Opinion
No. 3:03-CV-883-H.
January 14, 2005
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and an order of the District Court, this case has been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge. The findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge follow:
Parties
Petitioner Athena Charlene Burdick is an inmate in the custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division (TDCJ-CID). Respondent is Douglas Dretke, Director of TDCJ-CID.
Factual and Procedural History
Steve Watkins, a drug dealer, sent Burdick and Robert Gratzol, two of his customers, to Steve Stallings's apartment to get some of Watkins's property. In exchange, Watkins agreed to give Burdick and Gratzol some cocaine. (3 R.R. 82-85, 95; 4 R.R. at 26-28.) On July 3, 1997, Burdick and Gratzol saw Stallings at a bar, and the trio went to Stallings's apartment. (3 R.R. 89-93; 4 R.R. at 26-32.) After they drank alcohol and used cocaine, Burdick followed Gratzol to the bathroom where she watched Gratzol pull out his Bowie knife and return to the table where Stallings sat. Gratzol repeatedly stabbed Stallings in the back while Stallings screamed for help. (3 R.R. 101-10, 160; 4 R.R. at 40-41, 50, 68.) Gratzol claimed that Burdick also stabbed Stallings during the struggle, using one or both of her pocket knives, and beat him in the head. (3 R.R. at 110-11, 115-16, 158-59.) Gratzol and Burdick tied Stallings's hands together and searched the apartment for Watkins's property. (3 R.R. at 115-22; 4 R.R. at 50-51.) Burdick took Stallings's money, and she and Gratzol loaded some stereo speakers into Stallings's truck. (3 R.R. at 122-25.) When the truck would not start, the two fled across a field where Gratzol discarded his knife and bloody pants. ( Id. at 126-30.)
Stallings bled to death in the apartment and was found there later the next day. ( Id. at 43, 59.) Burdick and Gratzol were later apprehended. ( Id. at 132-33.) Both gave statements to the police, claiming the murder was precipitated by Stallings's attempt to rape Burdick. (3 R.R. at 99-100; 4 R.R. at 59.) Blood was later found on one of Burdick's pocket knives. (4 R.R. at 107-08.) Burdick denied agreeing to attack Stallings and stabbing Stallings. ( Id. at 46-47, 71, 92.) She admitted that she had kicked him during the struggle, but asserted that the money she took from Stallings was money he owed her for previously cleaning his apartment. (4 R.R. at 36-37, 41-42, 47-48.) Gratzol denied Stallings's behavior was the catalyst for the murder and maintained he and Burdick concocted the tale of attempted rape to justify the murder to police. (3 R.R. at 99-101.)
Burdick pleaded guilty to murder, and a jury assessed her punishment at 45 years' confinement. (State Habeas R. at 70.) The Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused Burdick's petition for discretionary review on March 7, 2001. Burdick v. State, No. 5-99-691-CR (Tex.App.-Dallas July 27, 2000, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication).
On May 22, 2002, Burdick filed a state application for writ of habeas corpus challenging her conviction, which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied without written order on the findings of the trial court without a hearing. Ex parte Burdick, Nos. 54,803-01 (Tex.Crim.App. Apr. 2, 2003) (not designated for publication). Burdick filed her federal petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, on April 14, 2003. See Spotville v. Cain, 149 F.3d 374, 377 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (holding, under prison mailbox rule, pro se habeas petition filed when papers delivered to prison authorities for mailing).
Issues
Burdick argues that:
1. her guilty plea was involuntary,
2. trial counsel were constitutionally ineffective,
3. appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective,
4. the trial court should have refused to accept her guilty plea,
5. the trial court did not properly admonish her regarding the applicable range of punishment,
6. the trial court abused its discretion when Burdick was not allowed to question Gratzol regarding his plea-bargain agreement with the State, and
7. she was denied a fair trial because the State avoided performing DNA testing on the knife and relied solely on the prosecutor's and Gratzol's statements,
Exhaustion of State Court Remedies
Dretke argues that Burdick's claim that her plea was involuntary has not been exhausted and asserts that it has been procedurally defaulted. However, Dretke believes that Burdick's remaining allegations have been properly exhausted.Exhaustion and Procedural Default
Applicants seeking habeas relief under § 2254 are required to exhaust all claims in state court before requesting federal collateral relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); Fisher v. Texas, 169 F.3d 295, 302 (5th Cir. 1999). The exhaustion requirement is satisfied when the substance of the federal habeas claim has been fairly presented to the highest state court. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76 (1981); Fisher, 169 F.3d at 302. This requires that the state court be given a fair opportunity to pass on the claim, which in turn requires that the applicant present her claims before the state courts in a procedurally proper manner according to the rules of the state courts. Dupuy v. Butler, 837 F.2d 699, 702 (5th Cir. 1988).Burdick did not raise in either her petition for discretionary review or her state habeas corpus application her argument that her guilty plea was involuntary. (Federal Pet. at supp. pp. 2, 4.) Thus, she seeks federal habeas relief on factual allegations that were never made in the Texas courts, which renders this claim unexhausted. Finley v. Burdick, 243 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2001).
However, Burdick cannot return to the Texas courts to cure this deficiency. The Texas abuse-of-the-writ doctrine prohibits a successive habeas petition, absent a showing of cause, if the applicant urges grounds that could have been, but were not, raised in her first habeas petition. Ex parte Barber, 879 S.W.2d 889, 891 n. 1 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1084 (1995). This doctrine is an adequate state procedural bar for purposes of federal habeas review. Emery v. Burdick, 139 F.3d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 969 (1998); Nobles v. Burdick, 127 F.3d 409, 423 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1139 (1998). Accordingly, federal habeas corpus relief is unavailable in the face of a state procedural default unless the petitioner can show either (1) cause for the default and actual prejudice or (2) that the federal court's failure to consider the claim will result in a miscarriage of justice, i.e., that the petitioner is actually innocent of the crime. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339-40 (1992); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Finley, 243 F.3d at 219-20.
Burdick has not given any explanation to excuse her default. Indeed, any problem with her guilty plea was known to Burdick before she filed her state habeas corpus application. Robison v. Burdick, 151 F.3d 256, 263 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1100 (1999). Accordingly, this claim is procedurally barred. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621-22 (1998) (holding involuntary-guilty-plea claim based on insufficient information, as opposed to involuntariness based on coercion by government agent, procedurally barred because raised for the first time on federal habeas corpus review).
However, even if she had not procedurally defaulted this claim, it is meritless because the record shows her plea was voluntary. See infra pp. 6-8.
Standard of Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody under a state court judgment shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless he shows that the prior adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the United States Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000); see also Hill v. Burdick, 210 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1039 (2001). A state court decision will be an unreasonable application of clearly established precedent if it correctly identifies the applicable rule but applies it objectively unreasonably to the facts of the case. Holland v. Jackson, 124 S. Ct. 2736, 2738-39 (2004); see also Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 236, 244-46 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc per curiam), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1104 (2003).
Section 2254(e)(1) provides that a determination of a factual issue made by a state court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant has the burden of rebutting this presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. Hill, 210 F.3d at 485. When the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denies relief in a state habeas corpus application without written order, it is an adjudication on the merits, which is entitled to this presumption. Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469, 472 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997).
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 1. Trial counsel — before guilty plea
Burdick asserts that trial counsel was ineffective before she pleaded guilty because counsel (1) did not communicate her counteroffer of 15 years' confinement in exchange for her guilty plea to the State, (2) told her she could be convicted of murder even though she was merely present and did not participate, (3) did not tell her that she could be tried and sentenced in a bench trial, (4) did not tell her she could be exonerated through presentation of a duress defense. (Federal Pet. at supp. pp. 1-2, 6-7, 9.) Because Burdick pleaded guilty, she may only challenge the voluntary character of her guilty plea in raising an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1985); Smith v. Estelle, 711 F.2d 677, 682 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 906 (1984).
