Opinion
C. A. 3:23-2967-JFA-SVH
08-29-2023
Walter Tyrone Brown, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Prisma Health Hospital Richland and Prisma Health Hospital Richland Springs, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SHIVA V. HODGES, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Walter Tyrone Brown, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) sues Prisma Health Hospital Richland and Prisma Health Hospital Richland Springs (“Defendants”), alleging they unlawfully sent him to a mental health hospital. Defendants seek dismissal, arguing in part that Plaintiff's case is barred by res judicata and barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
Plaintiff originally filed his complaint in this court on June 23, 2023, concerning events that are alleged to have occurred on May 26, 2016, when he was “sent into a mental health institution by Prisma Health Medical Doctor without [his] consent.” [ECF No. 1-1 at 5].
This matter comes before the court on Defendants' motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment. [ECF No. 15]. Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Petitioner of the motion and dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately. [ECF No. 17]. The motion having been fully briefed [ECF Nos. 20, 21], it is ripe for disposition.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), this matter has been referred to the undersigned for all pretrial proceedings. Having carefully considered the parties' submissions and the record in this case, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendants' motion.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
In 2022, Plaintiff filed both a complaint and notice of intent to file suit in Richland County Court of Common Pleas (“state court”) against Prisma Health Hospital, alleging that “Prisma health hospital and doctors lied and insulted me by treating me as a mental health patient . . . [o]n May 26, 2016 . . . .” [ECF No. 15-3 at 3 (complaint), see also ECF No. 15-4 (state court notice of intent to file suit)].In his complaint, Plaintiff stated he was suing for “[f]ale health records, Negligence, medical bill[s] and travel cost and pain and suffering” and “[f]or being negligent as a doctor by not making sure I was who they could treat as a mental health patient and make take medication or administer those type[s] of drugs at a high dosage . . . .” [ECF No. 15-3 at 5-6 (errors in original)]. In total, Plaintiff sought to recover $3,053,950 in damages. Id. at 6.
The court takes judicial notice of Plaintiff's prior case. See, e.g., Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record.”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”); Andrews v. Daw, 201 F.3d 521, 524 n.1 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[W]hen entertaining a motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata, a court may take judicial notice of facts from a prior judicial proceeding when the res judicata defense raises no disputed issue of fact.”) (citing Thomas v. Consolidation Coal Co., 380 F.2d 69, 75 (4th Cir. 1967)).
On June 14, 2023, the state court judge found:
This matter came before the Court on June 14, 2023 on the Motion of Defendant Prisma Health Hospital seeking an Order dismissing the case for failure to comply with the mandatory pleading requirements as found in South Carolina Code Ann. §§ 15-36-100 and 15-79-125 by failing to file with the Notice of Intent to File Suit an affidavit of a competent expert witness and answers to standard interrogatories and upon Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment. All parties were present for the hearing. The Court finds Defendant timely filed a Motion to Dismiss in lieu of an Answer as provided in Rule 12, SCRCP. As such, Plaintiff's Motion is denied. The Court further finds Plaintiff has failed to comply with the mandatory pleading requirements. As such, the matter must be dismissed. Defendant's Motion is hereby granted.[ECF No. 15-1, see also ECF No. 15-2 (order dated the same day by same state court judge dismissing notice of intent to file suit)].
Now, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this court on June 23, 2023, again seeking $3,053,950 in damages. [ECF No. 1 at 3]. Plaintiff alleges as follows:
My facts start at me being sent into a Mental health institution by Prisma Health Medical Doctor Dana M. Narn from the hospital Richland without my consent. MD Narn did not tell me what the health records I have obtained have on it. Other doctors
at Prisma Health Hospital Richland Springs would not allow me to leave the mental health hospital (holding me against my will), while being held at [their] mental hospital the doctors from Richland and Richland Springs agree to use a high dosage drug which I believe is unconstitutional to drug someone and make them take medication which makes you have bad headaches. Okay, my arrest record is clear I have not been adjudicated or committed to a mental health hospital, but these hospitals and doctors refuse to change the lies they put on my health record and background.[ECF No. 1-1 at 5 (errors in original)].
II. Discussion
A. Standard on Motion to Dismiss
To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The court is “not required to accept as true the legal conclusions set forth in a plaintiff's complaint.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999). Indeed, “[t]he presence of a few conclusory legal terms does not insulate a complaint from dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when the facts alleged in the complaint cannot support” the legal conclusion. Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 577 (4th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, in analyzing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court may consider “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs. Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). When a federal court is evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dept of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Standard on Motion for Summary Judgment
The court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is appropriate; if the movant carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). If a movant asserts that a fact cannot be disputed, it must support that assertion either by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials;” or “showing . . . that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248. Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts that set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. Weller, 901 F.2d 387.
C. Analysis
1. Res Judicata
“The doctrine of res judicata encompasses two concepts: 1) claim preclusion and 2) issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel.” Orca Yachts, L.L.C. v. Mollicam, Inc., 287 F.3d 316, 318 (4th Cir. 2002). Under the doctrine of res judicata, “[a] final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.” Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981); see also Pueschel v. United States, 369 F.3d 345, 354 (4th Cir. 2004).
Claim preclusion under South Carolina law has three elements: “(1) identity of the parties; (2) identity of the subject matter; and (3) adjudication of the issue in the former suit.” Plum Creek Dev. Co., Inc. v. City of Conway, 512 S.E.2d 106, 109 (S.C. 1999); see also Stone v. Roadway Express, Employer, 627 S.E.2d 695, 697 (S.C. 2006) (outlining the factors as “1) a final, valid judgment on the merits; 2) identity of parties; and 3) the second action must involve matters properly included in the first suit.”).
“The Full Faith and Credit Act . . . requires federal courts to apply state res judicata law to determine the preclusive effects of a state court judgment.” Greengael, LC v. Bd. of Sup'rs of Culpeper Cty., Va., 313 Fed.Appx. 577, 579 (4th Cir. 2008).
There appears to be no dispute that the present action involves the same claims as Plaintiff's state court action or that both actions involve the same parties. However, the dismissal of Plaintiff's state court action was based, in part, on his failure to comply with the mandatory South Carolina pleading requirements in that, in part, he failed to file an affidavit of a competent expert witness. [See ECF No. 15-1]. This does not function as an adjudication of any of the issues presented. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Glenn, C/A No. 1:16-16-RMG, 2017 WL 1051011, at *4 (D.S.C. Mar. 20, 2017) (“A dismissal for failure to comply with S.C. Code Ann. § 15-36-100, however, is without prejudice.”) (citing Rotureau v. Chaplin, C/A No. 2:09-1388-DCN, 2009 WL 5195968, at *6 (D.S.C. Dec. 21, 2009)); Int'l Fid. Ins. Co. v. China Const. Am. (SC) Inc., 650 S.E.2d 677, 680 (S.C. Ct. App. 2007) (“a dismissal of a claim without prejudice is not an adjudication of the merits of the controversy and has no preclusive effect as a matter of law”) (citing McEachern v. Black, 496 S.E.2d 659, 663 (S.C. 1998)).
Therefore, the undersigned recommends denying Defendants' motion based on res judicata.
2. South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act
Plaintiff seeks the following relief, in part:
I'm suing for punitive damages for administering drugs 2,500,000, doctor medical bills of 35,967 with a compensation of 17,983 for sending me bill after I told them I did not need [their] services, pain and suffering for causing for me to go through things in life that I should be dealing with also for what do to me
while at [their] hospital and for drugging me.[ECF No. 1-1 at 6]. Plaintiff also seeks for the court to hold Defendants “accountable” for their actions and require them to correct his medical records. See id.
Plaintiff's negligence claim is one for alleged medical malpractice. The South Carolina Legislature enacted the Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act “in an effort to prevent the filing of frivolous lawsuits and initiate the investigation and settlement of cases prior to the filing of complaints.” Oakman v. Lincare, C/A No. 1:13-00428-JMC, 2013 WL 3549848, at *3 (D.S.C. July 10, 2013). It “requires the contemporaneous filing of an expert affidavit with the complaint in certain lawsuits alleging professional negligence.” Id.; see also S.C. Code Ann. § 15-36-100. The pertinent section provides:
Except as provided in Section 15-79-125, in an action for damages alleging professional negligence against a professional licensed by or registered with the State of South Carolina and listed in subsection (G) or against any licensed health care facility alleged to be liable based upon the action or inaction of a health care professional licensed by the State of South Carolina and listed in subsection (G), the plaintiff must file as part of the complaint an affidavit of an expert witness which must specify at least one negligent act or omission claimed to exist and the factual basis for each claim based on the available evidence at the time of the filing of the affidavit.S.C. Code Ann. § 15-36-100(B). Subsection (G) includes medical personnel.
Plaintiff did not file an affidavit contemporaneously with the filing of his complaint, and it does not appear any exception to this requirement is applicable in this case. See, e.g., SC Code Ann. § 15-36-100(C)(2) (“The contemporaneous filing requirement of subsection (B) is not required to support a pleaded specification of negligence involving subject matter that lies within the ambit of common knowledge and experience, so that no special learning is needed to evaluate the conduct of the defendant.”).
Therefore, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendants' motion as to Plaintiff's claim for medical malpractice.
To the extent that Plaintiff is asserting a cause of action under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) by claiming that false information has been entered into his medical records and in seeking a court order to have his records corrected, he does not have a cause of action. See, e.g., Payne v. Taslimi, 998 F.3d 648, 660 (4th Cir. 2021) (“HIPAA does not expressly allow for a private cause of action but delegates enforcement authority to the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, reflecting Congress's intent to forgo creating a private remedy.”). Plaintiff has submitted to the court documentation indicating that he requested an amendment to his medical records, that he was denied, and that he has submitted a statement disagreeing with the denial that has been placed in his chart. [See ECF No. 1-2 at 3-4, ECF No. 20-1].
3. Statute of Limitations
Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-545, the statute of limitations for bringing an action based on medical malpractice is three years. The statute of repose for such an action is six years. See id.
Plaintiff alleges the relevant acts occurred on or near May 26, 2016, just over seven years ago. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendants' motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations, dismissing Plaintiff's complaint with prejudice.
Although not clear, to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to bring additional claims based on his alleged involuntary commitment, it appears any such claims would also be barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See, e.g., SC Code Ann. § 15-3-550 (providing for a two-year statute of limitations for “an action for libel, slander, or false imprisonment”).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the recommends the district judge grant Defendants' motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment [ECF No. 15] and dismiss Plaintiff's claims against Defendants with prejudice.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).