Summary
In Lemon, supra, the defendant was convicted of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 211(a) for possession of a forged inspection certificate; in Deems, supra, the defendant was convicted of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 304 for the sale of a vehicle with defaced numbers.
Summary of this case from Com. v. StrunkOpinion
Argued June 9, 1977
July 18, 1977.
Motor vehicle — Revocation of motor vehicle operator's license — Valid state interest — Vehicle safety — Possession of forged inspection certificate — The Vehicle Code, Act 1959, April 29, P.L. 58 — Substantive due process.
1. A motor vehicle operator's license may be constitutionally revoked for reasons other than driver incompetence if the purpose of the revocation is rationally related to a valid state interest. [134-5]
2. The Commonwealth has a legitimate interest in preventing the forgery of inspection certificates and in the safety of the public and the vehicles operated in the Commonwealth, so that a revocation of a motor vehicle operator's license for the commission of the felony under The Vehicle Code, Act 1959, April 29, P.L. 58, of possessing a forged inspection certificate is a proper means of enforcing these state interests and is not violative of substantive due process. [135-6]
Argued June 9, 1977, before Judges WILKINSON, JR., MENCER and ROGERS, sitting as a panel of three.
Appeal, No. 1000 C.D. 1976, from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County in case of In Re: Appeal of Albert Wesley Lemon from Revocation of Operator's License, No. 427 November Term, 1975.
Revocation of motor vehicle operator's license by Secretary of Transportation. Licensee appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County. Appeal sustained. BELL, J. Commonwealth appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Held: Reversed. Revocation order reinstated.
John L. Heaton, Assistant Attorney General, with him Robert W. Cunliffe, Deputy Attorney General, and Robert P. Kane, Attorney General, for appellant.
Robert L. Johnson, for appellee.
This is an appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County reversing the action of the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) revoking appellee's operator's license under Section 616(a)(2) of The Vehicle Code, Act of April 29, 1959, P.L. 58, as amended, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 616(a)(2). We reverse.
On September 19, 1975, appellee pied guilty to violating Section 211(a) of The Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 211(a) (possession of forged inspection certificate, a felony) in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County. Appellee was fined $200.00 and placed on probation for one year. Upon receipt of a certified record from the clerk of the court, the Secretary revoked appellee's operator's license pursuant to Section 616(a)(2) which requires revocation upon a plea of guilty to any felony under The Vehicle Code or any other felony in which a motor vehicle is used. Appellee appealed to the lower court and a supersedeas was granted. After a de novo hearing, the court sustained appellee's appeal ruling that the revocation was in violation of substantive due process.
All parties agree that the proper test for determining the validity of Section 616(a)(2) is whether it is reasonably related to a rational state interest. Appellee urges and the lower court found that the state interest in revoking an operator's license is "the removal from the highways of persons who operate motor vehicles incompetently and thus presenting a hazard to the life, safety and property of others or who operate in the furtherance of unlawful activity." Appellee argues that revocation of a license for other serious violations of The Vehicle Code does not further these goals and, therefore, is unrelated to any rational state interest.
The lower court erred as a matter of law when it ruled that the Secretary can revoke operator licenses only to keep incompetent, unsafe drivers off the roads. The enforcement provisions of The Vehicle Code seek to protect the public by deterring violations. The revocation of operating privileges is rationally related to this goal. Therefore, a driver's license may be constitutionally revoked for many reasons in addition to the regulation of driver competence as long as such purposes are rationally related to a valid state interest. In Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Rodgers, 20 Pa. Commw. 393, 341 A.2d 917 (1975), the suspension of a license was upheld under the "financial responsibility" provisions of The Vehicle Code. We held that "[t]he legislative purpose of attempting to more readily provide a source of compensation to motor vehicle victims is a legitimate state interest." Id. at 399, 341 A.2d at 920. Also, in Commonwealth v. Wharrey, 26 Pa. Commw. 508, 365 A.2d 181 (1976), a case with issues similar to this appeal, we upheld the mandatory revocation of operating privileges of a driver who was convicted of transporting a controlled substance in his automobile. Judge BLATT writing for the Court stated:
In Campbell v. Bureau of Traffic Safety, 16 Pa. Commw. 9, 329 A.2d 867 (1974) we affirmed a revocation based upon a conviction for possession of two illegally purchased certificates of inspection. In Commonwealth v. Hahn, 23 Pa. Commw. 540, 353 A.2d 74 (1976) we affirmed a revocation based upon a plea of guilty to a charge of knowingly and willingly possessing an altered registration card.
He argues that there is no legitimate state interest to be served in regulating his use of his automobile for private purposes so long as that use does not affect his ability to operate the vehicle safely upon the highways. Again we must disagree. We believe that the state has a legitimate interest in preventing the operation of motor vehicles while the operator is in unlawful possession of, or is actually delivering a controlled substance. This interest is not concerned with the competence of the operator but rather with the increased danger to the public which results when such unlawful activities are conducted contemporaneously with the use of a motor vehicle. The weight of this interest is sufficient to support the revocation of appellant's operating privileges.
Id. at 512, 365 A.2d at 183.
We believe that the state has a legitimate interest in preventing the forgery of inspection certificates. This interest is not concerned with the competence of the operator, but rather, with the safety of motor vehicles and the increased danger to the public which may result from the forging of inspection certificates. Revocation of operating privileges is a rational and constitutionally proper means of enforcing these state interests.
Accordingly, we will enter the following
ORDER
NOW, July 18, 1977, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County, dated May 3, 1976, at No. 427 November Term, 1975, is reversed and the action of the Secretary is reinstated.