Opinion
CIV NO. 3:15-CV-960
07-13-2018
ALEXANDER BRUNELLE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF SCRANTON, et al., Defendants.
(Judge Mariani)
( ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Factual Background
The plaintiff in this litigation, Alexander Brunelle, is a real estate contractor and developer who initiated this lawsuit on May 15, 2015, and is now bringing an eleven-count complaint against the City of Scranton and affiliated defendants, charging them with a host of illegal and arbitrary actions allegedly taken relative to the plaintiff's business activities and properties in Scranton. (Doc. 28.) There are several potentially dispositive motions pending before the court which have been filed by the defendants, (Docs. 30, 44), but this matter also comes before the Court for consideration of the defendants' motion to stay this litigation pending the resolution of several other cases. (Doc. 49.) Specifically, the defendants cite four other categories of pending litigation that, in their view, should be resolved prior to this lawsuit and suggest that the court should stay further proceedings in this case pending the resolution of this other litigation.
The first of these collateral cases does not directly involve any of the parties to this federal civil rights case. Rather, it is a state criminal prosecution of a person who is not a party to this lawsuit, another Scranton area developer, Vsevolod Garanin. Garanin has been charged with insurance fraud relating to a property that Garanin owns in Scranton. Brunelle's connection to this state criminal case is somewhat tangential. He is not named as a defendant in this case, but a company in which he has an interest is apparently mentioned as a firm which provided bids to Garanin which Garanin later used in what is alleged to have been an insurance fraud scheme. In the absence of any allegation of wrongdoing on Brunelle's part, however, it appears that his status in this matter presently is that of a potential witness, a person whose conduct fell within the scope of the investigation.
The second category of litigation that the defendants suggest compels a stay of this lawsuit consists of some appeals of traffic citations. In particular, the defendants note that Brunelle has brought malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims against the defendants arising out of what Brunelle alleges was disparate and meritless enforcement of non-traffic citations and other infractions. While it appears that Brunelle was acquitted on a number of these charges, it also seems that he was convicted of other offenses and may have several summary offense appeals pending. The Defendants contend, therefore, that this lawsuit should be stayed pending the resolution of all of these traffic court appeals.
Third, the defendants argue that a zoning board decision appeal in state court also requires a stay of this longstanding federal civil rights litigation. Specifically, the defendants note that one count of Brunelle's complaint contains an unlawful taking claim relating to some particular properties in Scranton. According to the defendants, Brunelle has appealed one of these zoning board decisions to the court of common pleas, and that zoning board appeal remains pending. Defendants assert, therefore, that this multi-count federal civil rights lawsuit should be stayed pending the resolution of this particular zoning appeal.
Finally, the defendants note that three paragraphs of Brunelle's 67-page, 273-paragraph civil complaint contain allegations that the defendants' attempted enforcement of a local rental registration ordinance was discriminatory. Defendants note that in separate state court class action litigation the court of common pleas has authorized the collection of these fees, and also suggests that in light of this state litigation this federal case should be stayed.
Brunelle disagrees. According to Brunelle, the delay of this case while these other, collateral cases are resolved is unnecessary and the balance of the discretionary factors which the court must consider in determining whether the stay litigation weighs heavily in favor of denying this stay.
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that a stay is not necessary here and recommend that the district court deny the defendants' motion to stay this litigation, but without prejudice to either party moving for a stay or other relief if a change in circumstances provides good cause to reconsider the issuance of a stay.
While we submit a resolution of this motion to the district court as a report and recommendation, we are mindful that we may rule upon motions to stay as non-dispositive matters, and in fact have done so at the urging of the district court in other cases. See Garanin v. City of Scranton, No. 3:14-CV-2129. (Mannion, J.) Nonetheless we present this issue to the district court through a Report and Recommendation in the first instance because we recognize that a decision on this stay request by us effects the case management decisions that must be made by the district court with respect to its own docket.
II. Discussion
The legal standards which govern stay requests are familiar ones and emphasize the court's broad discretion. Nonetheless that discretion is guided by certain basic principles. As part of the district court's power to control the disposition of civil matters that come before it, the court has the power to stay proceedings when judicial economy or other interests may require. Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936); see also CTF Hotel Holdings, Inc. v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 381 F.3d 131, 136 (3d Cir. 2004); Barker v. Kane, 149 F. Supp. 3d 521, 525 and n.42 (M.D. Pa. 2016). "A stay is an extraordinary measure, and the decision to impose a stay rests within the sound discretion of the district court." Barker v. Kane, 149 F. Supp. 3d 521, 525 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (citing In re Adelphia Commcn's Secs. Litig., No. 02-1781, 2003 WL 22358819, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 13, 2003); see also Landis, 299 U.S. at 254-56. When determining whether to stay a civil case pending resolution of a related proceedings, courts consider the following factors:
(1) the extent to which the issues in the civil and criminal cases overlap; (2) the status of the criminal proceedings, including whether any defendants have been indicted; (3) the plaintiff's interests in expeditious civil proceedings weighed against the prejudice to the plaintiff caused by the delay; (4) the burden on the defendants; (5) the interests of the court; and (6) the public interest.Barker, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 525-26 (citations omitted).
In this case we find that the assessment of these considerations weighs in favor of denying this motion to stay at the present time. We consider each of those factors below.
