Opinion
CV-22-306
11-13-2024
BUILDERS TRANSPORTATION COMPANY APPELLANT v. JEREMY SMITH APPELLEE
Wright, Lindsey & Jennings LLP, by: Kyle R. Wilson, Michael A. Thompson, and Antwan D. Phillips, for appellant. McDaniel Law Firm, PLC, by: Bobby McDaniel, for appelle.
APPEAL FROM THE CRITTENDEN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 18-CV-2018-548] HONORABLE SCOTT ELLINGTON, JUDGE AFFIRMED
Wright, Lindsey & Jennings LLP, by: Kyle R. Wilson, Michael A. Thompson, and Antwan D. Phillips, for appellant.
McDaniel Law Firm, PLC, by: Bobby McDaniel, for appelle.
BART F. VIRDEN, JUDGE
Builders Transportation Company (Builders) appeals from a Crittenden County Circuit Court jury's decision in favor of the appellee for his negligence claim against the appellant. We affirm.
I. Factual Background
On June 29, 2017, Jeremy Smith was driving his motorcycle south on U.S. Interstate highway bridge 55, when he was involved in a merging accident with a tractor-trailer. Kevin McKinney was driving the tractor-trailer in the course of his employment with Builders. At the time of the accident, Smith was employed by the Memphis Fire Department. Smith had completed firefighter training and earned certifications for firefighter one and two, pumper driver operator, fire service instructor and smoke diver. Also, he had received training to become an emergency medical technician ("EMT").
On May 30, 2018, Smith filed his complaint naming Builders as the only defendant. Smith's complaint originally asserted two claims against Builders: (1) vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the alleged negligence of its employee McKinney; and (2) direct negligence in hiring, training, supervising, and controlling McKinney. Builders timely answered and admitted that McKinney was its employee and was acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Builders affirmatively pleaded "all defenses available pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 8(c)."
At the conclusion of discovery, Builders filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that it was entitled to judgment on Smith's vicarious liability claims because the statute of limitations had expired as to any claims against McKinney individually, Builders asserted that Smith never added McKinney as a defendant and was required to add McKinney as a party before the statute of limitations expired. Builders conceded that Arkansas law "initially" permits a plaintiff to sue only the employer; however, Builders further argued that the expiration of the statute of limitations against a non-party agent serves to release the principal who has been sued under a theory of vicarious liability for the negligence of its agent acting in the scope of his/her employment. As a result, Smith's decision not to join McKinney as a party served as a release of claims against him, and ultimately Builders.
Smith disagreed contending that he timely brought suit solely against Builders; thus, the expiration of the statute of limitations as to any claims against McKinney individually was irrelevant. Smith specifically stated that he had not added McKinney as a party and had no intention of doing so. Following a hearing, the circuit court denied Builders' motion for summary judgment on the vicarious-liability claims.
In December 2021, the circuit court conducted a three-day jury trial. On the first day of trial, the attentiveness of the jurors became an issue. Counsel for Smith noted that more than one juror was sleeping. On multiple occasions, the circuit court interrupted the proceedings to question whether the jurors needed a break and asked the jurors to stay attentive. On the second day of the trial, counsel for Smith informed the court that juror 85 slept through opening statements and part of the testimony of his first witness and further noted juror 93 may have nodded off through some of the openings and testimony as well. The circuit court again instructed the jurors that they must be attentive to the attorneys and their witnesses.
Juror 85 subsequently slept during the second day of testimony, and Smith moved the circuit court to excuse the juror. Builders objected arguing that juror 68 and juror 93 were also nodding off and had to be awakened by the bailiff, and there was no reason to only single out juror 85. Builders argued that the court was addressing the issue appropriately and singling out juror 85 was inappropriate. At the end of the day, the circuit court entertained argument from the parties regarding the jurors' inattentiveness, noting that it was prepared to excuse juror 85 because he had been observed sleeping multiple times over two days despite several attempts by the bailiff and other jurors to rouse him. Builders then moved the court to also excuse juror 68 and juror 93. The circuit court stated that it had not observed either juror 68 or juror 93 having trouble staying awake and denied the Builders' motion.
At the trial, Smith offered the following testimony. At the time of the accident, Smith operating his motorcycle over the bridge from Arkansas into Mississippi in the left lane and began slowing down when the traffic began to back up. He saw McKinney's left front tire enter his lane, so he slammed on his brakes. Smith did not have any other indication that McKinney was going to enter the left lane, and McKinney did not use his turn signal. He tried to move as far left near the concrete barrier as possible, but McKinney continued to move into his lane and pushed Smith against the concrete barrier. Smith and his motorcycle became trapped under the tractor-trailer, though he did not recall how it happened. His legs were pinned under McKinney's trailer, but McKinney kept driving. Eventually, Smith was able to pull his legs out and roll out under the axles of the trailer. He felt the injuries occur as he was being dragged under the trailer, and he was afraid he was going to die. He sustained multiple rib fractures, fractures of his thoracic spine, severe injuries to his right hand resulting in the amputation of his ring finger, broken bones in his left hand, a chin contusion requiring stitches, road rash on his abdomen and arm, and four broken teeth. He experienced severe pain from both his injuries and the treatment of his injuries, and he continued to have pain every day in his right hand and back. Smith had undergone extensive treatment and therapy, including multiple surgeries on his right hand, daily debridement of dead skin on his right hand and torso, and physical therapy for his hand and back. As a result of the accident, he could not meet the physical requirements to be a firefighter, and his prospects within the MFD had decreased. For example, prior to the accident his goal was to become a division chief of training at the Memphis Fire Academy, but that was no longer possible, and in general, he had fewer opportunities to receive a promotion to battalion chief on the EMS side. Additionally, Smith was not able to participate in the activities he enjoyed before the accident including weightlifting, organized sports, and mudding.
Multiple witnesses for Smith include a witness to the accident, Smith's passenger during the accident, current and former co-workers, his parents, and his girlfriend who testified about Smith's life before and after the accident. They recalled that before he was injured, Smith had expressed his desire to achieve a battalion chief position within the fire department; but after the accident he experienced severe physical and mental pain, and he was forced to give up firefighting. Builders asserted a continuing objection that this witness testimony was inadmissible because it lacked the proper foundation as a present sense impression and the testimony was being used to improperly strengthen Smith's credibility. The circuit court overruled those objections as admissible pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 803(3).
Smith's expert witness, Dr. Raymond Gardocki, was Smith's treating orthopedic surgeon following his accident and testified about the extent of his injuries. Dr. Gardocki testified that immediately following the accident Smith was diagnosed with multiple fractures of his right hand, ribs, and spine, bruising of his lungs, cervical strain, and road rash. He noted that Smith's spine fractures were healed about three months later, but he had expected more improvement than Smith was experiencing and ordered an MRI. He testified that Smith's continued pain was consistent with the MRI results showing a T7-T8 disc herniation and opined the herniation was more likely than not related to the accident.
On cross-examination, Smith admitted that before this accident, he had been in other motorcycle wrecks that resulted in broken bones and time off work. Smith was questioned about documents in his personnel file suggesting that before the accident he was employed in the EMS division of the Memphis Fire Department not the firefighter division. He testified that his paycheck came from the EMS bureau for budget reasons, but he was still a firefighter/paramedic. Smith stated that the EMS budget line covers all employees with a paramedic license or working on the EMS side. He confirmed that he worked on the firefighter side for two-and-one-half years before the accident. Smith rested his case at the conclusion of his testimony. Builders moved for a directed verdict and contemporaneously filed a motion for directed verdict regarding the issue of vicarious liability, asserting the same argument from the first motion for summary judgment. Builders again requested that the circuit court expand the law regarding vicarious liability, arguing that because Smith failed to add McKinney as a defendant in a timely manner, the statute of limitations had also run on any vicarious liability claims against Builders. The circuit court rejected Builders' argument and denied the motion.
Before the case was submitted to the jury, Builders objected to a proposed jury instruction which provided for separate itemization of damages of the verdict. Builders claimed the separate itemization of the instruction could lead to jury confusion and double recovery. Also, Builders asserted that separate itemization of damages would constitute separate verdicts which should be signed and treated separately. Smith responded that the itemized verdict form was easier for the jury to understand, and on appeal, it would enable certain elements of recovery to be stricken if the evidence was determined to be insufficient to support such claims. The circuit court overruled Builders' objection to the itemized verdict form.
At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence, Builders renewed its directed verdict motion relating to its vicarious liability in the absence of claims against McKinney, which was overruled. Builders further renewed its objection to the itemized verdict form as contrary to AMI 2201, the general instruction on the measure of damages, and the objection was overruled. Finally, Builders renewed its objection to the dismissal of juror 85 and argued that the court should also excuse the other two other jurors who had dozed off. The circuit court denied Builders' motion to strike the other two jurors noting that one of the jurors was only dozing on the first day of trial and did not doze again after admonishment by the court. The court further noted that it did not observe juror 93 sleeping.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Smith. Nine jurors agreed that Smith was 30% liable for the accident and McKinney was 70% negligent. Ten jurors agreed on the amount of damages incurred by Smith as a result of the accident. The circuit court entered judgment on the jury's verdict in favor of Smith and against Builders in the amount of $2,800,000 plus costs following the 30% reduction representing Smith's comparative fault.
Following the court's order entering judgment in favor of Smith, Builders filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and alternative motion for new trial or remittitur. Builders also filed a motion for new trial pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 59(a) propounding the same arguments it had presented in its motions for a directed verdict. The circuit court denied the motions following a hearing. Builders timely appealed.
II. Issues on Appeal
Builders raises six points on appeal. First, Builders claims that it cannot be vicariously liable for the negligence of McKinney because Smith failed to add him as a party before the expiration of the statute of limitations. Second, Builders asserts that the circuit court abused its discretion in striking only one of several sleeping jurors and in refusing to examine all jurors who slept during trial. Third, Builders maintains that the circuit court erred in allowing Smith to preemptively bolster his credibility by repeatedly offering hearsay testimony from his witnesses. Fourth, Builders claims it is entitled to a new trial and/or remittitur because the jury's verdict was excessive and the product of passion and prejudice. Fifth, Builders asserts that the circuit court abused its discretion in submitting the issue of damages on an itemized verdict form. Sixth, Builders further argues that the verdict form's itemization of damages improperly called for a special verdict without requiring the jury to make a special written finding on each issue of fact. We consider the discussion of Builders' fifth and sixth issues on appeal together, as they both involve the propriety of the verdict form. We affirm.
III. Discussion
A. Vicarious Liability
Builders argues on appeal, as it did below, that Smith's claims were extinguished against Builders, because Smith failed to add McKinney as a party within the statute of limitations. From the outset, Builders admitted that McKinney was its employee and was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Builders contends that the expiration of the statute of limitations on Smith's claims against McKinney constitutes a "release or dismissal" of any such claims, which in turn, eliminates the vicarious liability of Builders. Smith argues as he did below that he was not required to add McKinney as a party to recover against Builders for McKinney's negligence.
Arkansas courts consistently have held that "The liability of the employer for the acts of his employee is wholly derivative based upon the theory of respondeat superior." Barnett v. Isabell, 282 Ark. 88, 90, 666 S.W.2d 393, 394 (1984). Accord. Sweeden v. Atkinson Imp. Co., 93 Ark. 397, 125 S.W. 439, 441 (1910) ("The act of the servant for which the master is liable must pertain to something that is incident to the employment for which he is hired, and which it is his duty to perform, or be for the benefit of the master."); Razorback Cab of Fort Smith, Inc. v. Lingo, 304 Ark. 323, 327, 802 S.W.2d 444, 446 (1991) (respondeat-superior is dependent whether the employee is carrying out the object and purpose of his employment); Regions Bank &Tr. v. Stone Cnty. Skilled Nursing Facility, Inc., 345 Ark. 555, 566-67, 49 S.W.3d 107, 114 (2001) (in order for an employer to be liable, the harm must arise from an employee's acts that were his duty to perform or for the employer's benefit). Further, "It is well-settled that when an employee has been released or dismissed, and the employer has been sued solely on a theory of vicarious liability, any liability of the employer is likewise eliminated." Stephens v. Petrino, 350 Ark. 268, 279, 86 S.W.3d 836, 843 (2002).
