Opinion
Nos. 05-74325, 05-76149.
This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a)(2).
Filed December 10, 2007.
Teresa Salazar, Law Offices of Martin Resendez Guajardo, A Professional Corporation, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioners.
Ronald E. Lefevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Oil, Patricia A. Smith, Esq., DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Div./Office of Immigration Lit., Washington, DC, for Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Agency Nos. A73-398-053, A73-398-054, A73-398-055.
Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Carlos Alberto Marquez Buenrostro, his wife and daughter, all natives and citizens of Mexico, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") order denying their first motion to reopen deportation proceedings (No. 05-74325) and the BIA's order denying their second motion to reopen deportation proceedings (No. 05-76149). To the extent we have jurisdiction, it is conferred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion, Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir. 2003), and we deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review in No. 05-74325, and we deny the petition for review in No. 05-76149.
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners' first motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed more than two years after the BIA's final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of final administrative decision), and the BIA clarified its earlier ruling in accordance with Lanza v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2004), in any event.
We lack jurisdiction to consider Petitioners' challenge to the BIA's underlying order dismissing their direct appeal from the immigration judge's decision because the petition for review is not timely as to that order. See Singh v. INS, 315 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2003)
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners' second motion to reopen because it was numerically barred and did not meet any of the regulatory exceptions. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3). Moreover, the BIA properly concluded that Petitioners were not eligible for repapering because a final administrative order had been issued. See, e.g., Alcaraz v. INS, 384 F.3d 1150, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining eligibility requirements for repapering).