A. Degree of Overlap
The degree of overlap between the various pending cases is considered by many courts to be "the most important threshold issue" in determining whether or not to stay the civil action pending the outcome of other cases. Id. at 526 (citing cases). The parties here disagree sharply over the degree of overlap between these various cases, but we find that with respect to the state criminal prosecution of Vsevolod Garanin on insurance fraud charges, and the state class action litigation that relates to the City of Scranton's rental registration ordinance, there is very little overlap between these cases, and the instant federal lawsuit. Brunelle is not a party to state the criminal prosecution of Garanin. Typically, "[a] stay is more appropriate when criminal charges have been filed against the moving party." Barker, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 527. Therefore, Brunelle's non-party status in this state criminal case suggests that this federal lawsuit need not be stayed while Garanin's criminal charges are adjudicated. Furthermore, the collection of rental registration fees is a very minor part of this federal lawsuit, comprising only three paragraphs in a 67 page 273 paragraph civil complaint. Accordingly, the overlap between this tangential aspect of Brunelle's federal complaint and the state court class action litigation regarding Scranton's rental registration ordinance seems minimal.
We note that in Garanin v. City of Scranton, No. 3:14-CV-2129. (Mannion, J.) we granted a stay request. That decision, however, is readily distinguishable from the instant case since Garanin was the named defendant in a pending felony case, whereas Brunelle is not charged in connection with this case. The difference between a defendant, and non-defendant is significant for a number of reasons. For example, we note that the Garanin case presented an additional factor which is not present here to the same degree that it was in Garanin. In Garanin the plaintiff understandably declined to answer questions relating to his pending state criminal charges, since those questions implicated his Fifth Amendment privilege. The same considerations do not apply here with respect to Brunelle, who appears to have answered a number of questions at his deposition concerning the criminal case lodged against Garanin before his counsel interposed a relevance objection to those questions. --------
There is admittedly some greater potential overlap between Brunelle's malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and unlawful taking claims and the pending traffic citation and zoning board appeals. However, these pending state court appeals are not integral to the plaintiffs' federal claims, since the malicious prosecution claims rests upon what are alleged to have been a host of traffic citations upon which Brunelle was acquitted, and Brunelle's unlawful taking claim involves two properties, only one of which appears to be the subject of a zoning appeal. In short, both of these claims entail conduct which is, in part, independent from the issues in these state court appeals. Furthermore, these claims comprise only a discrete portion of the eleven-count federal civil rights complaint lodged by Brunelle. Moreover, the merits of all of these claims are the subject of pending motions filed by the defendants, motions which will be addressed separately by this court. After these potentially dispositive motions are resolved the court and the parties will be a position to make much more informed judgments with respect to the importance of this pending state litigation to the remaining issues in this federal case, yet another factor which suggests that a stay would be premature at this time. Given these facts, we find that consideration of the degree of overlap in these cases weighs against the defendants' stay request.
B. Status of Other Proceedings
When considering stay requests based upon other litigation we are also enjoined that: "Stays of indefinite duration are especially discouraged . . . , because they put the parties 'effectively out of court.'" Structural Grp., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. CIV.A 1:07-CV-01793, 2008 WL 4616843, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2008). We are mindful of this consideration in the instant case, and believe that this factor also weighs against the entry of a stay at this time. Indeed, in our view the stay proposed by the defense in this case is precisely the type of stay which is highly disfavored, a stay of potentially indefinite duration. This stay would be conditioned upon the following events: (1) the resolution of a criminal case involving a non-party defendant, Mr. Garanin; (2) the adjudication of some traffic citation appeals; (3) the completion of a state court zoning board appeal; and (4) the litigation of a state court putative class action lawsuit. Individually these cases have uncertain durations. Taken in combination, the time required to complete all of this other, collateral litigation is incalculable, but plainly prolonged. Simply put, since the duration of this stay is unknown, and unknowable, but is likely of a lengthy duration, this factor also weighs against granting the defendants' request to stay these proceedings.
C. Prejudice to the Parties and Interests of the Court and the Public
Courts are also to consider the risk of prejudice to the plaintiff if the litigation is stayed. Barker, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 528. "The mere fact of a less expeditious resolution is insufficient to show prejudice." Id. Instead, parties opposing a stay may be required to show particularly unique injury, such as financial harm or an attempt by the moving party to gain unfair advantage from the stay of proceedings. Id. Likewise, both the Court and the public generally have an interest in the efficient adjudication of civil matters, an interest which must be considered and often favors the prompt resolution of cases. Barker, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 529 (citations omitted).
In this case we conclude that these factors all favor prompt consideration of the merits of this longstanding federal civil rights lawsuit and caution against a stay of this litigation. Here, we find that the harms complained of by Brunelle are now more than three years old, and the injuries alleged by the plaintiff have not yet been addressed. Thus, further delay results in some prejudice to Brunelle. Moreover, an indefinite delay of these proceedings pending the completion of multi-faceted litigation of other collateral matters is not in the public's interest and would be antithetical to the efficient administration of justice. In particular, entry of a stay would be inappropriate and premature at this time since it would delay the resolution of the pending, and potentially dispositive, motions filed by the defendants. In our view, all parties deserve to have these motions considered on their merits in a timely manner. Therefore, these factors also appear to favor denial of this motion to stay, at least until after the court addresses the potentially dispositive motions filed by the defendants. At the point where those motions are resolved the court and all parties will then be able to make more informed judgments on the future course, scope and direction of this litigation.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the defendants' motion for a temporary stay of this litigation, (Doc. 49), be DENIED without prejudice to the either party seeking reconsideration of this matter in the event circumstances become materially changed, or if there otherwise exists good cause for the Court to re-examine whether a stay is appropriate.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 13th day of July, 2018.
S/Martin C . Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge