Summary
affirming postconviction court's order denying juvenile offender's rule 3.800 motion challenging his sentence of forty years’ imprisonment because "this is not the functional equivalent of a life sentence"
Summary of this case from Nugent v. StateOpinion
No. 1D18-4888
04-23-2021
Donta BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Glen P. Gifford, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Tabitha Herrera, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Glen P. Gifford, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Tabitha Herrera, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
Per Curiam.
On December 11, 2020, the Florida Supreme Court quashed our decision in this case and remanded the matter for reconsideration in light of its decision in Pedroza v. State , 291 So. 3d 541 (Fla. 2020). In Pedroza , the supreme court held that "a juvenile offender's sentence does not implicate Graham [v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) ], and therefore Miller [v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) ], unless it meets the threshold requirement of being a life sentence or the functional equivalent of a life sentence." Id. at 548.
Appellant was sentenced to 40 years’ incarceration when he was 16 years old. We conclude that this is not the functional equivalent of a life sentence. See id. at 543, 549 (holding that Pedroza's forty-year sentence was not "a life sentence or the functional equivalent of a life sentence"); see also Hart v. State , 313 So.3d 155 (Fla. 1st DCA Dec. 31, 2020). Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to be resentenced, and the trial court did not err in denying his motion to correct illegal sentence.
AFFIRMED .
Lewis, Osterhaus, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.