Opinion
C/A 4:21-0670-TMC-TER
04-07-2022
DEMETRIUS ALEXANDER BROWN, PLAINTIFF, v. MAJ. CHANAE LUMPKIN, CAPT. BLANDING, STAFF SGT. RICHARDSON, AND MISS. WHITE Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Thomas E. Rogers, III United States Magistrate Judge
This is a civil action filed pro se by Demetrius Alexander Brown (“Plaintiff”/ “Brown”) on March 8, 2021. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on April 5, 2021. At the time he filed this action, Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee housed at the Sumter-Lee Regional Detention Center (SLDC). Plaintiff seeks monetary damages based on alleged civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et seq. This matter is currently before the court on the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Blanding, Lumpkin, and Richardson (hereinafter “Defendants”). (ECF No. 65). As the Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court issued an order on or about November 19, 2021, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the motion for summary judgment procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately. Plaintiff filed a response in opposition on November 29, 2021. (ECF No. 68). Defendants filed a reply on December 3, 2021. (ECF No. 69).
All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d),DSC. Because this is a dispositive motion, the report and recommendation is entered for review by the District Judge.
Based on the court's order of March 2, 2022, Defendant White filed an answer to the amended complaint on March 22, 2022, and the court entered an amended scheduling order on March 29, 2022. (ECF Nos. 77, 80, 82). Plaintiff filed a motion for summary Judgment as to Defendant White on April 6, 2022. (ECF No. 84).
Plaintiff filed a motion entitled “Motion to Compel/Emergency Injunction.” (ECF No. 71). In this motion, Plaintiff argues that Defendants' attorney, James Davis, Jr., should be held in contempt of court for “willfully giving false and misleading information/testimony under oath in this court” in Defendants' reply to the motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff argues that Defendants' attorney committed perjury in the reply to the response for summary judgment but does not assert that there are any discovery requests outstanding or that he submitted discovery to Defendants. This is not a proper motion to compel pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, Plaintiff requests an emergency injunction due to counsel allegedly providing false and misleading information to the court in the reply. (ECF No. 73). Plaintiff has not set forth what relief he desires and this is not a proper way to challenge the merits of the reply to summary judgment or to raise ethical issues against an attorney. These are not proper motions. However, the court will deem these motions a supplemental memorandum in opposition to summary judgment. Therefore, the motions (ECF Nos. 71 and 73) are moot.
DISCUSSION
STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The federal court is charged with liberally construing the complaints filed by pro se litigants, to allow them to fully develop potentially meritorious cases. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). The court's function, however, is not to decide issues of fact, but to decide whether there is an issue of fact to be tried. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a federal claim, Weller v. Dep't of Social Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990), nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. If none can be shown, the motion should be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
The moving party bears the burden of showing that summary judgment is proper. Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment is proper if the non-moving party fails to establish an essential element of any cause of action upon which the non-moving party has the burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. 317. Once the moving party has brought into question whether there is a genuine dispute for trial on a material element of the non-moving party's claims, the non-moving party bears the burden of coming forward with specific facts which show a genuine dispute for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The non-moving party must come forward with enough evidence, beyond a mere scintilla, upon which the fact finder could reasonably find for it. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1011 (4th Cir. 1991). However, the non-moving party may not rely on beliefs, conjecture, speculation, or conclusory allegations to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Barber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 874-75 (4th Cir. 1992). The evidence relied on must meet “the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at a trial on the merits.” Mitchell v. Data General Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th Cir. 1993).
To show that a genuine dispute of material fact exists, a party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (Rule 56(e) permits a proper summary judgment motion to be opposed by any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves). Rather, the party must present evidence supporting his or her position through “depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with ... affidavits, if any.” Id. at 322; see also Cray Communications, Inc. v. Novatel Computer Systems, Inc., 33 F.3d 390 (4th Cir. 1994); Orsi v. Kickwood, 999 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1993); Local Rules 7.04, 7.05, D.S.C.
ALLEGATIONS
In the amended complaint filed April 5, 2021, Plaintiff alleges while a pretrial detainee housed at the SLDC, Defendant Lumpkin denied him the right to wear his kufi in lock-up B-Pod (SMU) while on solitary confinement “until just recently when I was pulled out of my cell on Nov. 2021; showing me that the facility just adopted a new policy that permits religious headwear to be worn in our cubes and cells effective on October 1, 2021.” (ECF No. 68 at 3). Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Lumpkin would not allow him to order certain books he wanted by an African American author. As to Defendants Blanding and Richardson, Plaintiff alleges they reclassified him as a maximum-security inmate in order to punish him. Plaintiff alleges that his injuries are “Anxiety issues, emotional distress, mental anguish, and other grievous injuries in which I've been seeing mental health for in which I've been increased on several medications to due anxiety, stress, and depression dealing with the disclosed issues and situations.” (ECF No. 10 at 19 of 35). Plaintiff requests actual, punitive, and exemplary damages.
Defendants filed a reply arguing that the action is barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. They assert this is not a new claim as the only addition is his allegation that he was in lock-up. They assert that the crux of his allegations are the same; that Defendant Lumpkin violated his rights by not allowing him to wear his kufi. Further, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has brought a claim under RLUIPA in this action “after the District Court found in the prior action that was the appropriate vehicle to bring this action, and it is undisputed that he could have and should have brought a RLUIPA claim in the original action.” (ECF No. 69 at 2). Defendants assert that Plaintiff has provided “zero evidence that Blanding was involved in any of his allegations, and it is clear this Defendant had no involvement in these allegations.” Id. Additionally, Defendants argue that Defendant Lumpkin was not involved in the review and return of any books ordered by the Plaintiff, the regular part of her job did not deal with mail and books, and she was not the officer who responded to his complaints.
RES JUDICATA/COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
Defendants argue that the claims against Defendant Lumpkin are barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Specifically, Defendants assert that Plaintiff previously filed an action against Defendant Lumpkin under the same set of facts regarding the denial of his request to wear his religious clothing, or kufi, pleading a First and Fourteenth Amendment violation. Defendants point out that in the prior action, the court issued an order on March 3, 2021, finding that the Plaintiff could not establish a First Amendment claim under the factors from Turner v. Safely and found a valid rational connection between the complained of regulation and the legitimate governmental interest. (C/A No. 4:19-cv-2790-TMC, ECF No. 79). Further, the court found that the defendants in that case were entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established that their actions in following policy with regard to religious headgear and trying to keep both the Plaintiff and other inmates safe would violate any constitutional rights.
“Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an issue decided previously in judicial or administrative proceedings provided the party against whom the prior decision was asserted enjoyed a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in an earlier proceeding.” In re McNallen, 62 F.3d 619, 624 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980)). Thus, “[c]ollateral estoppel forecloses the relitigation of issues of fact or law that are identical to issues which have been actually determined and necessarily decided in prior litigation in which the party against whom [collateral estoppel] is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate.” Sedlack v. Braswell Servs. Group, Inc., 134 F.3d 219, 224 (4th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). To apply collateral estoppel or issue preclusion to an issue or fact, the proponent must demonstrate that (1) the issue or fact is identical to the one previously litigated; (2) the issue or fact was actually resolved in the prior proceeding; (3) the issue or fact was critical and necessary to the judgment in the prior proceeding; (4) the judgment in the prior proceeding is final and valid; and (5) the party to be foreclosed by the prior resolution of the issue or fact had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue or fact in the prior proceeding. See id.
Parties must “have a fair opportunity procedurally, substantively and evidentially to pursue [their] claim the first time.” Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of III. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 333 (1971) (quotation omitted); see also Scott v. Metro. Health Corp., No. 5:12-CV-383-F, 2013 WL 4520264, at *11 (E.D. N.C. Aug. 23, 2013). The party must have had the opportunity to litigate; it does not matter if it chose not to so litigate. See Sartin v. Macik, 535 F.3d 284, 290 (4th Cir. 2008); see also Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 332-33 (1979); SEC v. Resnick, 604 F.Supp.2d 773, 780 (D. Md. 2009). As the Fourth Circuit has explained, “[i]t is well settled that the full-and-fair opportunity formulation generally requires that a litigant receive reasonable notice of the claim against him and opportunity to be heard in opposition to that claim.” Holland v. Kohn, 12 Fed.Appx. 160, 166 (4th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original) (quotation omitted).
As the court noted in Cardenas v. Spinnaker Resorts, Inc., 2019 WL 7761751, at *3-4 (D.S.C. Mar. 5, 2019), clarified on denial of reconsideration, No. CV 9:18-761-BHH, 2019 WL 7761707 (D.S.C. July 3, 2019):
The doctrine of res judicata embodies two distinct preclusion concepts: (1) claim preclusion; and (2) issue preclusion (or collateral estoppel). Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 376 n. 1 (1985); Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n. 1 (1984). While claim preclusion refers to the preclusive effect of a judgment in foreclosing litigation of matters that should have been raised in an earlier suit, issue preclusion refers to the effect of a judgment in precluding the relitigation of particular matters that were actually litigated and decided. Briggs v. Newberry County School District, 838 F.Supp. 232 (D.S.C. 1992). “Issue preclusion is more narrowly drawn and ... operates to bar subsequent litigation of those legal and factual issues common to both actions that were ‘actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in the first litigation.' ” Orca Yachts, L.L.C. v. Mollicam, Inc., 287 F.3d 316, 318 (4th Cir. 2002). The Fourth Circuit has stated the following with respect to collateral estoppel:
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars subsequent litigation of legal and factual issues common to an earlier action that were “actually and necessarily determined” in the first litigation. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S.Ct. 970, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979); Combs v. Richardson, 838 F.2d 112, 114 (4th Cir. 1988). Thus, “[c]ollateral estoppel forecloses the relitigation of issues of
fact or law that are identical to issues which have been actually determined and necessarily decided in prior litigation in which the party against whom [collateral estoppel] is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate.” Sedlack v. Braswell Servs. Group, Inc., 134 F.3d 219, 224 (4th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). To apply collateral estoppel or issue preclusion to an issue or fact, the proponent must demonstrate that (1) the issue or fact is identical to the one previously litigated; (2) the issue or fact was actually resolved in the prior proceeding; (3) the issue or fact was critical and necessary to the judgment in the prior proceeding; (4) the judgment in the prior proceeding is final and valid; and (5) the party to be foreclosed by the prior resolution of the issue or fact had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue or fact in the prior proceeding.Id. at *5 quoting Malm v. Gonzales, 151 Fed.Appx. 252, 256 (4th Cir. 2005).
Thus, collateral estoppel prevents the relitigation of an issue of fact or law that was settled in a previous case. See Virginia Hosp. Ass'n v. Baliles, 830 F.2d 1308, 1311 (4th Cir.1987). It is related to the doctrine of res judicata, but it “can be applied to narrower portions of an action than is the case for res judicata.” United States v. Tatum, 943 F.2d 370, 382 (4th Cir.1991). “Issue preclusion is more narrowly drawn and ... operates to bar subsequent litigation of those legal and factual issues common to both actions that were ‘actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in the first litigation.” Orca Yachts, L.L.C., 287 F.3d at 318. Collateral estoppel may be used defensively as a bar if the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the previous suit; mutuality of the parties is not required. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313, 91 S.Ct. 1434, 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971); Thurston v. United States, 810 F.2d 438 (4th Cir.1987). In the court's prior order (C/A No.: 4:19-cv-2790-TMC), it was held that “Plaintiff failed to make a threshold showing that SLRDC's policy regarding religious headwear ‘places a substantial burden on his ability to practice his religion.'” (ECF No. 79 at 13). The Plaintiff's allegations of First and Fourteenth Amendment violations with regard to religious headgear, the kufi, were decided in his first case against the same party, Defendant Lumpkin. Additionally, in the court's prior order (C/A No.: 4:19-cv-2790-TMC), the court held that “Defendants' conduct as alleged by Plaintiff, even if true, would not have violated clearly established law putting them on notice that such conduct is unconstitutional. The court, therefore, concludes that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to this claim on the additional basis of qualified immunity.” Accordingly, it is recommended that these claims in the current case against Defendant Lumpkin be dismissed pursuant to res judicata and collateral estoppel.
Collateral estoppel “prevents a party from re-litigating in a subsequent suit an issue actually and necessarily litigated and determined in a prior action” Jinks v. Richland County, 355 S.C. 341, 585 S.E.2d 281 (S.C. 2003).
