Opinion
Civil Action 2:23-cv-76
08-12-2024
JOSE BURGOS-RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, NURSE DRURY, NURSE GRIMES, and DOES 1 & 2, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
BENJAMIN W. CHEESBRO, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Defendants United States of America, Drury, and Grimes filed Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. Doc. 18. I directed Plaintiff to file a response to the Motion within 14 days of the May 14, 2024 Order and advised Plaintiff his lack of response would indicate his lack of opposition. Doc. 19. Plaintiff filed for two extensions to respond, which I granted in part. Docs. 21, 22, 24, 26. Plaintiff still has not filed a response, and the extended time to do so has elapsed. As discussed below in further detail, I RECOMMEND the Court GRANT as unopposed Defendants' Motion, DISMISS without prejudice Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to follow this Court's Orders, DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case and enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal, and DENY Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. I also RECOMMEND the Court DENY as moot Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment. Doc. 17.
Plaintiff never provided the identities of the two Doe Defendants, nor have these two Defendants appeared. Even so, this Recommendation applies equally to Plaintiff's claims against the Doe Defendants.
A “district court can only dismiss an action on its own motion as long as the procedure employed is fair .... To employ fair procedure, a district court must generally provide the plaintiff with notice of its intent to dismiss or an opportunity to respond.” Tazoe v. Airbus S.A.S., 631 F.3d 1321, 1336 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation provides such notice and opportunity to respond. See Shivers v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local Union, 349, 262 Fed.Appx. 121, 125, 127 (11th Cir. 2008) (indicating a party has notice of a district court's intent to sua sponte grant summary judgment where a magistrate judge issues a report recommending the sua sponte granting of summary judgment); Anderson v. Dunbar Armored, Inc., 678 F.Supp.2d 1280, 1296 (N.D.Ga. 2009) (noting report and recommendation served as notice claims would be sua sponte dismissed). This Report and Recommendation constitutes fair notice to Plaintiff his suit is due to be dismissed. As indicated below, Plaintiff will have the opportunity to present his objections to this finding, and the presiding district judge will review de novo properly submitted objections. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72; see also Glover v. Williams, No. 1:12-CV-3562, 2012 WL 5930633, at *1 (N.D.Ga. Oct. 18, 2012) (explaining magistrate judge's report and recommendation constituted adequate notice and petitioner's opportunity to file objections provided a reasonable opportunity to respond).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brought this cause of action under the Federal Tort Claims Act and Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Doc. 1. Because Plaintiff paid the requisite filing fee, service of his Complaint was his responsibility. See Docs. 7, 11, 13, 15. On May 8, 2024, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss, arguing Plaintiff's claim against the United States is barred under the Inmate Accident Compensation Act, Plaintiff failed to serve the Defendants, Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies on his Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiff fails to set forth a viable Eighth Amendment claim, and the individually named Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Doc. 18.
The Court issued an Order on May 14, 2024, informing Plaintiff Defendants had moved to dismiss his cause of action and ordering Plaintiff to file a response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss within 14 days of that Order. Doc. 19. The Court cautioned Plaintiff his failure to file a timely response would indicate he does not oppose the Motion and lead to the dismissal of certain claims or the entire cause of action. Id. at 1. In addition, the Clerk of Court re-mailed this Court's Order to Plaintiff on May 22, 2024, after Plaintiff informed the Court of his new address, and Plaintiff still had not responded to this Court's Order or the Motion to Dismiss. Doc. 20; dkt. entry dated May 22, 2024. There is nothing before the Court indicating this Order or Defendants' Motion to Dismiss failed to reach Plaintiff. However, these 14 days elapsed with no response. Plaintiff then moved for a 14-day extension to respond to the Motion to Dismiss, which the Court granted on June 18, 2024. Docs. 21, 22. Plaintiff moved for another extension of time to respond to the Motion to Dismiss. Doc. 24. I granted in part this motion and allowed Plaintiff until July 26, 2024, to file his response. Doc. 26. There is nothing indicating this Order was returned as undeliverable or did not reach Plaintiff. This extended time has elapsed, and Plaintiff still has not filed a response.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff has not responded to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or the Court's May 14, June 18, and July 12, 2024 Orders. The Court must now determine how to address Plaintiff's failure to comply with this Court's Orders. For the reasons set forth below, I RECOMMEND the Court DISMISS without prejudice Plaintiff's Complaint and DENY Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
I. Dismissal for Failure to Follow This Court's Orders
A district court may dismiss a plaintiff's claims sua sponte pursuant to either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) or the court's inherent authority to manage its docket. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962); Coleman v. St. Lucie Cnty. Jail, 433 Fed.Appx. 716, 718 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) and Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V MONADA, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005)). In particular, Rule 41(b) allows for the involuntary dismissal of a plaintiff's claims where he has failed to prosecute those claims, comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or local rules, or follow a court order. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b); see also Coleman, 433 Fed.Appx. at 718; Sanders v. Barrett, No. 05-12660, 2005 WL 2640979, at *1 (11th Cir. Oct. 17, 2005) (citing Kilgo v. Ricks, 983 F.2d 189, 192 (11th Cir. 1993)); cf. Local R. 41.1(b) (“[T]he assigned Judge may, after notice to counsel of record, sua sponte . . . dismiss any action for want of prosecution, with or without prejudice[,] . . . [based on] willful disobedience or neglect of any order of the Court.” (emphasis omitted)). Additionally, a district court's “power to dismiss is an inherent aspect of its authority to enforce its orders and ensure prompt disposition of lawsuits.” Brown v. Tallahassee Police Dep't, 205 Fed.Appx. 802, 802 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Jones v. Graham, 709 F.2d 1457, 1458 (11th Cir. 1983)).
In Wabash, the Court held a trial court may dismiss an action for failure to prosecute “even without affording notice of its intention to do so.” 370 U.S. at 633. Nonetheless, in the case at hand, the Court advised Plaintiff his failure to respond to the Motion to Dismiss or the Court's Order could result in dismissal of this action. Doc. 19 at 1.
It is true dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute is a “sanction . . . to be utilized only in extreme situations” and requires a court to “(1) conclud[e] a clear record of delay or willful contempt exists; and (2) mak[e] an implicit or explicit finding that lesser sanctions would not suffice.” Thomas v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 170 Fed.Appx. 623, 625-26 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Morewitz v. West of Eng. Ship Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass'n (Lux.), 62 F.3d 1356, 1366 (11th Cir. 1995)); see also Taylor v. Spaziano, 251 Fed.Appx. 616, 619 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Morewitz, 62 F.3d at 1366). By contrast, dismissal without prejudice for failure to prosecute is not an adjudication on the merits, and, therefore, courts are afforded greater discretion in dismissing claims in this manner. Taylor, 251 Fed.Appx. at 619; see also Coleman, 433 Fed.Appx. at 719; Brown, 205 Fed.Appx. at 802-03.
While the Court exercises its discretion to dismiss cases with caution, dismissal of this action without prejudice is warranted. See Coleman, 433 Fed.Appx. at 719 (upholding dismissal without prejudice for failure to prosecute § 1983 complaint where plaintiff did not respond to court order to supply defendant's current address for purpose of service); Taylor, 251 Fed.Appx. at 620-21 (upholding dismissal without prejudice for failure to prosecute, because plaintiffs insisted on going forward with deficient amended complaint rather than complying or seeking an extension of time to comply with court's order to file second amended complaint); Brown, 205 Fed.Appx. at 802-03 (upholding dismissal without prejudice for failure to prosecute § 1983 claims where plaintiff failed to follow court order to file amended complaint and court had informed plaintiff non-compliance could lead to dismissal).
Plaintiff failed to follow this Court's Orders or respond to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, despite having ample opportunity to do so and being forewarned of the consequences of his failure to do so. Doc. 19. Consequently, the Court should GRANT as unopposed Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, doc. 18, DISMISS without prejudice Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to follow this Court's Orders, and DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case and enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal.
II. Leave to Appeal in Forma Pauperis
The Court should also deny Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. Though Plaintiff has not yet filed a notice of appeal, it would be appropriate to address that issue in the Court's order of dismissal. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3) (noting trial court may certify appeal is not taken in good faith “before or after the notice of appeal is filed”).
An appeal cannot be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies, either before or after the notice of appeal is filed, the appeal is not taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3). Good faith in this context must be judged by an objective standard. Busch v. County of Volusia, 189 F.R.D. 687, 691 (M.D. Fla. 1999). A party does not proceed in good faith when he seeks to advance a frivolous claim or argument. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). A claim or argument is frivolous when it appears the factual allegations are clearly baseless or the legal theories are indisputably meritless. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). An in forma pauperis action is frivolous and not brought in good faith if it is “without arguable merit either in law or fact.” Moore v. Bargstedt, 203 Fed.Appx. 321, 323 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)); see also Brown v. United States, Nos. 407CV085, 403CR001, 2009 WL 307872, at *1-2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2009).
Based on the above analysis of Plaintiff's failure to follow this Court's Orders or respond to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, there are no non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal, and an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Thus, the Court should DENY Plaintiff in forma pauperis status on appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, I RECOMMEND the Court GRANT as unopposed Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, DISMISS without prejudice Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to follow this Court's Order, DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case and enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal, and DENY Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. I also RECOMMEND the Court DENY as moot Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment. Doc. 17.
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation shall be filed within 14 days of today's date. Objections shall be specific and in writing. Any objection that the Magistrate Judge failed to address a contention raised in the Complaint must be included. Failure to file timely, written objections will bar any later challenge or review of the Magistrate Judge's factual findings and legal conclusions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Harrigan v. Metro Dade Police Dep't Station #4, 977 F.3d 1185, 1192-93 (11th Cir. 2020). To be clear, a party waives all rights to challenge the Magistrate Judge's factual findings and legal conclusions on appeal by failing to file timely, written objections. Harrigan, 977 F.3d at 1192-93; 11th Cir. R. 3-1. A copy of the objections must be served upon all other parties to the action.
Upon receipt of Objections meeting the specificity requirement set out above, a United States District Judge will make a de novo determination of those portions of the report, proposed findings, or recommendation to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge. Objections not meeting the specificity requirement set out above will not be considered by a District Judge. A party may not appeal a Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made only from a final judgment entered by or at the direction of a District Judge.
SO REPORTED and RECOMMENDED.