Opinion
Case No. 15-cv-01070-TEH
08-17-2016
MARK BURAS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SANTA ROSA, et al., Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Mark Buras contends that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by Defendants Brett Siwy, Michael Paetzold, and the City of Santa Rosa when he was searched and arrested on July 17, 2014. His complaint asserts violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as various state laws.
Siwy and Paetzold are officers of the Santa Rosa Police Department. The complaint also names the Santa Rosa Police Department as a defendant but asserts no claims against it. The Court does not detail Buras's factual allegations because they are not material to the pending motion.
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims, but their three-page reply focused primarily on evidentiary objections. The Court overruled those objections and ordered Defendants to "file a supplemental brief (a) identifying which, if any, issues in their summary judgment motion they believe are not foreclosed by the Court's evidentiary rulings and (b) addressing the arguments raised in Buras's opposition on any such issues." Aug. 2, 2016 Order at 2. Defendants filed a timely brief stating that two issues remain: first, whether Plaintiffs' claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), following his no contest plea to a violation of California Health and Safety Code section 11377(a); and, second, whether Defendant City of Santa Rosa is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. After carefully reviewing the parties' written arguments, the Court finds these issues suitable for resolution without oral argument, see Civil L.R. 7-1(b), and now GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants' motion as discussed below.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is "genuine" if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. The court may not weigh the evidence and must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 255.
A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion, and of identifying those portions of the pleadings or materials in the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving party will have the burden of proof at trial, it "must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party." Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). However, on an issue for which its opponent will have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party can prevail merely by "pointing out to the district court . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. If the moving party meets its initial burden, the opposing party must then set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial to defeat the motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
DISCUSSION
I. Heck v. Humphrey
The Court first considers Defendants' argument that Buras's claims are barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Under Heck, "the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated." Id. at 487.
Although the Ninth Circuit has previously applied Heck to bar claims following a no contest plea, e.g., Szajer v. City of Los Angeles, 632 F.3d 607 (9th Cir. 2011), a more recent case, Lockett v. Ericson, 656 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2011), has called that practice into question. In Lockett, the plaintiff filed a § 1983 complaint contending that officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they entered his home to obtain evidence of driving under the influence. Id. at 893. His motion to suppress the evidence was denied, and he subsequently entered a plea of nolo contendere to a lesser offense. Id. at 895. The district court dismissed the case based on Heck, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that:
He was not tried, and no evidence was introduced against him. Therefore, . . . Lockett's conviction derives from his plea, not from a verdict obtained with supposedly illegal evidence. The validity of Lockett's conviction does not in any way depend on the legality of the search of his home. We therefore hold that Heck does not bar Lockett's § 1983 claim.Id. at 897 (alterations, quotation marks, and citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has since cited Lockett with approval as "holding that a plaintiff who pled nolo contendre to reckless driving was not Heck-barred from bringing a § 1983 claim based on an alleged unlawful search because the outcome of the claim had no bearing on the validity of the plaintiff's plea." Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 760 (9th Cir. 2014).
As two other district courts have observed, the Lockett court did not mention prior precedent "or purport to expressly overrule them, even though Szajer was decided only months earlier." Cooley v. City of Vallejo, Case No. 2:14-cv-0620-TLH-KJN PS, 2014 WL 3749369, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 29, 2014); see also Leon v. San Jose Police Dep't, Case No. 5:11-cv-05504 HRL, 2013 WL 5487543, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2013). Nonetheless, these courts followed Lockett as binding Ninth Circuit precedent. Cooley, 2014 WL 3749369, at *4; Leon, 2013 WL 5487543, at *4; accord Ellis v. Thomas, Case No. 14-cv-00199-JCS, 2015 WL 5915368, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2015). Another district court declined to follow Lockett where "Plaintiff assert[ed] claims for malicious prosecution against the charging prosecutors" and not claims "related to the methods used by police to obtain evidence." Kowarsh v. Heckman, Case No. 14-cv-05314-MEJ, 2015 WL 2406785, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2015). Here, however, the claims fall into the latter category and are indistinguishable from the claims asserted in Lockett, which is directly on point and binding on this Court. Like Lockett, Buras "challenge[s] the search and seizure of the very evidence that led to the criminal charge[] against him" after pleading no contest to that charge. Leon, 2013 WL 5487543, at *4 n.6 (describing Lockett).
Defendants attempt to distinguish Lockett on grounds that the criminal docket for Buras's case reflects a minute entry that "Defendant stipulates to factual basis for plea." Ex. 5 to Req. for Judicial Notice at 3. However, the record in Lockett is silent as to whether there was a stipulated factual basis for the plea in that case, and Defendants have therefore not established that the case is distinguishable on that basis. Moreover, the cited minute entry does not reveal to which facts Buras stipulated, and Defendants have cited no authority for their assertion that a stipulated factual basis for the plea necessarily implies that "BURAS also stipulated to the non-existence of facts that Officer SIWY's 'search incident to arrest' that discovered the meth was violative of the Fourth Amendment; that Officer SIWY's attempted standing search of BURAS was violative of the Fourth Amendment; and that the traffic stop was violative of the Fourth Amendment." Mot. at 22. This Court cannot draw these inferences when, as required, it views the record in a light most favorable to Buras.
Defendants' unopposed request for judicial notice is GRANTED. --------
Accordingly, following Lockett, the Court DENIES Defendants' motion for summary judgment based on Heck v. Humphrey. // //
II. Defendant City of Santa Rosa
Defendants also argue that Defendant City of Santa Rosa is entitled to summary judgment because Buras has presented no evidence to support a finding of municipal liability. Buras asserts only a § 1983 claim against the City, and it is well-established that:
a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.Monell v. Department of Social Services , 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Buras seeks to rely on City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), which he cites as standing for the proposition that "plaintiffs are able to show municipal liability by pointing to various failures on the part of the municipality, such as failures to adequately investigate, train, supervise or discipline their employees." Opp'n at 27. However, he ignores the Supreme Court's holding that "the inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact." City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388. This is because "[o]nly where a municipality's failure to train its employees in a relevant respect evidences a 'deliberate indifference' to the rights of its inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a city 'policy or custom' that is actionable under § 1983." Id. at 389.
Here, in addition to conceding that Officer Siwy received "many hours of training," Opp'n at 29, Buras presents no evidence of deliberate indifference. Instead, he relies only on his counsel's assertions - which are not evidence - that the internal investigation into Buras's use of force allegations was "shockingly inadequate." Opp'n at 27. This is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment. In the absence of any evidence of the required "policy or custom," this Court GRANTS Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Defendant City of Santa Rosa.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The motion is GRANTED only as to Defendant City of Santa Rosa.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: 08/17/16
/s/_________
THELTON E. HENDERSON
United States District Judge