Defendants argue that any claim that Defendant Lumpkin should have followed policy, the claims are meritless as the record is clear that the policy did not allow religious headwear until the policy was changed and Defendant Lumpkin had no authority to change or violate the policy. It is further noted that Plaintiff is no longer a pretrial detainee and is currently housed at the Kirkland R & E Center.
Plaintiff has also raised a RLUIPA claim in this complaint against Defendant Lumpkin in which he claims his right to wear his kufi has been restricted by Defendant Lumpkin, and therefore, his constitutional rights based on RLUIPA have been violated. Defendants argue that this RLUIPA claim is barred because of collateral estoppel, that he only requested monetary damages, and the policy has been changed by the Sheriff to allow inmates to wear religious clothing in their cells or cubicles.
In Faver v. Clarke, 24 F.4th 954 (4th Cir. 2022), the Fourth Circuit stated the following:
Congress has specifically reaffirmed the First Amendment rights of inmates to the exercise of religion in prison with the enactment of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). That Act provides that no government may “impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution ... unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person ... is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest ... [and] is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). The “compelling governmental interest” clause, however, must be read to accord “due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators in establishing necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good order, security and discipline, consistent with consideration of costs and limited resources.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005) (citation omitted); see also Greenhill v. Clarke, 944 F.3d 243, 250 (4th Cir. 2019). And in this regard, “RLUIPA [is not meant] to elevate accommodation of religious observances over an institution's need to maintain order and safety.” Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722, 125 S.Ct. 2113; see also Couch v. Jabe, 679 F.3d 197, 201 (4th Cir. 2012).Faver v. Clarke, 24 F.4th at 959-60.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff has only requested monetary damages against Defendant Lumpkin. A prisoner bringing a cause of action under RLUIPA is not entitled to money damages against state defendants in either their individual or official capacities. See Ellis v. Lassiter, 848 Fed.Appx. 555, 556 (4th Cir. 2021) citing Wall v. Wade, 741 F.3d 492, 496 n.5 (4th Cir. 2014) (explaining that compensatory damages are not available under RLUIPA); Edwards v. Stephon, No. 220CV02459CMCMGB, 2021 WL 2419565, at *3 (D.S.C. May 6, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:20-CV-2459-CMC, 2021 WL 2417858 (D.S.C. June 14, 2021) (“a prisoner bringing a cause of action under RLUIPA is not entitled to money damages against state defendants in either their individual or official capacities.” citing Wall v. Wade, 741 F.3d at 496 n.5 (explaining that Congress did not authorize damages claims against state officials under RLUIPA). Further, Plaintiff has not requested injunctive relief in the amended complaint. However, even if Plaintiff requested injunctive relief, it would be moot as Plaintiff has been transferred to a different institution and the policy was changed. Therefore, it is recommended that Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted due to solely pursuing monetary damages under RLUIPA.
Personal Participation
Defendants argue that summary judgment should be granted because Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient personal participation by Defendant Blanding as to reclassification and as to Defendant Lumpkin for denying him certain books. In his response to summary judgment, Plaintiff attached the affidavits of two inmates, Monty Drayton and Charles Hice, Jr., who attest that they are incarcerated at the SLDC housed in B-Pod (SMU) and that incoming publications ordered by individual inmates have circulated among the inmates in B-pod and that they have read books by other authors they listed which contain profanity, drug use, killing, and sexual situations, explanations of how to commit crimes, murdering and violence but were still permitted without problems. (ECF Nos. 68-1 at 12-15 of 26). Defendants argue that Defendant Lumpkin does not create or establish policy relating to what books are allowed, and, therefore, cannot be liable for a claim related to ordering or receiving books. Defendants submitted the affidavit of Defendant Lumpkin in which she attests that she is employed by the Sumter County Sheriff's Office as the Deputy Major and Assistant Director at the Detention Center. (ECF No. 65-4). With regard to Plaintiff's allegation that Lumpkin denied him books he wanted to read by African American authors and purged books that were available in the library, she attests that the detention center has a concern over allowing books that will incite violence or discord among the inmates resulting in ceratin books and authors not being allowed. Id. The decision on not allowing a book or author is not meant to discriminate on the basis of race but is based on the safety and security of the institution. Id. Lumpkin attests that she is not aware of books being taken from a pod library, except in cases where contraband was involved and that she never personally purged books from a pod library. Id. Lumpkin attests that “I have never disallowed a book based on the race of the author, as I am an African American as well and would be offended if someone disallowed a book because the author was African American. Moreover, I am not involved in the day to day screening of mail that is coming into inmates.” Id. Defendants submitted the supplemental affidavit of Lumpkin attesting that Plaintiff attached several grievances concerning the ordering and receiving of books which were answered by officer “J524". (ECF No. 69-1). Lumpkin attests that she was not involved in those grievances and identifies her officer number which is a different J-number. Id. Further, Lumpkin is not in charge of deciding what books are allowed and generally is not involved in handling mail or receiving materials sent to inmates and certainly does not give “final approval” of what materials are allowed. Id.
