Opinion
Civil No. 03-426-SLR.
April 25, 2007
Albert James Brown, Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Wilmington, DE, Pro se Plaintiff.
Dana Spring Monzo, Esquire, McCullough McKenty, P.A., Wilmington, DE, for Defendant Tammy Y. Kastre.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 24, 2003, Albert James Brown, a pro se plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis ("plaintiff"), filed the present action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Dave Williams, Courtney Porstman, and Warden Raphael Williams (collectively, the "State defendants"). (D.I. 2) On May 24, 2006, plaintiff amended his complaint to add Tammy Y. Kastre ("Kastre") as a defendant. (D.I. 60) Plaintiff asserts four claims, all of which arise under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff requests declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and compensatory and punitive damages. (D.I. 8 at 16) The court has jurisdiction over the present suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Before the court is Kastre's motion to dismiss. (D.I. 71) For the reasons that follow, the court grants defendant's motion.
The statute provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in the action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff has also alleged Eighth Amendment violations by Courtney A., Diana Hernandez, Doctor Alvin Kingcade, Doctor Ali, Doctor N. Shah, and PA Ina (collectively, the "medical defendants"), claiming inadequate medical care. (D.I. 8 at 13)
II. BACKGROUND
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
EighthFourteenth 12Kost v. Kozakiewicz 1 F.3d 176183See Trump Hotels Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts, Inc.140 F.3d 478483Id. See Conley v. Gibson355 U.S. 4145-46See Haines v. Kerner 404 U.S. 519520-21Gibbs v. Roman116 F.3d 8386Urrutia v. Harrisburg County Police Dep't 91 F.3d 451456See Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc. 926 F.2d 14061409
Plaintiff alleges that on the night of his arrest, he was the victim of police brutality, assault, and battery. (D.I. 8 at 1) Plaintiff has filed a separate complaint regarding that incident in Civ. No. 03-404-SLR.
State defendants moved for summary judgment, which the court granted noting that liability in a civil rights action cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior. (D.I. 46 at 9) Plaintiff's claims against the medical defendants are still pending.
Specifically, plaintiff alleges that Kastre "is [at] fault [for] the responsibilities of Dr. Shah, supervisor Courtney Portsman, Alvin A. Kingcade, Dr. Ali, PA Ina, [and] Diana Hernandez." (D.I. 51)
IV. DISCUSSION
The Third Circuit has concluded that a person in a supervisory position cannot be the moving force behind a constitutional violation of a subordinate unless the supervisor has exhibited deliberate indifference to the plight of the person deprived. See Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989); Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 902 (1st Cir. 1988)). In addition, "a defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior." Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (citingParratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 537 n. 3 (1981); Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077, 1082 (3d Cir. 1976)). Personal involvement can be established through allegations of either personal direction or actual knowledge and acquiesence (deliberate indifference); however, such allegations must be made with particularity. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. Finally, the Supreme Court has held that supervising officials do not violate the constitutional rights of victims of misconduct unless they have had an affirmative part in the misconduct. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 377 (1976); Commonwealth of Pa. v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306, 336 (3d. Cir. 1981) (requiring that supervising officials play an affirmative role in violating the plaintiff's rights and that an official's misconduct "cannot be merely a failure to act").
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege personal involvement on behalf of Kastre in order to subject her to liability. Plaintiff's allegations have not been made with the requisite particularity. In both his motion to amend the complaint and his answering brief to Kastre's motion to dismiss, plaintiff failed to state any affirmative actions on the part of Kastre. (D.I. 51, 59, 73) Plaintiff only related that Kastre is the owner of First Correctional Medical and that she, therefore, is responsible for the actions of the medical personnel. (D.I. 51) Without specific instances in which Kastre affirmatively knew of or participated in the withholding of constitutionally adequate medical care to plaintiff, it can be inferred that plaintiff intends to hold her liable by virtue of her position. Because § 1983 prohibits the imposition of liability on the sole basis of the doctrine of respondeat superior, the court concludes that plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 n. 14 (3d Cir. 1993).
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, defendant's motion to dismiss is granted. An appropriate order shall issue.
ORDER
At Wilmington this 25th day of April, 2007, consistent with the memorandum opinion issued this same date;
IT IS ORDERED that defendant Kastre's motion to dismiss (D.I. 71) is granted.