Burdick has failed to show that her plea was involuntary. If a challenged guilty plea is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, it will be upheld on federal habeas review. James v. Cain, 56 F.3d 662, 666 (5th Cir. 1995). Although a defendant's attestation of voluntariness at the time of the plea is not an absolute bar to later contrary contentions, it places a heavy burden upon her. United States v. Diaz, 733 F.2d 371, 373-74 (5th Cir. 1979). She must show such a strong degree of misunderstanding, duress, or misrepresentation by others that her plea would become a constitutionally inadequate basis for imprisonment. Id. (citing Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 (1977)). Before a trial court may accept a guilty plea, the court must ensure that the defendant "has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence," but not that she understood the "technical legal effect" of the charges. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969); James, 56 F.3d at 666. A plea is involuntary, and thus insufficient to support a conviction, if the defendant "has such an incomplete understanding of the charge that [her] plea cannot stand as an intelligent admission of guilt." Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 n. 13 (1976). If the defendant understands the maximum prison term and fine for the offense, the subsequent guilty plea is knowingly entered. Ables v. Scott, 73 F.3d 591, 592 n. 2 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1198 (1996). Absent supporting evidence in the record, a court cannot consider a habeas petitioner's mere assertions on a critical issue in his pro se petition to be of probative evidentiary value. Armstead v. Scott, 37 F.3d 202, 210 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1071 (1995); Ross v. Estelle, 694 F.2d 1008, 1011-12 (5th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
The record reflects that Burdick (1) was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily, (2) was mentally competent, and (3) was aware of the consequences of her plea. (State Habeas R. at 18; 3 R.R. at 8.) Burdick has offered nothing more than her self-serving allegations that her plea was involuntary, which is insufficient to rebut the presumption of regularity of the state court records. Babb v. Burdick, 61 F. Supp. 2d 604, 606 (S.D. Tex. 1999); see also Armstead, 37 F.3d at 210. Burdick's attacks on her guilty plea do not undermine the sufficiency of the information she was provided before she pleaded guilty. Ables, 73 F.3d at 592 n. 2. Further, the state habeas courts made factual findings regarding her ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims and concluded that the plea was voluntary. (State Habeas R. at 47.) Burdick has not overcome the presumption of correctness, which applies to these factual findings, with clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This conclusion was not contrary to federal law and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence. Id. § 2254(d). Thus, she has failed to overcome the presumption that she was properly admonished and that her plea was voluntary. Burdick's guilty plea waived her ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims occurring before she pleaded guilty. Beasley v. McCotter, 798 F.2d 116, 118 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1039 (1987); see also Tollet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (stating guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defects occurring before entry of plea); Matthew v. Burdick, 201 F.3d 353, 364 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 830 (2000) (noting long-standing rule that valid guilty plea bars habeas review of non-jurisdictional claims alleging antecedent violations of constitutional rights).
2. Trial counsel — after guilty plea
Burdick also asserts that counsel were constitutionally ineffective after she pleaded guilty when they (1) did not investigate or present mitigation evidence at punishment to lessen the penalty, (2) did not request DNA testing on the knives, and (3) failed to object to the State's leading questions to Gratzol. (Federal Pet. at supp. pp. 1, 5-8, 9-11.)
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to the effective assistance of counsel. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is measured under a twopronged standard by which a petitioner must show (1) that counsel's performance was deficient in that the errors made were so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and (2) prejudice by demonstrating that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984); Carter v. Collins, 918 F.2d 1198, 1200 (5th Cir. 1990).
In assessing whether a particular counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient, courts indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. In general, scrutiny of an attorney's performance is highly deferential, and reviewing courts will not second-guess strategic decisions; rather, the attorney's performance is evaluated in light of all the circumstances as they existed at the time of the conduct, and is presumed to have been adequate. Id. at 689-90. Strategic choices made after thorough investigation of the law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable. Id. at 690-91. To satisfy the prejudice prong in a guilty-plea context, the petitioner must show that she would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); Montoya v. Johnson, 226 F.3d 399, 408 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1067 (2001).
Burdick's complaints about counsel were reviewed and rejected during state collateral review proceedings. A claim of ineffective assistance is a mixed question of law and fact. Id. at 698. Thus, a federal habeas court cannot grant relief unless the state court's rejection of the claim involved an unreasonable application of the law to the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Burdick argues that counsel should have investigated and presented evidence that she had cooperated and helped prosecute Gratzol and that she had a family history of being sexually abused. She asserts that this evidence would have resulted in a more lenient sentence and would have offset the negative light the State portrayed her in at punishment. In his affidavit, trial counsel C. Wayne Huff stated that he did not present evidence that Burdick had cooperated in Gratzol's prosecution because "we did not want jurors to know that she had already substantially benefitted from her assistance, feeling that jurors might believe she had received all of the consideration she had coming to her, and that they might actually increase her punishment." (State Habeas R. at 50.) Trial counsel Phillip A. Linder stated that they did all Burdick asked them to do:
Ms. Burdick was happy with the result that Mr. Huff and I got when the State reduced the case from capital murder to murder. She voluntarily went to jury trial after we urged her to take the [25-year] plea [offer]. We went over with her and investigated every angle she brought to us about her involvement in the offense and at trial asked her on numerous occasions if there was anything different that she wanted us to do. She consistently indicated that she was happy with the way we were defending her. She never indicated having any problem with us except for the fact that we could not procure a probation or minimum time offer. ( Id. at 53.)
Based on these affidavits, the state habeas courts concluded that counsel were not ineffective. ( Id. at 46.) She has failed to overcome the presumption of correctness of these findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Further, this conclusion is not contrary to federal law and was not an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence. Id. § 2254(d). In order to establish that counsel were ineffective due to a failure to investigate the case, Burdick must do more than merely allege a failure to investigate — she must state with specificity what the investigation would have revealed, what specific evidence would have been disclosed, and how the evidence would have altered the outcome of the trial. Anderson v. Collins, 18 F.3d 1208, 1221 (5th Cir. 1994); Rose v. Johnson, 141 F. Supp. 2d 661, 691 (S.D. Tex. 2001). Burdick argues that counsel never investigated her background or other mitigating evidence to reduce her punishment. Linder stated in his affidavit that his investigation was hampered by Burdick's assertion that there was nothing else she wanted them to present. ( Id. at 53.) Indeed, the extent of an attorney's duty to investigate must be viewed in the context of the defendant's cooperation with the attorney's investigation, taking into account the totality of the circumstances, with a heavy deference in favor of counsel's judgments. In other words, the scope of an investigation may be limited by a defendant's lack of cooperation. See Randle v. Scott, 43 F.3d 221, 225 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (holding counsel not deficient when defendant told attorney to quit investigating prior conviction, even though it had been reversed, to expedite his guilty plea), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1108 (1995); Bell v. Watkins, 692 F.2d 999, 1009 n. 11 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding counsel not deficient when defendant refused to provide a list of witnesses that would help his case), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 843 (1983); Gray v. Lucas, 677 F.2d 1086, 1093 (5th Cir. 1982) (same), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 910 (1983); Akridge v. Hopper, 545 F.2d 457, 459 (5th Cir.) (holding counsel not deficient where defendant claimed he could remember nothing of the crime and gave no indication of a credible defense), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 941 (1977). Thus, counsel was not deficient.
Likewise, Burdick's claim that counsel were ineffective for failing to perform DNA tests on the knives is meritless. Huff stated in his affidavit that he did not test the knives because Burdick gave them no indication that such a test would have been fruitful:
The two knives were never tested for DNA because Ms. Burdick's allegations that the blood on them were hers and not [Stallings's] did not arise until after she testified. Ms. Burdick never told me that she cut herself, and had previously maintained that all of the blood came from the crime scene, during her participation in the commission of the offense. (State Habeas R. at 50.)
The state habeas court credited these statements and found counsel were not ineffective. ( Id. at 46.) Counsel's duties were limited by Burdick's lack of cooperation and failure to be forthright about the blood on the knives. E.g., Randle, 43 F.3d at 225. Burdick has failed to show, pursuant to the statutory standard, that she is entitled to habeas corpus relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)-(e)(1).
Finally, Burdick asserts counsel were ineffective for failing to object to the State's leading questions to Gratzol. However, failure to object to leading questions is a matter of trial strategy that will not be second-guessed. Burnett v. Collins, 982 F.2d 922, 930 (5th Cir. 1993).
3. Appellate counsel
Burdick asserts appellate counsel was ineffective when she failed to raise the following issues on appeal: (1) her guilty plea was involuntary, (2) the trial court's admonishments were defective, (3) trial counsel were ineffective for failing to raise a duress defense, (4) trial counsel were ineffective for failing to raise mitigating evidence at punishment, and (5) trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object to the State's leading questions. (Federal Pet. at supp. pp. 3, 4, 7, 8-9, 11.) Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must likewise meet the strict Strickland standard. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000). To establish deficient performance, Burdick must show that counsel unreasonably failed to discover and raise nonfrivolous issues. Id. To establish prejudice, Burdick must demonstrate that, but for counsel's error, she would have prevailed on appeal. Id. As discussed above, these claims are without merit. Thus, Burdick cannot satisfy the Strickland requirements. Williams v. Collins, 16 F.3d 626, 635 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1289 (1994); Cantu v. Collins, 967 F.2d 1006, 1017 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 926 (1993); Duhamel v. Collins, 955 F.2d 962, 967 (5th Cir. 1992). Further, the trial court concluded that counsel had rendered effective assistance. (State Habeas R. at 46.) Burdick has not met the statutory burden of proof to overcome the presumption of correctness of this determination and show herself entitled to habeas corpus relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)-(e)(1).
Trial Court Abuse of Discretion
Burdick argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to properly admonish her regarding the range of punishment, accepting her guilty plea, and failing to allow her to question Gratzol about his plea-bargain agreement with the State. (Federal Pet. at supp. pp. 3, 12, 14-15.) Burdick's first two allegations merely attack defects in state procedures and fail to raise a federal Constitutional issue cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. Castillo v. Johnson, 141 F.3d 218, 222 (5th Cir. 1998). Further, the state habeas courts held that Burdick had been properly admonished and that the trial court properly accepted her guilty plea under state law. A federal court in a habeas review of a state court conviction cannot review state rulings on state law that do not present a federal constitutional question. Gibbs v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 253, 259 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1089 (1999). Burdick has failed to establish she is entitled to habeas corpus relief in light of the state courts' determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)-(e)(1).
Likewise, Burdick is not entitled to relief on her claim that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to allow her to question Gratzol regarding his plea agreement with the State. The state court of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this respect:
In this case, the trial court observed the co-defendant, heard all of his testimony concerning the plea agreement, and heard him deny that he had been compelled to testify against appellant or that he had been promised anything by the State. Evidence of a co-defendant's conviction and punishment is not included among the mitigating circumstances which a defendant has a right to present.
Ordinarily, the disposition of the case against a co-defendant never becomes admissible in the trial of another co-defendant. In the present case, the jury knew a great deal of the disposition of Gratzol's case: that he had pleaded guilty, had been finally convicted, and was serving his sentence in the penitentiary. The only part not known to the jury was the number of years of punishment.
After the hearing outside the jury's presence, the trial court determined that evidence of the plea bargain was not relevant and admissible. We cannot say that the court abused its discretion in refusing to admit the evidence.Burdick, No. 5-99-691-CR, slip op. at 11-12 (citations omitted). The Court of Criminal Appeals refused Burdick's petition for discretionary review raising this issue. Based on these determinations and because Burdick has failed to overcome the applicable presumption of correctness, she is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Burdick argues that she was denied a fair trial when the State avoided performing DNA tests on the knives and relied solely on Gratzol's perjured testimony to prove that she stabbed Stallings with the knives. (Federal Pet. at supp. pp. 12-13.) To run afoul of the Due Process Clause, a petitioner must show that the State knowingly presented materially false evidence to the jury or allowed untrue testimony to go uncorrected. Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515, 519 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 995 (1996); Koch v. Puckett, 907 F.2d 524, 531 (5th Cir. 1990). To obtain relief, the petitioner must show that (1) the testimony was actually false, (2) the state knew it was false, and (3) the testimony was material. Kirkpatrick v. Whitley, 992 F.2d 491, 497 (5th Cir. 1993). Burdick has not shown any of these requirements. There is nothing in the record, including Burdick's own testimony admitting that she pleaded guilty to stabbing Stallings, that shows Gratzol lied about the attack or that the State knew he was lying. (4 Rep. R. at 65-66.) Burdick's conclusory allegation is insufficient to support habeas corpus relief. Ross, 694 F.2d at 1011-12.
Summary
Burdick is lawfully restrained because she has failed to prove that she has been denied a constitutionally protected interest. Accordingly, the state courts' determination that Burdick was not entitled to relief is not contrary to or does not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law and is not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings.
Recommendation
This Court recommends that the petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be DENIED.