Opinion
No. 1652 C.D. 2011
03-05-2012
BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, President Judge HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
This case was assigned to the opinion writer on or before January 6, 2012, when President Judge Leadbetter completed her term as President Judge.
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE LEAVITT
Erin J. Brown (Claimant), pro se, petitions for review of an adjudication of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) denying her claim for benefits. In doing so, the Board affirmed the decision of the Referee that Claimant was ineligible for benefits under Section 402(b) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law) because she voluntarily quit her job without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature. The Board held that job dissatisfaction did not constitute a necessitous and compelling reason. We affirm.
Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. § 802(b). In relevant part, Section 402(b) provides that an employee is ineligible for compensation when "his unemployment is due to voluntarily leaving work without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature[.]" 43 P.S. §802(b).
Claimant worked as a Customer Service Agent for Regional Elite Services, Delta Connection (Employer), at the Wilkes-Barre/Scranton International Airport, from July 13, 2000, to January 5, 2011. Claimant quit her job on January 7, 2011, because she was unhappy with the working environment, which she found overwhelmingly stressful. Claimant applied for unemployment compensation benefits, asserting that she quit for mental health reasons. Certified Record, Item 2 (C.R., Item___).
Claimant worked Saturday to Wednesday. Claimant's final day of work, January 5, 2011, was a Wednesday. However, Claimant did not tell Employer she quit until Friday, January 7, 2011.
The UC Service Center denied benefits under Section 402(b) of the Law for Claimant's failure to prove that she had a necessitous and compelling reason to quit. Claimant appealed, asserting that she suffered from an eating disorder and that she feared a relapse would be caused by the stress at work. A telephone hearing was held before a Referee on April 27, 2011, because Claimant had relocated to Michigan to further her education. Employer did not participate in the hearing.
Claimant testified that she believed Employer was trying to get rid of employees, like her, who had seniority. New hires were allowed to choose their jobs and were not trained, thereby leaving the senior employees with the responsibility to "do everything." See C.R., Item 9, Notes of Testimony at 11 (N.T. ___). At the same time new employees were not disciplined, as were senior employees. Claimant acknowledged that she did not contact Employer's human resources department to voice her displeasure because she thought it would be a waste of time. Claimant did speak to her branch manager about her displeasure and called Employer's confidential "stress hotline." N.T. 13. Neither of these actions was productive. Claimant was also frustrated by a reduction in her pay and hours that had been effected two years earlier.
Claimant testified that workplace stress caused her to quit. Specifically, Claimant explained that she struggled with an eating disorder for approximately six years in the 1990s. She feared that she would resume her eating disorder as a mechanism for coping with workplace stress.
Regarding the timing of her resignation, Claimant stated that in March 2010 she had requested leave for December 2010, but Employer did not process her request quickly, as was the norm. When Claimant gave two weeks' notice of her resignation in early December, her leave request was denied. Claimant rescinded her two weeks' notice, so that she could receive her leave, and then resigned on January 7, 2011.
Claimant admitted that when she submitted her two weeks' notice, Employer offered to transfer her to Michigan, which she declined. According to Claimant, she declined Employer's offer because she assumed the work environment in Michigan would be no better and wanted a "fresh start." See N.T. 13
The Referee admitted various documents into the record, including a letter from Ann D. Smith, a licensed clinical social worker, who treated Claimant for her eating disorder. Smith stated that she had been treating Claimant for a "severe eating disorder for the past 14 years." C.R., Item 6 (emphasis in original). She noted that over the preceding two years Claimant suffered from stress at work due to various factors including, inter alia, pay cuts and management policies. Smith stated that she was "concern[ed] [Claimant] might slip back into her eating disorder patterns." Id. Her letter did not state that it was medically necessary for Claimant to resign, and Claimant acknowledged that Smith did not advise her to resign.
The Referee affirmed the UC Service Center's decision. The Referee found that Claimant was dissatisfied with her working environment, declined to be transferred to another office and, instead, voluntarily quit. The Referee found that Claimant did not have a necessitous and compelling reason to resign and, thus, was ineligible for benefits. Claimant appealed to the Board, asserting the Referee erred by assigning no weight to the fact that she had an eating disorder.