The affiants do not make any mention of Defendant Lumpkin or that she participated in relation to ordering and receiving publications.
In order to assert a plausible § 1983 claim against any particular state actor, a “causal connection” must exist between the conduct alleged by the plaintiff and the particular defendant named in the suit. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.159, 166 (1985); Rizzo v. Good, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72 (1976) (a § 1983 plaintiff must show that he suffered a specific injury resulting from a specific defendant's specific conduct and must show an affirmative link between the injury and that conduct); Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir.1977) (for an individual to be liable under § 1983, the Plaintiff must show that the defendant named acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights). Plaintiff here must demonstrate that the official personally caused or played a role in causing the deprivation of a federal right. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 166 and Harris v. City of Va. Beach, 11 Fed. App'x 212, 215 (4th Cir.2001) (affirming dismissal of the plaintiff's claim against five defendants when the plaintiff did not allege any of the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of his civil rights). In his response, Plaintiff asserts that he had a couple of African American authored books “turned around” that did not pose any threat to the security of the facility or staff. (ECF No. 68 at 11). Plaintiff states that “when inquired about it was said that Maj. Lumpkin did not approve them when a lot of other books she has approved contain some of the same content as the books that were denied. . .” Id.
As to Defendant Blanding, Plaintiff alleges that she reclassified his custody status from medium to maximum security in September 2020. Defendants argue that she had nothing to do with classification as that is handled by the classification officer, Defendant Richardson. Defendants submitted the affidavit of Andrea Blanding who attests that at all times during the allegations in the Plaintiff's complaint, she was employed by the SCSO as the Security Captain at the SLDC but left the Detention Center in May 2021. (ECF No. 65-2). In her role as the Security Captain, she supervised all shifts and dealt with any issues involving security, either from inmates or officers but had no direct responsibility related to supervising inmates in the pods. Id. Blanding attests that she has reviewed the allegations in the complaint and does not recall any specific interactions with Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff has alleged that Blanding discriminated against him by reclassifying his custody status from medium to maximum security in September 2020. Id. Blanding attests that she was not involved in changing custody status of an inmate which was handled by Sergeant Richardson, the classification officer. Id. Further, Blanding attests that she was not consulted by Sergeant Richardson and did not have any input into the decision to reclassify Plaintiff. Id. Blanding states that she reviewed Plaintiff's file and believes his custody and classification was appropriate based on his charges and discipline history at the detention center. Id. It is her understanding that it was not unusual to reclassify an inmate based on their behavior and other factors, as the classification officer is trying to make sure the detention center, its employees and inmates are kept as safe as possible. Id. Based on a review of the incidents in which the Plaintiff was involved, Blanding attests that Plaintiff was a discipline and security problem during the time he was housed at the detention center before Blanding left the detention center's employment. Id. As to Plaintiff's claims that he filed grievances addressed to Blanding, she attests that while inmates ask a certain staff member to respond to the grievance, they cannot choose who responds, as grievances are handled at the lowest level possible. Id. Blanding does not recall seeing or responding to any grievances by this inmate. Id.
To maintain a claim under § 1983, a Plaintiff must have evidence to show both that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and that the alleged violation was committed by the Defendant acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,48 (1988). Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant Lumpkin was directly or personally involved in denying him books by a certain author or purging books in the library only that “it was said.” (ECF No. 68 at 11). The grievance Plaintiff attached to his response was responded to by another officer, not Lumpkin, based on the officer's number. Additionally, Plaintiff has provided no evidence to show that Defendant Blanding played any role in his reclassification of security status. Both Defendant Blanding and Defendant Richardson (ECF No. 65-3 at 5) have submitted affidavits that Defendant Blanding had no involvement in the reclassification matters. (ECF No. 65-2).
Plaintiff has not shown any evidence of direct involvement by Defendants Lumpkin and Blanding. It is well-settled that suits against officials in their individual capacity cannot succeed absent proof of some degree of personal involvement in the alleged deprivation of rights. Emesowum v. Arlington Cty., 2020 WL 3050377, at *8 (E.D. Va. June 5, 2020) citing Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017); Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928-29 (4th Cir. 1977). Thus, it is recommended that summary judgment be granted with respect to Plaintiff's claim against Defendants Lumpkin and Blanding.
CLASSIFICATION
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Richardson violated his due process rights by improperly reclassifying him as a maximum security inmate, punishing him as a pretrial detainee. In his response to summary judgment, Plaintiff asserts that classification is an administrative procedure and he was denied due process by not having the opportunity to appeal the classification decision. However, Defendant Richardson sets forth in her supplemental affidavit that she had previously addressed the argument believing that Plaintiff was alleging a violation of due process for not having a hearing on his classification. (ECF No. 69-2). Defendants argue that the claim fails because classifying an inmate as maximum security and placing him in segregation is “not punitive per se” because it can be rationally connected to legitimate governmental objectives including protecting an inmate's safety, protecting other inmates, breaking up disruptive groups of inmates, or awaiting later classification or transfer. Defendants submitted the affidavit of Adrienne Richardson attesting that she is employed by the SLDC as a staff sergeant at the detention center. (ECF No. 65-3). At the time of Plaintiff's incarceration, Richardson was the classification officer meaning she reviewed every inmate in B-pod to determine if their housing was appropriate, and if eligible to be moved to an open pod. (Id.). Richardson also checked to make sure all the classifications were accurate. (Id.). Richardson attests that she also serves as the transportation officer, so she is often not at the detention center. (Id.). Richardson is not involved in working as a security officer in a pod, except to possibly give an officer a break, she is not involved in disciplinary hearings unless a special circumstance arises, and she was not involved in any disciplinary hearings involving Plaintiff. (Id.). Richardson was not involved in his initial classification but reviewed it and found it was appropriate. (Id.). After being booked into the detention center on September 16, 2019, Plaintiff was initially placed in E-pod, which is an open pod. (Id.). Plaintiff was moved to B-pod on August 3, 2020, which is a closed cell in maximum security due to his involvement in a fight with another inmate (ECF No. 65-3 at 8). (Id.). Inmates housed in B-pod have restricted privileges and restricted movement due to their criminal charges or rules violations or both. (Id.). These restrictions are in place to maintain the safety and security of the institution, the inmates and the staff. (Id.). If an inmate is charged with a violation of the rules, they have certain privileges restricted such as recreation, canteen, and visitation. (Id.). To maintain the safety and security of the staff and institutional inmates in B-pod, inmates are placed in t-chains when they are out of their cell for safety reasons. (Id.). On August 14, 2020, Richardson approved this inmate's move back to E-pod to give him another chance in an open pod. However, Plaintiff understood that if he was involved in any more fights, he might have to stay in B-pod. (Id.). Plaintiff was involved in a major fight with another inmate and assaulted the inmate with a broom handle. (Id.). Plaintiff was charged with assault on another inmate with injury and moved back to B pod. (ECF No. 65-3 at 10 of 14). (Id.). As a result of this incident and Plaintiff's assaultive history and Murder charge, Richardson reviewed Plaintiff's classification as part of her normal job and reclassified him from medium to maximum believing this appropriate pursuant to policy and for safety measures. (Id.). No hearing is required to review and change an inmate's classification, as that is an administrative procedure. (Id.). On September 9, 2020, Plaintiff received a hearing on the charge of assault on an inmate with injury, pleaded guilty, and was given thirty days canteen suspension. (Id.). Once Plaintiff was moved to B-pod, his classification was periodically reviewed by Richardson every sixty to ninety days. (Id.). Richardson determined that Plaintiff continued to have rules violations and aggressive behavior disqualifying him from housing in an open pod. (Id.). When Richardson performs a review of an inmate's housing, it is based on their current charges, past charges, their ability to follow pod rules, and available space. (Id.). This review and classification is not to punish the inmate, but to maintain the safety and security of the institution, staff and other inmates. (Id.). Due to this inmate's change in classification, the only pod in which he could be housed was the lock-up unit of B-pod. (Id.). Once again, the classification was done to protect all inmates and staff at the institution, due to the documented history of the inmate. (Id.). Richardson reviewed Plaintiff's classification on October 9, 2020, and found it to be appropriate. (Id.). On November 9, 2020, Plaintiff argued with a staff member and became combative and attempted to assault the officer. (ECF No. 65-3 at 12 of 14). Due to the continued aggressive behavior and rules violations, Richardson found the classification to be appropriate on January 1, 2021. (Id.). Richardson reviewed Plaintiff's classification again on March 31, 2001, finding it to be appropriate. Plaintiff was charged on April 15, 2021, with assaulting a staff member. (ECF No. 653 at 14). Richardson reviewed Plaintiff's classification on July 2, 2021, August 2, 2021, and October 22, 2021, finding the classification to be appropriate each time. Plaintiff requested to be removed from protective custody status which is a status generally requested by the inmate and involves being on recreation without other inmates. (Id.). The request would not change his custody or classification status. Richardson was not involved in the resolution of any of the charges against Plaintiff. (Id.). Richardson attests that Plaintiff has continually displayed behavior incompatible with the general population rules and regulation, was given chances to be placed in an open pod, but continued to act aggressively and violating the detention center's rules. (Id.). Plaintiff was routinely assessed and determined to be a security threat to other inmates and staff. (Id.). Therefore, with the murder charges and rules violations, his continued placement in B-pod was appropriate and in accordance with policy. (Id.). Richardson stated that she is not aware of Defendant Blanding have any role in the classification review and decisions as that was handled by her as the classification officer. (Id.).
Confinement conditions of pretrial detainees are to be evaluated under the due process clause rather than the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Bell, 441 U.S. at 535 n.16. To prevail on a conditions of confinement claim, a pretrial detainee must show either (1) an expressed intent to punish, or (2) lack of a reasonable relationship to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective, from which a punitive intent may be inferred. Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 991 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988)). Prison officials act with the requisite culpable intent when they act with deliberate indifference to the inmates' suffering. Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1313 (9th Cir.) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)), as amended, 75 F.3d 448 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 916 (1995).
Out of an abundance of caution, the court will consider the merits on both of these arguments.
Plaintiff's allegations regarding classification fail as there is no liberty interest created in custodial classifications. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976). To the extent plaintiff alleges a due process violation, such a claim has no merit or factual support. If “a restriction imposed by the jail officials is for administrative purposes -which include managerial and security needs - the level of process to which the pretrial detainee is entitled is diminished.” Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 175 (4th Cir. 2018). A jail may take immediate preventative action to segregate a detainee for safety or security reasons after serious criminal or violent conduct. Dilworth v. Adams, 841 F.3d 246 at 255.209, 214 (2005)). Federal courts are required to accord great consideration to a correctional system's need to maintain order, discipline, and control, and the choices of where and how to confine Plaintiff are a determination made by the correctional system and not the courts. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558-62 (1974). An inmate does not have a constitutional right to be confined in a particular institution, at a particular custody level, or in a particular portion or unit of a correctional institution. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245-48 (1983).
See also Gethers v. Van Doran, No. CIVA 9:08-3483-HFF-B, 2009 WL 2900757, at *6 (D.S.C. Sept. 9, 2009) (Order adopting the report and recommendation) the court stated the following:
Indeed, Plaintiff appears to also concede that the detention facility may be justified in placing him in maximum security due to the nature of his underlying charges (murder), arguing that “[e]ven if prison officials feel we must be segregated because of our charges, that I feel like we should have access to the television and the same amount of recreation as the general population.” Plaintiff Memorandum in Opposition, pp. 1-2. See Alexander v. Frank, No. 91-35587, 1992 WL 149679 at * 1 (9th Cir. June 30, 1992) [Pretrial detainee not denied due process or equal protection or subjected to cruel and unusual punishment when he was placed in maximum security/maximum custody due to specific factors based on a legitimate government purpose of ensuring the safety and security of the prison facility.].