Because Builders concedes McKinney was acting within the course and scope of his employment the issue of Builders' statute of limitations defense "presents purely questions of law, and that the appropriate standard of review is therefore de novo." Brown v. Pine Bluff Nursing Home, 359 Ark. 471, 474, 199 S.W.3d 45, 47 (2004). A circuit court's conclusion on a question of law is given no deference on appeal. Sanford v. Sanford, 355 Ark. 274, 285, 137 S.W.3d 391, 397 (2003).
"The basis for vicarious liability is 'the master is liable only for the act of his servant, and not for anything he himself did, therefore, when the servant is not liable, the master for whom he was acting at the time should not be liable.'" Magrans v. Andrada, 2021 Ark.App. 35, at 9, 616 S.W.3d 668, 674. The same basic rule of agency law applies regardless of whether a servant's liability is determined by a release or by a verdict. See Id., 2021 Ark.App. 35, 10-11, 616 S.W.3d at 675. A plaintiff suing for the wrongful act of an agent may elect to sue the agent alone, the principal alone, or both. Id.
While Builders cited case law from other jurisdictions that have modified the law of vicarious liability in its favor, we decline to do so. Arkansas law is clear that an injured party may assert a vicarious liability action solely against the employer for the negligence of its employee. Here, Builders admitted that Smith timely asserted his claims against it, and in accordance with Arkansas law, we conclude that Smith's decision not to add McKinney as a party-defendant in no way constitutes a release or dismissal of his claims against McKinney. We decline Builder's suggestion that we extend or modify the established law regarding this issue. We find no error in the circuit court's decision and affirm.
B. Sleeping Jurors
Builders contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in striking only juror 85, when juror 68 and juror 93 had also fallen asleep during the trial. Builders' argument is not well taken. "A party moving for a new trial under Ark. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(2) must demonstrate that its rights have been materially affected by the misconduct by showing that a reasonable possibility of prejudice has resulted from the juror misconduct." Campbell v. Hankins, 2009 Ark.App. 479, 5, 324 S.W.3d 358, 361 (2009).
"Whether unfair prejudice occurred is a matter for the sound discretion of the circuit court." Dimas-Martinez v. State, 2011 Ark. 515, 9, 385 S.W.3d 238, 244 (2011). We reverse a circuit court's order denying a motion for a new trial only if there is a manifest abuse of discretion. Henderson v. State, 349 Ark. 701, 707-08, 80 S.W.3d 374, 378 (2002). "The burden of proof in establishing jury misconduct is on the moving party." Id., 349 Ark. at 708, 80 S.W.3d at 378. "This court has noted that a sleeping juror is not per se prejudicial." Howard v. State, 367 Ark. 18, 40, 238 S.W.3d 24, 41 (2006).
Builders contends that it was unfairly prejudiced by the removal of juror 85 when juror 68 and juror 93 were permitted to remain on the jury despite also nodding off during the trial. Builders argues that a juror sleeping for any period of time during a trial constitutes prejudicial juror misconduct and cites Dimas-Martinez, 2011 Ark. 515, 385 S.W.3d 238 to support its argument. In Dimas-Martinez, the court noted that it was unacceptable for a juror to doze off even if the juror hears the "vast majority" of the evidence. Id., 2011 Ark. 515, 11, 385 S.W.3d 238, 245. Dimas-Martinez is inapplicable to the instant case, because in that case, the juror slept for at least five minutes, whereas here the court stated that it did not observe juror 68 and juror 93 sleeping during the trial after they were admonished on the first day. The circuit court properly exercised its discretion, basing its decision on careful observation of jurors 68 and 93 remaining awake during the testimony, and juror 85 persistently sleeping even after admonishment and being awakened by the bailiff and other jurors.
We find no error in the circuit court's decision and affirm.
C. Fact Witnesses
Builders argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in allowing Smith to offer hearsay testimony from his fact witnesses to improperly bolster his testimony in advance. Builders claims that the numerous hearsay statements by Smith's witnesses allowed by the court pursuant to Ark. R. Evid. 803(3) were impermissible statements concerning Smith's memories about the past. Builders asserts that Smith failed to lay a proper foundation for the admissibility of such statements as hearsay exceptions. Builders further contends that the multitude of hearsay statements by Smith's witnesses were cumulative and unfairly prejudicial.
"Our standard of review for evidentiary rulings dictates that circuit courts have broad discretion and that a circuit court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Green v. Alpharma, Inc., 373 Ark. 378, 284 S.W.3d 29 (2008). "An abuse of discretion is a high threshold that does not simply require error in the circuit court's decision, but requires that the court act improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration." Ford Motor Co. v. Washington, 2013 Ark. 510, 9, 431 S.W.3d 210, 216 (2013). "We also note that an evidentiary error is harmless if the same or similar evidence is otherwise introduced at the trial." Eft v. Rogers, 2012 Ark.App. 632, 9, 425 S.W.3d 1, 6 (2012).
Twelve fact witnesses testified about Smith's time as a firefighter, the extent of his injuries, his complaints following the accident, and his ability to perform the work as a firefighter. Smith argued that such testimony was admissible pursuant to Ark. R. Evid. 803(3) (2022), which permits "A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition, such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health...." In a negligence action, the hearsay exceptions outlined in Ark. R. Evid. 803(3) do not include statements "of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed."
In Smith v. Galaz, 330 Ark. 222, 953 S.W.2d 576, 579 (1997), the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the admission of hearsay testimony pursuant to Ark. R. Evid. 803(3) as evidence of a then-existing physical condition regarding the plaintiff's statements that she had physical limitations in her job following an accident. "We have stated that we will not find prejudicial error where the evidence erroneously admitted was merely cumulative. Stated another way, evidentiary error is harmless if the same or similar evidence is otherwise introduced at trial." Williams v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 319 Ark. 626, 631, 893 S.W.2d 770, 773 (1995) (citation omitted).
Here, Smith testified that he had constant back pain and right-hand pain from the date of the accident. Smith stated that his grip strength never improved after his March 22, 2018 test. He testified extensively about his history as a firefighter, his goals in becoming a firefighter battalion chief and eventually a division chief, his injuries sustained in the accident, the pain resulting from the accident, and the effects the accident had on his ability to serve as a firefighter. Smith's fact witnesses did not offer any testimony regarding these topics that were not fully covered by his testimony. In most instances, Smith laid the proper foundation for the statements admitted pursuant to Ark. R. Evid. 803(3); however, because the testimony offered by Smith's fact witnesses was merely cumulative of the testimony presented by Smith there can be no prejudice. Further, the testimony was offered, as is routinely the case, as independent verification of Smith's testimony and claims. We hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion or commit reversible error in allowing cumulative testimony from Smith's witnesses.
D. Motion for a New Trial/Remittitur
Fourth, Builders contends that the circuit court erred in denying Builders' motion for new trial and/or remittitur claiming the jury's verdict was excessive and the product of passion and prejudice.
A circuit court evaluates a motion for directed verdict or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict by deciding whether the evidence is sufficient for the case to be submitted to the jury; that is, whether the case constitutes a prima facie case for relief. Walmart Stores, Inc. v. Tucker, 353 Ark. 730, 739, 120 S.W.3d 61, 66 (2003). In evaluating the motion for new trial under Rule 59(a)(6), the circuit court must determine whether the verdict or decision is clearly contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. See Ark. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6). Id., 353 Ark. at 739, 120 S.W.3d at 66. The appellate court affirms the verdict if it is supported by substantial evidence. Id., 353 Ark. at 739, 120 S.W.3d at 66-67. "Additionally, the court may not substitute its judgment for the jury's when there is a basis in the evidence for the award and when there is no evidence, appropriately objected to, which tends to create passion or prejudice." Id., 353 Ark. at 742, 120 S.W.3d at 68.
Our standard of review in deciding whether a jury award is excessive is whether the verdict is so great as to shock the conscience of this court or demonstrate passion or prejudice on the part of the trier of fact. Smith v. Galaz, 330 Ark. 222, 953 S.W.2d 576, 577 (1997). "In determining whether the amount of damages is so great as to shock the conscience, the appellate court considers such elements as past and future medical expenses, permanent injury, loss of earning capacity, scars resulting in disfigurement, and pain, suffering, and mental anguish." Builder's Transp., Inc. v. Wilson, 323 Ark. 327, 328, 914 S.W.2d 742, 743 (1996). Compensation for pain and suffering must be left to the sound discretion of the jury and the conclusion reached by it should not be disturbed unless the award is clearly excessive. Advocat, Inc. v. Sauer, 353 Ark. 29, 45, 111 S.W.3d 346, 354 (2003).
