauconier v. Clarke, 966 F.3d 265, 277 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992)). To state a claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must allege: (1) “that he has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated;” and (2) “that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination.” Fauconier, 966 F.3d at 277. Put simply, Plaintiff fails to establish any claim under this Clause. While he alleges in his Complaint that he was locked-up in solitary confinement without due process or equal protection, he does not otherwise expound on this claim. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants STG Board breached its duty to him when they refused to permit his release to normal privileges as “similar inmates do,” but he does not allege or provide any factual basis for this claim. Nor does he allege or establish it was a result of intentional or purposeful discrimination. Plaintiff does not address this claim in his Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Thus, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment to Defendants as to any alleged equal protection cause of action.
e. Eighth Amendment Claims
Defendants next argue that, to the extent Plaintiff alleges a deprivation of his constitutional rights afforded under the Eighth Amendment, those claims must also fail. Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when two conditions are met. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). First, the alleged deprivation must be “sufficiently serious.” Id. To prevail on a claim based on a failure to prevent harm, an inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions that pose a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. Second, the prison officials must have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id. at 834 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Under the second prong, the subjective prong, the inmate must demonstrate that the prison official's state of mind was one of “deliberate indifference” to inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. To be deliberately indifferent, a prison official must “know[ ] of and disregard[ ] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837. Deliberate indifference “lies somewhere between negligence and purpose or knowledge: namely, recklessness of the subjective type used in criminal law.” Makdessi v. Fields, 789 F.3d 126, 133 (4th Cir. 2015). A prison official's subjective actual knowledge can be proven through circumstantial evidence. Id.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff wholly fails to set forth any conditions of his confinement resulting in a violation of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff does not respond to this argument. In reviewing the record in this case, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's main contention regarding the conditions of his confinement relate to his placement in the RHU. Courts must remain ever mindful of the difficulties of operating a detention center, providing deference to correctional officers when keeping in mind that maintaining safety and order at these facilities requires the expertise of the individuals employed at the facility. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cty. of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 326 (2012). First, Plaintiff's contention that he should not have been placed there, and that he was not afforded due process, have previously been considered in this R&R. Second, the undersigned has previously considered whether the conditions in the RHU were unnecessarily harsh. Finally, as pointed out by Defendants, Plaintiff has not identified any conditions that he believes rises to the level of a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment as to any Eighth Amendment claim.
f. Personal Involvement
Defendants alternatively allege that Plaintiff failed to establish that the named Defendants were personally involved in any way in the purported deprivation of his rights.Defendants argue that “personal participation” is a necessary element in any § 1983 claim against government officials in their individual capacities; thus, Plaintiff is required to show that these Defendants personally deprived him of his constitutional rights. Liability under § 1983 involves a showing that “the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.” Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985). The doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable in these cases. Id.; see Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983). However, supervisory officials may be held liable in certain circumstances upon a “recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates' misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed to their case.” Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372-73 (4th Cir. 1984)). To establish supervisory liability under § 1983 one must show: (1) the “supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a ‘pervasive and unreasonable risk' of constitutional injury”; (2) the “supervisor's response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show ‘deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices,'”; and (3) there was an “affirmative causal link between the supervisors inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.” Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799 (internal citation omitted).
Defendants also allege that because Plaintiff failed to allege any physical injury, his § 1983 claims should be denied for failure to demonstrate more than a de minimis physical injury. However, Plaintiff does specifically allege he suffered physical injuries, as well as alleging loss of appetite. See ECF No. 1 at 12, 13. Nevertheless, Plaintiff still fails to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants' conduct violated the Eighth Amendment, as described above.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Stirling breached a duty of care owed to him to properly train staff members. ECF No. 1 at 9. However, Plaintiff does not allege Defendant Stirling was in any way involved in or had any knowledge of the alleged violation of Plaintiff's rights. Nor does he allege that any failure on the part of Defendant Stirling to train staff members had any connection to his placement in the RHU. As to Defendant Director Davis, Plaintiff similarly alleges that he failed to correct injuries being asserted by Plaintiff, as well as failed to oversee the training of staff to abate malicious treatment of prisoners. ECF No. 1 at 9-10. Again, Plaintiff provides no factual basis to determine that Defendant Davis had any knowledge or personal involvement in the decision to put Plaintiff in the RHU. As to Defendant Tennant-Craine, Plaintiff alleges she owed him a duty but does not explain how she breached this duty, other than by being negligent. ECF No. 1 at 10. Aside from generally alleging she was negligent, Plaintiff fails to provide any allegations to suggest this Defendant had any involvement whatsoever in his placement in solitary confinement.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Christopher Voll violated his rights by failing to update computer records to show Plaintiff's status as a non-gang member. ECF No. 1 at 10. However, Plaintiff fails to establish that this is the sole reason he was placed in solitary confinement. Indeed, as previously discussed in this R&R, Defendants provided evidence establishing that Plaintiff, at least initially, self-identified as being in a gang (despite his allegation that he disaffiliated from that gang sometime thereafter), and further that he was being investigated for threats to the institution. Accordingly, even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, he fails to allege personal involvement sufficient to establish liability on the part of Defendant Voll. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Warden of BRCI failed to properly oversee “John Doe Officers” to prevent them from creating false and misleading reports. ECF No. 1 at 11. Plaintiff fails to establish that Defendant Warden of BRCI had any knowledge that he was placed in the RHU at PCI, nor does Plaintiff establish that he was deliberately indifferent toward Plaintiff by allegedly failing to ensure other officers updated his disaffiliation with a gang. Similarly, Plaintiff's allegations that Defendant Warden of PCI should have ensured there was a legitimate basis to place him in the RHU aside from his affiliation as a gang member is contradicted by the evidence in the record establishing that the Committee at PCI was investigating Plaintiff for threats. ECF No. 84-4 at 12. As to Defendant John Doe Officers, Plaintiff alleges generally that they falsified institutional records when they placed Plaintiff in a gang-affiliation status. ECF No. 1 at 11. However, the evidence before the undersigned establishes that at least at some point according to his own admission he was affiliated with a gang. Moreover, Plaintiff does not set forth any facts to establish any link between these alleged false records and his placement in the RHU. Finally, as to Defendant STG Board, Plaintiff alleges the board refused to permit his release despite having no evidence available that he should not be in general population, particularly because he had been disciplinary free for nearly two years. ECF No. 1 at 12. Again, the evidence in the record refutes his allegations, as the Committee Forms indicate he had not followed the rules established by the SCDC. Plaintiff provides no argument or support in his Response to support a finding that there is a genuine issue of fact as to these Defendants' personal involvement in placing him in the RHU. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment to Defendants.
g. Injunctive Relief
Finally, Defendants argue that to the extent Plaintiff makes any claim for injunctive relief, this claim must be dismissed. Within Plaintiff's Complaint, he seeks injunctive relief to “protect against unwarranted lockup.” ECF No. 1 at 13. Defendants argue that Plaintiff has wholly failed to make any showing that injunctive relief is appropriate in this case. The standard for a permanent injunction is essentially the same as a preliminary injunction, except that a plaintiff must show actual success on the merits. Smith v. S.C. State Election Comm'n, 901 F.Supp.2d 639, 649 (D.S.C. Oct. 3, 2012). “Preliminary injunctions are extraordinary remedies involving the exercise of very far-reaching power to be granted only sparingly and in limited circumstances.” MicroStrategy Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 245 F.3d 335, 339 (4th Cir. 2001). To establish the need for a preliminary injunction, the party seeking the injunction must show: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The primary purpose of injunctive relief is to preserve the status quo pending a resolution on the merits of a case. See Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980) (quoting Meiselman v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 180 F.2d 94, 97 (4th Cir. 1960)). Here, Plaintiff has failed to make a showing of a likelihood of success on the merits, nor has he made a showing of actual success on the merits. Further, Plaintiff has not alleged that he is likely to suffer any irreparable harm, or any harm beyond his allegations that he has suffered harm while in the RHU. Nor has Plaintiff made a showing that the balance of equities tips in his favor or that any injunctive relief is in the public interest. Therefore, the undersigned recommends denying any request for injunctive relief.
IV. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the reasons explained above, the undersigned recommends granting Defendants' Motion, ECF No. 84, and entering summary judgment in favor of Defendants as to Plaintiff's claims.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. [I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 2317
Florence, South Carolina 29503
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).