Summary
In Bui v. Ashcroft (N.D.Tex., Jan. 31, 2003 No. 3:02-CV-1140-L) 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1565, Bui was deported based on a Texas "deferred adjudication," under which a Texas court, after receiving a plea of guilty or no contest, defers further proceedings without an adjudication of guilt and places the defendant on probation; upon successful completion of probation, the proceedings are dismissed and the defendant is discharged.
Summary of this case from People v. LainoOpinion
No. 3:02-CV-1140-L
January 31, 2003
ORDER
This is a petition for habeas corpus relief brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b), and an order of the court in implementation thereof, this action was referred to the United States magistrate judge for proposed findings and recommendation. On January 8, 2003, the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge were filed, to which Petitioner filed written objections on January 21, 2003.
Petitioner seeks relief from a final order of removal upon his claim that § 322 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(48), is unconstitutional. In his petition, Petitioner asserts four arguments in support of his claim. First, he contends that his removal is barred by the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1, both constitutionally and as codified by 28 U.S.C. § 1738. Second, he contends that his removal is barred by the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Third, he contends that § 1101(a)(48) denies him substantive due process of law. Finally, he contends that he is being denied equal protection of the laws because he was not allowed to seek a waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (h). Petitioner has since abandoned the last two arguments, see Petitioner's Written Objections to Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge at 2. The court, therefore, need only address his first two arguments: that his removal is barred by (1) the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1, both constitutionally and as codified by 28 U.S.C. § 1738, and (2) the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The magistrate judge determined that both of these arguments were without merit. The bases for the magistrate judge's findings and conclusions are not apparent initially; however, the court has conducted an independent review of Petitioner's claims and determines that the correct decision was made.
In 1996 Congress enacted IIRIRA, which, among other things, added a definition of the term "conviction" for federal immigration purposes to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 ("INA"). See IIRIRA § 322(a), amending INA § 101(a)(48)(A), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(48)(A). Under that definition, the term "conviction" means, with respect to an alien, a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court, or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where — (1) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and (2) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien's liberty to be imposed.
With respect to his first argument, Petitioner contends that his removal is barred by the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. Relying on Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994 (5th Cir. 1999), Respondents contend, and the magistrate judge found, that Petitioner's deferred adjudication is a "conviction" for immigration purposes. Petitioner disagrees, arguing that Texas has the exclusive authority to define the statutory crime for which he received a deferred adjudication. He further argues that under Texas law, deferred adjudication is not equivalent to a conviction. He maintains that the classification of his deferred adjudication as a "conviction" in this case violates the Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause in that it precludes a federal court from giving full faith and credit to a state court's judgment of deferred adjudication and to state law. Petitioner's argument is unavailing.
A Texas deferred adjudication is a type of criminal punishment in which a court, after receiving a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendre, defers further proceedings without an adjudication of guilt, and places the defendant on probation. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 5(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
The statutory counterpart to the federal constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause provides that federal courts must give full faith and credit to state acts, records, and judicial proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738; cf. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1 (states must give full faith and credit to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of other states). Under this authority, "a federal court must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered," Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984); however, "[a]ccording full faith and credit to a state judgment need not control the collateral consequences that flow from the judgment." 13 C. Wright, A. Miller E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 4469 (2002). As stated by the Fifth Circuit, "the consequences which a state chooses to attach to a conviction in its courts for purposes of its own law are for it to say; but they cannot control the consequences to be given it in a deportation proceeding — a function of federal law." Yazdchi v. INS., 878 F.2d 166, 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 978 (1989). Although the Fifth Circuit has not yet addressed whether § 1101(a)(48) violates the full faith and credit clause or the Tenth Amendment, one court faced with the issue has determined that it does not. In Herrera-Inirio v. INS, 208 F.3d 299 (1st Cir. 2000), the First Circuit Court of Appeals considered the constitutionality of § 1101(a)(48), and noted that nothing in the Full Faith and Credit Clause or its implementing statute prevents Congress from writing federal statutes that differ from state statutes, or from attaching to words in a federal statute a meaning different than that used in a state statute. Id. at 307 (citing Molina v. INS, 981 F.2d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 1992)). Moreover, federal law governs the application of Congressional statutes in the absence of plain language to the contrary, Wilson v. INS, 43 F.3d 211, 214-15 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 811 (1995), and "[t]he immigration laws contain no . . . indication that they are to be interpreted in accordance with state law." Moosa, 171 F.3d at 1006 (quoting United States v. Campbell, 167 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1999)). Petitioner's objection is overruled.
Petitioner next contends that § 1101(a)(48) violates the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it impinges on a state's sovereign right to legislate in the area of criminal law. The court disagrees. The Tenth Amendment provides that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." U.S. Const. amend. X. While this language "confirms that the power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States," New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992), no such limitation on federal authority is applicable here. It is well settled that the formulation of policies pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right to remain in the United States is entrusted exclusively to Congress, Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954), and its legislative power in enacting immigration-related laws is at least as pervasive and encompassing as any conceivable field. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). Since Congress has plenary authority over immigration-related matters, it may freely displace or preempt state laws, in respect to such matters. Herrera-Inirio, 208 F.3d at 307. Petitioner's second objection is without merit, and accordingly overruled.
Having reviewed the pleadings, file and record in this case and the findings and conclusions of the magistrate judge, the court concludes that the findings and conclusions are correct and hereby accepts them as those of the court. For the reasons previously stated, Petitioner's objections are overruled. Accordingly, Respondents' Motion to Dismiss is granted; Petitioner's petition for habeas corpus relief, and all relief sought therein, is denied; and this action is hereby dismissed with prejudice.