Opinion
Civil No. 02-1194(JAG)
November 13, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER
On August 16, 2002, defendant Wal-Mart de Puerto Rico, Inc. ("Wal-Mart") moved to dismiss plaintiff Shelly Bullard's ("Bullard") complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). (Docket No. 4.) On June 14, 2002, Bullard filed an opposition. (Docket No. 7.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES Wal-Mart's motion.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On February 10, 2001, Bullard, a resident of New York, visited the Wal-Mart store located in Isabela Plaza Mall in Aguadilla, Puerto Rico. While within Wal-Mart's premises, she slipped and fell on her buttocks due to the slippery floor. Various store patrons helped Bullard to her feet. She then sat down and prepared the accident report. She thereafter sought medical attention at the Aguadilla Hospital emergency room. At the hospital, the medical personnel took X-rays of Bullard and prescribed her pain medication. Upon returning to New York, Bullard continued to suffer from pain, and sought treatment from a pain management specialist, who prescribed Vicodin. Her pain has not subsided to date.
On February 8, 2002, Bullard filed suit, alleging that Wal-Mart's negligence caused her severe physical, emotional, and psychological damages. Bullard seeks compensatory damages under Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, 31 P.R. Laws Ann. §§ 5141 and 5142.
DISCUSSION A. Motion to Dismiss Standard
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a complaint may not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. See Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 530 (1st Cir. 1995). The Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor. See Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 51 (1st Cir. 1990). The Court need not credit, however, "bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, periphrastic circumlocutions, and the like" when evaluating the Complaint's allegations. Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996). When opposing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "a plaintiff cannot expect a trial court to do his homework for him." McCoy v. Massachusetts Institute of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 22 (1st Cir. 1991). Plaintiff is responsible for putting his best foot forward in an effort to present a legal theory that will support his claim. Id., at 23 (citing Correa Martinez, 903 F.2d at 52). Plaintiff must set forth "factual allegations, either direct or inferential, regarding each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable theory." Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir. 1988).
B. Wal-Mart's motion to dismiss
Wal-Mart argues that Bullard has failed to state a claim and that, as a result, the Court must dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Specifically, Wal-Mart contends that Bullard's complaint fails to describe the existence of the "dangerous condition" of which it knew or should have known. Wal-Mart further argues that Bullard failed to allege any facts regarding its actual or constructive knowledge.
In her opposition, Bullard states that paragraph 25 of the complaint defines the aforementioned dangerous condition. Paragraph 25 states that "[d]efendant was negligent in that it knew or should have known that the store floor was slippery and constituted a dangerous condition for its customers and visitors . . . . Defendant was also negligent in that it failed to provide warnings of the dangerous condition to its customers and visitors." (Docket No. 1 at 5-6.)
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require that Bullard set out in detail the facts upon which she bases her claim. To the contrary, the Rules simply require "a short and plain statement of the claim" that will give the defendant fair notice of what her claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The Court must "accept all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true, construe those allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, and deny the motion unless it appears to a certainty that plaintiffs can prove no [set of] facts that would entitle them to recover." Citicorp N. Am., Inc. v. Ogden Martin Sys. of Haverhill, Inc., 8 F. Supp.2d 72, 74 (D.Mass. 1998); see also Blackstone Realty LLC v. FDIC, 244 F.3d 193, 197 (1st Cir. 2001) (dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only if relief unobtainable under "any viable theory" suggested by the facts) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Universal Ins. Co., 838 F.2d 612, 622 (1st Cir. 1988) (directing that judgment be entered under a legal theory that was not pleaded but was implicated by the established facts of the case).
In her Complaint, Bullard described the dangerous condition in Wal-Mart's premises that led her to slip and fall. The Court finds that, at this stage, Bullard has pled sufficient facts to survive Wal-Mart's 12(b)(6) motion.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Wal-Mart's motion to dismiss.
IT IS SO ORDERED.