Opinion
7770-7771 Index 110537/05, 451498/15
12-04-2018
IN RE BLACK UNITED FUND OF NEW YORK, INC., Bufny Houses Associates, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. Black United Fund of New York, Inc., et al., Defendants–Respondents.
Howard I. Horn, Garden City, for appellants. Dentons U.S. LLP, New York (Charles E. Dorkey III of counsel, New York), for Black United Fund of New York, Inc. and Robert Williams, respondents. Herrick Feinstein, LLP, New York (Michelle M. Sekowski of counsel), for 2261–2273 ACP Residences, LLC, BUF Plaza, LLC and First American Title Insurance Company, respondent. Fidelity National Group, New York (Michael C. Sferlazza of counsel), for Chicago Title Insurance Company, respondents.
Howard I. Horn, Garden City, for appellants.
Dentons U.S. LLP, New York (Charles E. Dorkey III of counsel, New York), for Black United Fund of New York, Inc. and Robert Williams, respondents.
Herrick Feinstein, LLP, New York (Michelle M. Sekowski of counsel), for 2261–2273 ACP Residences, LLC, BUF Plaza, LLC and First American Title Insurance Company, respondent.
Fidelity National Group, New York (Michael C. Sferlazza of counsel), for Chicago Title Insurance Company, respondents.
Acosta, P.J., Renwick, Mazzarelli, Singh, JJ.
Plaintiffs argue that a subsequent purchaser of the real property at issue did not have a protected interest in that property because the purchaser had constructive knowledge of a prior, fraudulent transfer of the property arising from a discrepancy in the deed (see generally M.L.C. Constr., Inc. v. Hui Ru Zhang, 162 A.D.3d 410, 410, 75 N.Y.S.3d 30 [1st Dept. 2018] ; ABN AMRO Mort. Group, Inc. v. Pantoja, 91 A.D.3d 440, 441, 936 N.Y.S.2d 163 [1st Dept. 2012] ; Real Property Law § 266 ). The alleged discrepancy in the prior deed did not give the purchaser constructive notice of plaintiffs' interest in the property.
On their motions to renew, plaintiffs failed to present the motion court with any new material facts as to the purchaser's protected status in the property ( CPLR 2221[e] ). Similarly, plaintiffs do not dispute the basis for the motion court's sanctions—that the 2014 action was brought to delay the resolution of 2005 litigation or to harass the purchaser—or the type of sanctions—no more than $5,000 in attorneys' fees for defending that action and a bar to bringing further actions or proceedings regarding the premises without prior leave of the court ( 22 NYCRR 130–1.1 [a], [c][2] ).
Plaintiffs' argument regarding aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty is improperly raised for the first time on appeal.
Plaintiffs have not articulated any basis for us to interfere in the motion court's referral of certain issues.
No appeal lies from the denial of leave to reargue ( Espinal v. City of New York, 107 A.D.3d 411, 967 N.Y.S.2d 29 [1st Dept. 2013] ).
We have considered plaintiffs' remaining arguments and find them without merit.