Opinion
NO. 5-14-0621
04-13-2017
GEORGIE BUSCH, Individually and as Special Administrator of the Estate of Amber Wood, Deceased Plaintiff-Appellee, v. COUNTRY FINANCIAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE
Decision filed 04/13/17. The text of this decision may be changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Peti ion for Rehearing or the disposition of the same.
NOTICE
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of Madison County. No. 14-MR-100 Honorable Donald M. Flack, Judge, presiding. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the judgment of the court.
Justice Cates specially concurred.
Presiding Justice Moore dissented.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff is affirmed where the insurance company's payment to plaintiff on the uninsured limits of plaintiff's individual policy did not negate liability on a separate policy issued to plaintiff and plaintiff's deceased daughter. ¶ 2 This appeal is taken from the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, Georgie Busch, and against defendant, Country Financial Insurance Company (Country Mutual). The trial court found that Country Mutual's payment to plaintiff under an insurance policy issued solely to plaintiff did not negate Country Mutual's liability on a separate policy issued to plaintiff and plaintiff's deceased daughter after finding an ambiguity in the provisions of the policies. We affirm.
The circuit court entered an order on May 30, 2014, correcting the misnomer of Country Financial and ordering that the defendant shall be designated as Country Mutual in all subsequent pleadings. --------
¶ 3 BACKGROUND
¶ 4 The following facts are not in dispute. Plaintiff is the mother of Amber Wood. On April 27, 2012, at approximately 1:49 a.m., 23-year-old Amber was killed by a speeding hit and run driver as she attempted to cross South Broadway in St. Louis, Missouri. At the time of the accident, plaintiff and Amber were insured under the following two insurance policies issued by Country Mutual:
"a. Policy no. A12A8077880
Uninsured limits: $100,000
Named insureds: Georgie Busch and Amber Wood
Insured vehicle: 2001 Ford Focus (primary driver Amber Wood)
b. Policy no. A12A3259332
¶ 5 Following Amber's accident, plaintiff, individually and as special administrator of the estate of Amber Wood, deceased, sought uninsured motorist coverage pursuant to the two policies. The parties stipulated there was no question of liability and that the total amount of damages for wrongful death met or exceeded $350,000, which is the total combined uninsured limits of the two policies. On or about July 24, 2014, Country Mutual paid the $250,000 uninsured limits under the policy listing plaintiff as the sole named insured. The parties do not dispute that Country Mutual has no further obligation to plaintiff concerning the uninsured motorist benefits under that policy. However, Country Mutual denied plaintiff, as the special administrator of Amber's estate, coverage under the policy listing plaintiff and Amber as the named insureds with uninsured motorist limits of $100,000. ¶ 6 The parties subsequently filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Country Mutual asserted that the $250,000 it had already paid plaintiff was the maximum amount it was obligated to pay in relation to Amber's accident under both policies pursuant to the policy provisions. Plaintiff argued she was entitled to $100,000 as the special administrator of Amber's estate in addition to the $250,000 she had received individually under her own policy since Amber paid a separate premium on a separate policy and it was stipulated that the total amount of damages met or exceeded $350,000. ¶ 7 On November 20, 2014, after briefing the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted plaintiff's motion and denied Country Mutual's motion after finding an ambiguity in the provisions of Country Mutual's policies. The court determined this ambiguity must be resolved in favor of plaintiff, and its order provided that plaintiff was entitled to $100,000 under the subject policy in addition to the $250,000 plaintiff had received under her individual policy. On December 19, 2014, Country Mutual timely filed its notice of appeal.Uninsured limits: $250,000
Named insured: Georgie Busch
Insured vehicle: 2003 Infiniti (primary driver Georgie Busch)"
¶ 8 ANALYSIS
¶ 9 The issue raised on appeal is whether the uninsured limits to the two insurance policies issued by Country Mutual to plaintiff and Amber may be aggregated. Country Mutual alleges the trial court erred in refusing to enforce the unambiguous antistacking clauses of the two policies. In contrast, plaintiff contends the trial court's finding of an ambiguity in the policies' provisions was correct, and, therefore, the court's order directing Country Mutual to pay plaintiff, as special administrator of Amber's estate, an additional $100,000 should be affirmed. Plaintiff asserts Country Mutual's prior payment to plaintiff under the policy issued solely to plaintiff does not negate Country Mutual's liability on the separate policy issued to plaintiff and Amber. For the following reasons, we agree with plaintiff and affirm the judgment of the trial court. ¶ 10 As previously stated, this appeal is taken from the trial court's grant of a summary judgment in favor of plaintiff and against Country Mutual. Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2012). When parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, they agree that only a question of law is involved and the court should decide the issue based on the record. Millennium Park Joint Venture, LLC v. Houlihan, 241 Ill. 2d 281, 309, 948 N.E.2d 1, 18 (2010). We apply de novo review to both the court's summary judgment ruling and to the extent we construct the terms of the insurance policies. Pekin Insurance Co. v. Wilson, 237 Ill. 2d 446, 455, 930 N.E.2d 1011, 1016 (2010). ¶ 11 When a court construes an insurance policy, the agreement is to be enforced as written provided that it is unambiguous and only to the extent it does not contravene public policy. Johnson v. Davis, 377 Ill. App. 3d 602, 606-07, 883 N.E.2d 521, 526 (2007). In general, antistacking clauses do not contravene public policy. Johnson, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 607, 883 N.E.2d at 526. Moreover, the Illinois Insurance Code expressly authorizes the use of antistacking provisions in motor vehicle insurance policies. 215 ILCS 5/143a-2(5) (West 2012). However, any ambiguity must be construed in favor of the insured. Johnson, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 607, 883 N.E.2d at 526-27. ¶ 12 In determining whether an ambiguity exists, the provisions of an insurance contract must be read together and not in isolation. Johnson, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 607, 883 N.E.2d at 527. Policy provisions are considered ambiguous if they are subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. Johnson, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 607, 883 N.E.2d at 527. Reasonableness is essential, and the benchmark is whether the provision is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, not whether creative possibilities can be suggested. Johnson, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 607, 883 N.E.2d at 527. ¶ 13 Here, plaintiff and Amber purchased two insurance policies from Country Mutual. The first policy, policy No. A12A8077880, lists plaintiff and Amber as the named insureds and includes uninsured motorist limits of $100,000. The second policy, policy No. A12A3258332, lists only plaintiff as the named insured and includes uninsured motorist limits of $250,000. Each policy contains, in relevant part, the following language in section 2 of the policies, which specifically concerns uninsured-underinsured motorists coverage:
"2. Limits of Liability. The Uninsured-Underinsured Motorists limits of liability shown on the declarations page apply as follows:
* * *
b. Subject to the limit for 'each person,' the limit for 'each occurrence' is the maximum amount we will pay for bodily injury sustained by two or more persons in any one accident.
The figure listed is the most we will pay for bodily injury sustained by two or more persons in any one accident regardless of the number of insureds, claims made, insured vehicles, premiums shown on the declarations page, or uninsured or underinsured motor vehicles involved in the accident.
* * *
4. Other Insurance. If there is other applicable uninsured-underinsured motorists insurance that covers a loss, we will pay our proportionate share of that loss. Our share is the proportion our limits of liability bear to the total of all applicable limits. However, in the case of motor vehicles you do not own, this policy will be excess and will apply only in the amount our limit of liability exceeds the sum of the applicable limits of liability of all other applicable insurance. We will pay only after all other applicable liability limits have been paid.
* * *
6. Payment of Loss. Any amount due under the provisions in this Section of the policy is payable:
¶ 14 A plain reading of this portion of the policies indicates Country Mutual contemplated situations in which more than one insurance policy may apply to a single occurrence. Specifically, the "Other Insurance" clause provides that Country Mutual will pay its proportionate share of a loss where there is other applicable uninsured-underinsured motorist insurance covering that loss. ¶ 15 Here, plaintiff is seeking uninsured motorist coverage of $100,000 as the special administrator of Amber's estate under the policy issued to plaintiff and Amber, in addition to the $250,000 plaintiff received under plaintiff's individual policy. As previously indicated, the damages of plaintiff and Amber's estate exceed all applicable policy limits. As the trial court noted, the plain language of the "Other Insurance" clause indicates Amber's estate is covered under the policy issued to plaintiff and Amber given the stipulated damages and that more than one insurance policy may apply to a single occurrence. ¶ 16 However, Country Mutual alleges the trial court erred in refusing to enforce the unambiguous antistacking clauses contained in the "General Policy Conditions" portion of the policies. The antistacking clause Country Mutual refers to provides:a. to the insured; or
b. if the insured is a minor, to the insured's parent or guardian; or
c. if the insured is deceased, to the insured's surviving spouse; or
d. to a person authorized by law to receive such payment, or to a person who is legally entitled to recover damages which the payment represents.
We maintain the option to pay any amount due under this section of the policy in accordance with paragraph 'd' above." (Emphasis in original.)
"8. Other Vehicle Insurance with Us. If this policy and any other vehicle insurance policy issued to you or a relative by one of our companies apply to the same accident, the maximum limit of our liability under all the policies will not exceed the highest applicable limit of liability under any one policy."¶ 17 Country Mutual indicates the policies define "you" as the person named on the declaration page and that person's spouse if the spouse is a resident of the same household. Country Mutual further indicates "relative" is defined as a person related to "you" as defined above, who resides in the same household as "you." Country Mutual then points out that both policies have plaintiff named on the declaration page, while Amber is named on the declaration page of the $100,000 limit policy. From these facts, and because it has been stipulated that Amber was a "relative" who lived in the same household to which both policies were issued, Country Mutual argues the clear language of the "Other Vehicle Insurance with Us" clause provides that the maximum limit of uninsured motorist liability cannot be higher than any one of the two policies, which in this case is the $250,000 limit Country Mutual already paid plaintiff. ¶ 18 Further, Country Mutual indicates section 2 of the policies, which expressly pertains to uninsured motorist coverage, explicitly refers to the general conditions of the policy in its terms and incorporates those conditions into section 2. Specifically, section 2 provides:
"Conditions, Section 2
In addition to the following conditions, all General Policy Conditions listed at the back of this policy also apply to Section 2."¶ 19 Relying on this exclusionary language, Country Mutual alleges the trial court erred in refusing to enforce the unambiguous antistacking clauses of the policies. Country Mutual asserts this court should reverse the trial court's order directing it to pay plaintiff, as special administrator of Amber's estate, an additional $100,000 pursuant to the policy issued to plaintiff and Amber because it already paid plaintiff $250,000 under plaintiff's individual policy. We disagree. ¶ 20 An insurance policy is construed by ascertaining and giving effect to the parties' intent as expressed in the policy language. Burcham v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Co., 2011 IL App (2d) 101035, ¶ 11, 961 N.E.2d 453. A policy provision purporting to exclude or limit coverage is to be read narrowly and applies only where its terms are clear, definite, and specific. Gillen v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 215 Ill. 2d 381, 393, 830 N.E.2d 575, 582 (2005). We reiterate that where such a provision is ambiguous, it will be construed liberally in favor of coverage. Founders Insurance Co. v. Munoz, 237 Ill. 2d 424, 433, 930 N.E.2d 999, 1004 (2010). ¶ 21 After careful review of the insurance policies at issue, we find there is a conflict creating an ambiguity when the "Other Insurance" clause is compared to the "Other Vehicle Insurance with Us" clause. While the "Other Vehicle Insurance with Us" clause attempts to limit Country Mutual's liability to the highest limit of a single policy, the "Other Insurance" clause directly states that Country Mutual will pay its proportionate share of a loss if there is applicable uninsured motorist insurance covering that loss. ¶ 22 Here, Country Mutual sold two separate policies of automobile insurance to plaintiff and Amber, as evidenced by the two separate declaration sheets containing differing limits of uninsured motorist coverage, differently assigned policy numbers, and different premiums amounts. Therefore, since it is agreed that the damages of plaintiff and Amber's estate exceed all applicable policy limits, we find plaintiff is entitled to the policy limits at issue. Although the "Other Vehicle Insurance with Us" clause supports Country Mutual's position, this clause is not to be read in isolation. We do not find this is a case in which one must be creative to find an ambiguity. Even assuming the antistacking clause is applicable, Country Mutual's policies contain inconsistent provisions which we must construe in favor of the insured. ¶ 23 It is relevant that plaintiff is not seeking additional uninsured motorist coverage in her individual capacity, but as the special administrator of Amber's estate on a separate policy which lists Amber as a named insured. Here, Country Mutual sold two separate insurance policies to plaintiff and Amber, as evidenced by the two separate declaration sheets containing differing limits of uninsured motorist coverage, differently assigned policy numbers, and different premiums amounts. ¶ 24 With this in mind, plaintiff is merely seeking coverage for the "each person" limit under section 2 of the policies. The $250,000 that plaintiff claimed in her individual capacity under her individual policy does not prevent Amber's estate from claiming the $100,000 policy limits under the separate policy listing Amber as a named insured. It is of no consequence that plaintiff is the individual making the $100,000 claim under Amber's policy; plaintiff is making the claim as the special administrator of Amber's estate rather than in her individual capacity. ¶ 25 Further, we find no reason to focus on the "Other Vehicle Insurance with Us" clause contained outside the uninsured motorist section of the policy and ignore the "Other Insurance" clause expressly contained within the uninsured motorist section. It is a well-settled principle of contract construction that when a contract contains both general and specific provisions concerning the same subject, the specific provision controls. Skidmore v. Throgmorton, 323 Ill. App. 3d 417, 426, 751 N.E.2d 637, 644 (2001). ¶ 26 Here, the "Other Insurance" provision is specifically provided under section 2 concerning uninsured motorists coverage, whereas the "Other Vehicle Insurance with Us" provision is stated under the "General Policy Conditions" portion of the policies. While section 2 makes reference to the general policy conditions, the clause lending support to Country Mutual's position is expressly stated under the "General Policy Conditions" section. Therefore, since both provisions concern uninsured motorists coverage, we find the specific provision "Other Insurance" controls over the general provision "Other Vehicle Insurance with Us." As previously noted, the "Other Insurance" clause directly states that Country Mutual will pay its proportionate share of a loss if there is applicable uninsured motorist insurance covering that loss. Accordingly, we find plaintiff is entitled to the coverage limits at issue on behalf of Amber's estate. ¶ 27 Country Mutual further argues a virtually identical provision to the "Other Vehicle Insurance with Us" clause has been addressed and found unambiguous by our supreme court in Bruder v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 156 Ill. 2d 179, 620 N.E.2d 355 (1993). Therefore, Country Mutual asserts this antistacking clause should be similarly found unambiguous and enforced as written. We disagree. ¶ 28 In Bruder, our supreme court considered whether a plaintiff should be allowed to stack uninsured motorists coverage on two vehicles set forth on a single automobile policy issued by Country Mutual. Bruder held there was no ambiguity when the antistacking clause was read in conjunction with the declarations page because the limit of the uninsured motorists coverage was set forth only one time on the declarations page instead of two times. The Bruder court further discussed what would happen if the uninsured motorists coverage was set forth two times on the declarations page, one adjacent to each insured vehicle, stating:
"It would not be difficult to find an ambiguity created by such a listing of the bodily injury liability limit for each person insured. *** There would be little to suggest in such a listing that the parties intended that coverage was to be limited to that provided for only one of the two pickup trucks. It would be more reasonable to assume that the parties intended that, in return for the two premiums, two *** coverage amounts were afforded." Bruder, 156 Ill. 2d at 192, 620 N.E.2d at 362.¶ 29 In contrast to Bruder, the two policies in the instant case set forth separate uninsured motorists coverage limits, once for plaintiff's individual policy and once for the policy issued to plaintiff and Amber. Unlike Bruder, where the single policy was covered by a single declaration page, here there are two separate policies with two separate declarations sheets containing different policy numbers and different premium amounts. This is not a case which involves the stacking of liability limits under a single policy. Plaintiff, acting in the capacity of the special administrator to Amber's estate, is merely seeking the benefit of what was purchased under the policy issued to plaintiff and Amber to which Amber paid a premium. ¶ 30 Since Bruder was decided, Country Mutual has changed its clause to include policies held by "relatives." We note that Amber fits the policy definition of "relative." However, after careful review of the policy language, we find this antistacking clause only prevents Amber's estate from making a duplicate claim under plaintiff's individual policy to which plaintiff has received $250,000. Considering it is stipulated that the damages meet or exceed $350,000, we find no reason why the antistacking clause would prevent Amber's estate from making a claim against Amber's separate policy for $100,000. Country Mutual's payment of $250,000 to plaintiff under plaintiff's individual policy does not prevent Amber's estate from making a separate claim for $100,000 under Amber's separate policy to which Amber paid a separate premium. As the trial court noted, to do so would permit Country Mutual to collect premiums for multiple policies from multiple related household members but be liable only under the single largest policy, resulting in a windfall for Country Mutual and an unjust result for its insureds. ¶ 31 Our supreme court addressed a similar issue in Glidden v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Ass'n, 57 Ill. 2d 330, 312 N.E.2d 247 (1974). In Glidden, the court discussed the effect "other insurance" clauses had on an insurer's attempt to bar the insured's recovery of more than the limit expressed in one policy when the insured paid for three separate automobile policies from a single insurer. The court stated:
"When an insured purchases three distinct policies from an insurer, each providing the specified coverage, and pays a separate premium for each, does he reasonably contemplate that the 'other insurance' clauses therein are effective to reduce his recovery to what he would have obtained under one policy? We think not. The apparent purpose of 'other insurance' clauses is to make certain that one company does not pay a disproportionate amount of a loss which is to be shared with another company. There is no purpose in proration unless the 'other insurance' is written by another company. The clause has no meaningful purpose when applied to coverage issued by one company to one insured. In this situation its meaning is ambiguous, and the clause should be construed in favor of the insured. [Citations.]" Glidden, 57 Ill. 2d at 336, 312 N.E.2d at 250.¶ 32 The court further noted:
"It is true that an insured might end up in a case such as this in a better situation than if the wrongdoer had been insured to the minimum requirements of the Financial Responsibility Law. That, however, is not material as long as he pays for the coverage. The insured is better off because he paid additional premiums. If there is to be a 'windfall' in this situation, it should be to the insured, who paid the several premiums, rather to the insurer, which collected them. [Citation.]" Glidden, 57 Ill. 2d at 336-37, 312 N.E.2d at 250-51.¶ 33 Accordingly, we find that the trial court's decision granting plaintiff, as special administrator of Amber's estate, $100,000 pursuant to the policy issued to plaintiff and Amber, in addition to the $250,000 already paid by Country Mutual to plaintiff under plaintiff's individual policy, was correct.
¶ 34 CONCLUSION
¶ 35 As it is stipulated that plaintiff's and Amber's damages exceed all applicable insurance policies, we find plaintiff is entitled to receive the uninsured policy limits at issue as the administrator of Amber's estate pursuant to the plain language of the "Other Insurance" clause in section 2 of the policies. The antistacking clause on which Country Mutual relies creates an ambiguity that must be resolved in favor of the insured. Here, Amber paid a premium on a policy which covers the loss at issue, namely uninsured motorists insurance. Accordingly, Amber's estate is entitled to receive the uninsured limits of $100,000 under the policy issued to plaintiff and Amber. ¶ 36 For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Madison County. ¶ 37 Affirmed. ¶ 38 JUSTICE CATES, specially concurring: ¶ 39 I agree with that portion of the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Georgie Busch, as special administrator of the estate of Amber Wood, deceased. I would, however, vacate that portion of the trial court's order granting summary judgment to Georgie Busch, individually. I write separately to clarify the determinative issue before this court, which is the legal posture of the party requesting the uninsured benefits. It is undisputed, as set forth in the trial court's order of November 20, 2014, that the parties to this litigation stipulated that "the total damages for her claim for wrongful death exceed $350,000. [Stip. of Fact, ¶ 4]." It is also undisputed that there were two insurance policies in effect at the time of Amber Wood's death. The first policy had an uninsured benefit of $250,000. Georgie Busch was the only named insured in that policy. Country Mutual Insurance Company paid the $250,000 in uninsured benefits to Georgie Busch, individually, under her individual policy of insurance. Country Mutual's reasons for making this payment to Georgie Busch, individually, are not apparent. There are, however, a multitude of reasons why Georgie Busch, as the mother of Amber Wood, might be entitled to such a payment for her individual damages. ¶ 40 The second insurance policy had an uninsured benefit of $100,000. Georgie Busch and Amber Wood were the named insureds in this policy. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the coverage issue. Georgie Busch sought payment of the $100,000 in her individual capacity, and as special administrator of the estate of Amber Wood, deceased. The appointment of a special administrator for the purpose of prosecuting the wrongful death of a decedent is found in section 2.1 of the Illinois Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/2.1 (West 2014)). A wrongful death action can only be filed by a representative of the decedent on behalf of the estate. Nagel v. Inman, 402 Ill. App. 3d 766, 770, 931 N.E.2d 1264, 1267 (2010). There is no proper plaintiff if the next of kin of a decedent sues in his or her individual capacity. Nagel, 402 Ill. App. 3d at 770, 931 N.E.2d at 1267. ¶ 41 In this case, Georgie Busch is acting on her own behalf, and as special administrator of the estate of Amber Wood. There are, in essence, two distinct legal persons acting as plaintiffs. Country Mutual paid Georgie Busch $250,000 in her individual capacity. This payment, however, did not prevent Georgie Busch, as special administrator of the estate of Amber Wood, from seeking the $100,000 in uninsured benefits under a separate policy listing Amber Wood and Georgie Busch as the named insureds. Georgie Busch's individual claim is separate and distinct from the claim brought by the special administrator of the estate under the Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/1 (West 2014)). As such, stacking is not implicated in the special administrator's claim because there has been no payment to the estate by Country Mutual. In contrast, the claim made by Georgie Busch, individually, for the $100,000 in uninsured benefits under the second policy would constitute impermissible stacking under Grzeszczak v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 168 Ill. 2d 216, 659 N.E.2d 952 (1995). Accordingly, I would vacate that portion of the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Georgie Busch, individually, and affirm that portion of the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Georgie Busch, as special administrator of the estate of Amber Wood. ¶ 42 PRESIDING JUSTICE MOORE, dissenting: ¶ 43 I respectfully dissent because I believe the terms of the insurance policies at issue are unambiguous and must be enforced as written in accordance with Illinois law. In construing the language of an insurance policy, our primary objective is "to ascertain and give effect to the intentions of the parties as expressed by the words of the policy." Central Illinois Light Co. v. Home Insurance Co., 213 Ill. 2d 141, 153, 821 N.E.2d 206, 213 (2004). We construe the policy as a whole, giving effect to every provision. Id. Where the words used in the policy are clear and unambiguous, we afford them their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning. Id. Ambiguous policy terms that limit an insurer's liability will be liberally construed in favor of coverage. Hobbs v. Hartford Insurance Co. of the Midwest, 214 Ill. 2d 11, 17, 823 N.E.2d 561, 564 (2005). However, ambiguity exists in an insurance contract only if the language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, and we should not strain to find an ambiguity where none exists. Id. ¶ 44 Here, the plaintiff and Amber purchased two insurance policies from Country Mutual. The first policy, policy No. A12A8077880, lists the plaintiff and Amber as the named insureds and includes uninsured motorist limits of $100,000. The second policy, policy No. A12A3258332, lists only the plaintiff as the named insured and includes uninsured motorist limits of $250,000. Each policy contains, in relevant part, the following language:
"General Policy Conditions¶ 45 Our Illinois Supreme Court has held that an antistacking provision nearly identical to the one at issue was unambiguous and did not violate public policy. Grzeszczak v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 168 Ill. 2d 216, 220, 659 N.E.2d 952, 955 (1995). The policy at issue unambiguously states that the General Policy Conditions are applicable to uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. Nevertheless, the circuit court refused to apply the provision because it found that it conflicted with paragraph 4 of the conditions stated in the uninsured/underinsured coverage section of the policy, thus creating an ambiguity to be construed against Country Mutual. My colleagues agree that such an ambiguity exists, but when the relevant provisions are read together, it is clear that each provision applies to a different situation. Paragraph 4 states as follows:
8. Other Vehicle Insurance with Us. If this policy and any other vehicle insurance policy issued to you or a relative by one of our companies apply to the same accident, the maximum limit of our liability under all the policies will not exceed the highest applicable limit of liability under any one policy."
"4. Other Insurance. If there is other applicable uninsured-underinsured motorists insurance that covers a loss, we will pay our proportionate share of that loss. Our share is the proportion our limits of liability bear to the total of all applicable limits. However, in the case of motor vehicles you do not own, this policy will be excess and will apply only in the amount our limit of liability exceeds the sum of the applicable limits of liability of all other applicable insurance. We will pay only after all other applicable liability limits have been paid."¶ 46 The circuit court found, and my colleagues agree, that because this "Other Insurance" provision does not clearly limit itself to insurance issued by other companies, an ambiguity exists as to which provision to apply in the case at bar. I disagree and would adopt the reasoning of our colleagues in the Second District in American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Martin, 312 Ill. App. 3d 829, 833, 728 N.E.2d 115, 118 (2000). Reading both provisions together, I would find that it is clear that the "Other Vehicle Insurance with Us" provision applies where two or more vehicles belonging to the same insured are covered by policies issued by Country Mutual, and the "Other Insurance" provision refers only to a situation where a different policy issued by a different company applies. Id. If the "Other Insurance" provision were intended to refer to other policies issued by Country Mutual, there would be no need to refer to a proportionate share; Country Mutual's proportionate share of liability would always be 100%. Id. "Moreover, reading the ['O]ther [I]nsurance['] clause in this fashion would render the antistacking provision meaningless." Id. Accordingly, I would find that each clause applies to a different situation, and the antistacking clause is simply not ambiguous. ¶ 47 Our Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Bruder v. Country Insurance Co., 156 Ill. 2d 179, 620 N.E.2d 355 (1993), provides further support for this reasoning. While in Bruder, the antistacking provision was applied to prevent stacking uninsured motorist coverage on two vehicles set forth on a single automobile policy (id. at 189, 620 N.E.2d at 360), I find this to be a distinction without a difference. Although the two vehicles were covered under the same policy, two separate premiums were paid, as in the case at bar. Id. With regard to the "premium rule," the Illinois Supreme Court held that antistacking provisions do not per se violate this rule, whether it be for coverage afforded under separate vehicles under one policy or separate policies. Id. at 184, 620 N.E.2d at 358. Instead, Bruder affirmed that it is the law in Illinois that an insurer is entitled to the enforcement of unambiguous antstacking provisions to the extent that such provisions represent terms to which the parties have agreed to be bound. Id. at 185-86, 620 N.E.2d at 359. As explained above, I find these conditions are met in the case at bar. For these reasons, I would find that the circuit court erred in granting a summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff and in denying Country Mutual's motion for a summary judgment. I would reverse the circuit court's summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff and would remand with directions that a summary judgment be entered in favor of Country Mutual.