As we discussed above, Smith recalled in detail the trauma of the accident, and the extent of his injuries resulting from the accident. He described his physical pain and loss of functionality such that he was unable to perform firefighter duties following the accident. He further testified about his monetary damages, including medical bills, lost wages, and the changes in his employment. Much of Smith's testimony was verified by the witnesses discussed in the previous section.
Builders did not object to Smith's testimony concerning the accident, his injuries, his pain and suffering, or his inability to function as a firefighter following the accident, only seeking to minimize the testimony by discussing Smith's prior motorcycle accidents, personnel file, and his eventual release from medical care by Dr. Gardocki and his other doctors.
We hold that the circuit court did not err in finding that the jury's award was not excessive or the result of passion or prejudice, and the amount of Smith's verdict does not shock the conscience of the court. The testimony on Smith's behalf addressed his competence as a firefighter, his employment goals, the facts surrounding the accident, Smith's injuries, and his damages resulting from the accident. Such testimony does not rise to the level of inflaming the passion or prejudice of the jury. In light of the above testimony, we hold that the jury's award is supported by substantial evidence. Builder's Transp., 323 Ark. at 328, 914 S.W.2d at 743.
E. Itemized Verdict Form
Finally, Builders contends that the itemized verdict form proffered by Smith allowed for recovery of damages for separate elements of damages that compensated for essentially the same loss. Builders asserts that permitting damages for the "nature, extent, duration, and permanency of the injury" as well as the "scars, disfigurement, and visible results for his injury" allowed the jury to award damages twice for the value of Smith's lost finger. Alternatively, Builders argues that each separate element of damages on the verdict form are separate issues of fact requiring individual interrogatories for each element. Builders relies on the fact that only ten jurors signed the damages interrogatory and asserts that the itemized verdict form could have led to "unnecessary compromises on individual items of damages" by the jurors.
The circuit court may exercise its discretion regarding "whether to submit a case to the jury on a general verdict or on interrogatories" or the "form of the special verdicts submitted to the jury...." Neste Polyester, Inc. v. Burnett, 92 Ark.App. 413, 421, 214 S.W.3d 882, 888 (2005). The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating reversible error. Nucor Steel-Arkansas v. Arkansas Pollution Control &Ecology Comm'n, 2015 Ark.App. 703, 12, 478 S.W.3d 232, 242 (2015).
Recovery can be had for each measure of damages described in Arkansas Model Jury Instructions 2202 through 2210 and each element of damages can be recovered separately. Matthews v. Rodgers, 279 Ark. 328, 335-36, 651 S.W.2d 453, 457-58 (1983). In Matthews, our supreme court held that only past medical expenses can be proven with exact certainty and future medical expenses did not require the same certainty as prior medical expenses. Continued complaints of pain as well as testimony from the physician that future medical care might be necessary are sufficient to support recovery for future medical expenses. Id. Moreover, permanent injury, if proven, constitutes a separate element of damages, and proven disfigurement and scarring constitute "elements of damage separate and apart from mere embarrassment and the mental anguish they may cause." Id. Similarly, evidence proving the element of pain, suffering and mental anguish is a separate recovery. Id.
We hold that Builders failed to demonstrate that the circuit court reversibly erred in presenting the jury with the itemized verdict form. The itemized verdict form complies with AMI 2201, wherein each element of damages from AMI 2202 through 2210 is to be enumerated. Here, the evidence was sufficient to establish that Smith suffered both permanent injuries to his back and right hand, illustrated by his lack of strength and constant pain, separate and apart from the scars and disfigurement on his hand from the significant damage caused by the accident resulting in the loss of his ring finger. Pursuant to the holding in Matthews, Smith is entitled to recover for each of these elements of damages.
Additionally, Builders cites no legal authority mandating or recommending that a separate interrogatory and verdict form be issued for each element of damages. Builders did not proffer a general verdict form or individual verdict forms for each element of damages. Builders merely assumes that the jurors may have compromised on different elements of damages to render a verdict but failed to demonstrate reversible error on such proposition. Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in submitting the verdict form itemizing each element of damages. We affirm.
Affirmed.
ABRAMSON and HIXSON, JJ., agree.