Here, Plaintiff was charged with assault on an inmate with injury and convicted of the charge. In his response, Plaintiff asserts that he is alleging that he was denied due process because he was not allowed to appeal the classification process which was an administrative procedure. Therefore, it appears Plaintiff is not alleging or arguing that he was denied due process by not having a hearing on his classification charge because that is administrative. Plaintiff asserts in his response that “Defendant Richardson neglected to inform the court that even though the classification is an administrative procedure that under Min. Standard “1083" that I still have a right to appeal her decision in which I was denied due to Defendant Richardson not disclosing my due process rights.. .” (ECF No. 68 at 13). Defendants submitted the supplemental affidavit of Defendant Richardson in which she attests that Plaintiff “actually filed two ‘appeals' in the form of grievances, and both were reviewed and the change in classification was found to be appropriate. Thereafter, I completed classification reviews, as set forth in my original affidavit, and noted continuing incidents involving this inmate since August 2020, which this inmate does not mention in his response.” (ECF No. 69-2 at 2). Richardson attached a copy of two documents entitled “Residence Request Report” to her supplemental affidavit in which Plaintiff is inquiring as to his classification which Defendant Richardson attests were grievances but handled as appeals to his reclassification. (ECF No. 69-2 at 4-5). In these two documents, Plaintiff was informed that he was reclassified due to his current charges and past incident reports. (ECF No. 69-2 at 5). He was also informed that he would be reviewed while in SMU. (Id. at 4). As set forth above, Defendant Richardson submitted her affidavit giving the dates that she has reviewed Plaintiff's classification. While in the B-pod, Petitioner continued to assert violent behavior with charges and rules violations so that at the reclassification review, Defendant Richardson found that being in B-pod was appropriate. Plaintiff has not alleged any collateral consequences on any sentence as he was a pretrial detainee and has since been released from the SLDC and transferred to another facility pursuant to his notice of change of address (ECF No. 76). Therefore, it is recommended that summary judgment be granted as to Defendant Richardson.
Plaintiff asserts in his pleadings that he had three disciplinary infractions since being incarcerated at SLDC . Plaintiff asserts he was convicted on two of the infractions with time served for one and thirty-day commissary restriction on the other. (ECF No. 10 at 9; ECF No. 68 at 12).
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Defendants deny that any of the alleged conduct or conditions complained of by Plaintiff gives rise to a constitutional violation. However, Defendants assert that, even if this Court concludes that the facts are sufficient to establish a Constitutional claim, they are entitled to qualified immunity.
The doctrine of qualified immunity attempts to reconcile two potentially conflicting principles: the need to deter government officials from violating an individual's federal civil rights and the need for government officials to act decisively without undue fear of judicial second guessing.Akers v. Caperton, 998 F.2d 220, 225-26 (4th Cir. 1993).
The Supreme Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), established the standard which the court is to follow in determining whether Defendant is protected by this immunity.
Government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
In a discussion of qualified immunity, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated:
Qualified immunity shields a governmental official from liability for civil monetary damages if the officer's "conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." "In determining whether the specific right allegedly violated was 'clearly established,' the proper focus is not upon the right at its most general or abstract level, but at the level of its application to the specific conduct being challenged." Moreover, "the manner in which this [clearly established] right applies to the actions of the official must also be apparent." As such, if there is a "legitimate question" as to whether an official's conduct constitutes a constitutional violation, the official is entitled to qualified immunity.Wiley v. Doory, 14 F.3d 993 (4th Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 824 (1995). As discussed above, the Plaintiff fails to show that Defendants violated any of his clearly established constitutional or statutory rights. However, even if there was a violation, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. The record before the court shows that Defendants performed the discretionary functions of their respective official duties in an objectively reasonable fashion. Defendants did not transgress any statutory or constitutional rights of Plaintiff of which they were aware in the exercise of their respective professional judgments. Thus, the undersigned recommends that summary judgment for Defendants be granted.
PENDENT JURISDICTION
Assuming Plaintiff's § 1983 claim is dismissed by this Court and Plaintiffs' complaint somehow can be conceived to state an additional claim for relief under any state common law theory, the undersigned concludes that such claim(s), if any, ought to be dismissed as well for want of jurisdiction. Specifically, this Court can decline to continue the action as to the pendent claims if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
CONCLUSION
Based on the above reasoning, it is recommended that Defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 65) be granted.
The parties' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.