In unemployment compensation proceedings the Board is the ultimate fact-finding body. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Wright, 347 A.2d 328, 329 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1975). As such, it is empowered to resolve conflicts in evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, and determine the weight to be assigned evidence. Id.
The Board adopted the Referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law and found Claimant ineligible for benefits. Claimant then petitioned for this Court's review.
Claimant fails to challenge any of the Board's findings of fact; therefore, they are conclusive on appeal. Campbell v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 694 A.2d 1167, 1169 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997).
Our review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, whether errors of law were committed, and whether findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Beddis v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 6 A.3d 1053, 1055 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). We are to review the case in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed before the Board, drawing all logical and reasonable inferences from the testimony. Taylor v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 474 Pa. 351, 354, 378 A.2d 829, 831 (1977). Further, we are bound by the facts certified in the record on appeal. Grever v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review , 989 A.2d 400, 402 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).
On appeal, Claimant sets forth three questions for our review, which we restate as one for clarity. Simply, Claimant argues that the Board erred in basing its decision solely upon her dissatisfaction with her job and not addressing her eating disorder. Conversely, the Board argues that all of Claimant's issues are waived because her brief does not comply with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Board also argues that, even if Claimant preserved an issue for review, its determination was proper.
Claimant's brief does not comply with the appellate rules. Nevertheless, we decline to find that Claimant's argument is waived because this Court generally construes pro se filings liberally. Robinson v. Schellenberg, 729 A.2d 122, 124 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999).
Section 402(b) of the Law states, in relevant part, that "an employe shall be ineligible for compensation for any week ... [in] which his unemployment is due to voluntarily leaving work without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature[.]" 43 P.S. §802(b) (emphasis added). An employee bears the burden of proving that her voluntary quit was the result of necessitous and compelling reasons, which are circumstances that would compel a reasonable person to resign. Renda v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 837 A.2d 685, 692 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). Lack of work, perpetual layoffs, and drastic reductions in hours are examples of necessitous and compelling reasons to terminate one's employment. Staub v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 673 A.2d 434, 437 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996). However, mere dissatisfaction with one's job is not a necessitous and compelling reason to quit. Brunswick Hotel and Conference Center, LLC v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 906 A.2d 657, 660 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).
Whether one has a necessitous and compelling reason to quit is the ultimate conclusion drawn from the underlying factual findings and, as such, is subject to appellate review. Taylor v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 474 Pa. 351, 358, 378 A.2d 829, 832 (1977).
A health problem may constitute a necessitous and compelling reason to quit but the claimant must prove, by competent evidence, that the problem existed at the time of termination. See Tyler v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 591 A.2d 1164, 1168 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991). It is well-settled that, in order for a health problem to constitute a necessitous and compelling reason to quit a claimant must inform her employer of her medical problem before quitting. Fox v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 522 A.2d 713, 715 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987).
A claimant must explain her inability to perform regularly assigned duties, regardless of whether she thinks it would be futile, because only through communication can an employer be afforded an opportunity to accommodate a claimant. Fox, 522 A.2d at 715. --------
Claimant contends that the Board erred by not finding that workplace stress gave her a necessitous and compelling reason to quit in light of her eating disorder. We disagree.
The Board found that Claimant quit because of her displeasure with the stressful working environment. As noted, mere displeasure with one's work environment does not, itself, provide a necessitous and compelling reason to quit. Brunswick Hotel and Conference Center, 906 A.2d at 660. The Board's finding is supported by Claimant's own testimony. Although Claimant cited her eating disorder, she produced no evidence that she had an eating disorder at the time she quit. Rather, she proved a previous eating disorder and a present fear that she could relapse. Speculation does not constitute a necessitous and compelling reason to quit. Renda, 837 A.2d at 692-694. In addition, Claimant did not inform Employer of her eating disorder, which was also fatal to her claim of a necessitous and compelling reason to quit. Fox, 522 A.2d at 715. Accordingly, the Board did not need to make findings about Claimant's history of eating disorder.
For these reasons, we affirm the Board.
/s/_________
MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 5th day of March, 2012, the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, dated July 19, 2011, in the above-captioned matter is hereby AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge