Opinion
June 15, 1967.
September 15, 1967.
Workmen's Compensation — Evidence — Effect of accident on pre-existing condition — Finding of fact or question of law — Judicial review — Credibility of witnesses and weight of testimony — Power of court below to remand case — Direction to consider testimony of witness previously considered and rejected.
1. In workmen's compensation cases, whether an accident has an effect on a pre-existing condition is a question of fact and not a conclusion of law.
2. A finding by the board which relates to a fact and not to the law is not reviewable by the courts, if supported by competent evidence, whether it is designated a finding of fact or a conclusion.
3. The limit of the power of the lower court in reviewing a finding of fact by the board is a determination of the question as to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the fact found by the board.
4. The court below exceeds its power when it remands a case to the board with a direction to specifically consider the testimony of a witness which the board has previously considered and rejected.
5. Where the board accepts certain testimony in making a finding of fact and in refusing compensation, its finding of fact is conclusive, regardless of whether claimant's medical testimony would have justified a contrary finding sufficient to support an award.
6. In workmen's compensation cases, the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of their testimony are exclusively for the board.
7. In this case, in which it appeared that the board found that the employe's accident had no effect on the growth of a pre-existing cancer and did not accelerate his subsequent death, it was Held that the board did not capriciously disregard competent evidence, and that the orders of the court below reversing the board and remanding the case should be reversed.
Before ERVIN, P.J., WRIGHT, WATKINS, MONTGOMERY, JACOBS, HOFFMAN, and SPAULDING, JJ.
Appeals, Nos. 123 and 124, Oct. T., 1967, from order of Court of Common Pleas No. 4 of Philadelphia County, June T., 1964, No. 4409, and from order of Court of Common Pleas No. 7, June T., 1964, No. 4410, in cases of Atlane Lewis Burke v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp.; and Claudia Burke v. Same. Orders reversed.
Appeals by claimants from decisions of Workmen's Compensation Board refusing awards.
Orders entered sustaining appeals and remanding records to Board, opinion by GREENBERG, J. Defendant appealed.
John W. Wellman, with him Chadwick, Petrikin, Smithers Ginsburg, for appellant.
Joseph Hakun, with him Sheer Mazzocone, for appellees.
Argued: June 15, 1967.
These two appeals arise from companion claims for workmen's compensation filed by dependents on account of the death of Dennis Burke. The decedent was injured on September 4, 1956, while employed by the Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corporation, appellant, when a steel ring from a nearby machine flew off, striking his legs, which resulted in the traumatic amputation of his right leg at the knee and a fracture of the left femur. He died May 8, 1957, from a carcinoma of the rectum. The Workmen's Compensation Board found as a fact and also concluded "that the accident had no effect on the growth of the decedent's pre-existing cancer and did not accelerate his death on May 8, 1957", and denied compensation to the present appellees. On appeal to the Common Pleas Court by the claimants that court considered the aforesaid quoted statement as a conclusion of law and not as a finding of fact, reversed it and remanded the case to the Board for a re-determination based on all the evidence, including that of Dr. Salvadore Meshon who had been called by the claimants.
Whether an accident has an effect on a pre-existing condition is a question of fact and not a conclusion of law. However, regardless of whether it is designated a finding of fact or a conclusion, if it relates to a fact and not to the law, it is not reviewable by the courts if supported by competent evidence. Vorbnoff v. Mesta Machine Co., 286 Pa. 199, 133 A. 256 (1926); Pudlosky v. Follmer Trucking Company, 206 Pa. Super. 450, 214 A.2d 270 (1965). The limit of the lower court's power in this matter was a determination of the question as to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the facts found by the Board. It exceeded its power when it remanded the case to the Board with a direction to specifically consider the testimony of Dr. Meshon, which had previously been considered by it and rejected.
In support of its finding that there was no causal connection between the accident and the death there was an abundance of testimony given by three medical doctors, Dr. William A. Frazier, Dr. Edgar L. Ralston, and Dr. Richard C. Taylor, respectively a surgeon, orthopedic surgeon, and a pathologist. Dr. Frazier and Dr. Ralston had treated the decedent for his accidental injuries and Dr. Taylor had performed the autopsy.
Dr. Meshon, a general surgeon, had never seen the patient alive and testified from a twenty to twenty-five minute review of decedent's medical records on the day of the hearing before the compensation referee, October 13, 1959. Dr. Meshon's testimony was that the accident "played a part" in the death in a chain reaction manner. The testimony of Dr. Meshon was not acceptable to the Board because, as stated in its opinion, "Dr. Meshon's testimony fails to provide the unequivocal testimony of causation or acceleration of death that the Act requires and thus falls short of the standard of proof demanded by the law in such cases" and, "In addition, it is difficult to equate the opinion of a medical expert who never saw the patient alive and whose only knowledge of his history was a twenty to twenty-five minute examination of his medical records, with that of a general surgeon and an orthopedic surgeon, both of whom had attended him for several months prior to his death. We cannot ignore the superior opportunity of Dr. Frazier and Dr. Ralston to evaluate the condition of the decedent. Further, the testimony of the pathologist, Dr. Taylor, was supporting."
The testimony accepted by the Board in refusing compensation is conclusive of the question regardless of whether claimants' medical testimony would have justified contrary findings sufficient to support an award. Bonzani v. Hillman Coal Coke Company, 150 Pa. Super. 356, 28 A. 329 (1942); and we find no capricious disregard of competent evidence. The credibility of the witnesses and the weight of their testimony were exclusively for the Board.
The orders of the court below are reversed and the orders of the Board are reinstated; and
The motion ex parte appellee to quash these appeals is refused.