Opinion
2023-CA-0889-MR 2023-CA-0932-MR
10-11-2024
TIA BROWN APPELLANT v. FENWICK PLACE APARTMENTS AND THE MICHELSON ORGANIZATION APPELLEES AND FENWICK PLACE APARTMENTS AND THE MICHELSON ORGANIZATION CROSS-APPELLANTS v. TIA BROWN CROSS-APPELLEE
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE: Tia Brown, pro se Louisville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS: Andrew Zeh
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE MITCHELL PERRY, JUDGE ACTION NO. 22-CI-001721
CROSS-APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE MITCHELL PERRY, JUDGE ACTION NO. 22-CI-001721
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE: Tia Brown, pro se Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS: Andrew Zeh
BEFORE: ECKERLE, GOODWINE, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.
OPINION
GOODWINE, JUDGE:
Tia Brown ("Brown"), proceeding pro se, appeals and Fenwick Place Apartments and The Michelson Organization (collectively "Fenwick Place") cross-appeal from a judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court in a landlord/tenant dispute. After careful review, finding no error, we affirm.
On July 29, 2017, Brown "entered into an initial rental agreement for the lease of an apartment" with Fenwick Place. Record ("R.") at 222. The parties renewed the lease on May 11, 2018, and the new "lease term ran from July 29, 2018 to July 29, 2019." Id.
On November 5, 2018, after her rent was already late, Brown notified Fenwick Place "that she did not have the full amount of rent but offered to make two separate payments for the month of November" with the final payment being made on November 19. Id. Fenwick Place did not accept her offer and "instead she was provided with a [7-day] notice to either pay the rent that was owed or vacate the apartment before the 12th and eviction proceedings would not be commenced." Id. Brown moved out before November 12, and Fenwick Place did not send an eviction notice. "In December 2018, Ms. Brown received a letter from a company called RentDebt Automated Collections, LLC attempting to collect $5,274.81 that Fenwick Place claims was the amount owed under the lease agreement for early moveout." R. at 223. Brown's lease "provided that a tenant could terminate the lease early by giving Fenwick Place 60-days written notice, and pay the sum totaling: two months rent, plus 20% of the entire amount of rent due under the Lease.... Fenwick Place calculated this amount to be $5,274.81" and sent that amount to collections. Id.
On April 2, 2022, Brown filed a complaint in the Jefferson Circuit Court alleging the parties mutually agreed to terminate her lease or that Fenwick Place violated the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act "good faith" obligation codified in KRS 383.550 in giving her a "7 Day or Quit Notice" instead of replying to her good faith request to pay her November 2018 rent in two installments. R. at 1. On June 14, 2022, Fenwick Place filed an answer and counterclaim denying Brown's allegations and raising a claim for $5,274.81 as there was no written amendment to the lease allowing Brown to move out early without penalties. R. at 41.
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
The circuit court held a bench trial on February 8, 2023, and directed the parties to tender proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law within 60 days. On May 8, 2023, the circuit court entered a judgment awarding Fenwick Place $5,274.81 plus the statutory interest rate of 6% from Brown. However, the circuit court denied Fenwick Place's request for the total judgment to be $11,565.00 because she did not provide a 60-day notice prior to moving out as required by Paragraph 18 of the lease. The circuit court also denied Fenwick Place its request for 18% interest under Paragraph 2 of the lease. Based on our review of the record, Fenwick Place did not make claims for the larger damages amount or the contractual interest rate in its counterclaim and never moved to amend the counterclaim.
Both parties moved to alter, amend, or vacate the circuit court's judgment under CR 59.05. On June 29, 2023, the circuit court entered an order denying both parties' motions. The circuit court summarized both parties' arguments: Fenwick Place argued "that the [c]ourt should award the full amount they have asked for, as well as attorney's fees," and the court impermissibly considered parol evidence. R. at 251. Brown "in turn claim[ed] that she should have prevailed based on the evidence presented at" the bench trial regarding verbal negotiations with Fenwick Place's representative prior to moving out. Id. The circuit court denied the motions because it had "leeway to operate equitably within" its limits. Id. The circuit court found the damages Fenwick Place sought were "disproportionate to the conduct that occurred here," and it considered the terms of the lease agreement in reaching its decision. Id. The circuit court noted the agreement was a contract of adhesion and overly punitive. Id. Thus, its judgment was "just and equitable." R. at 252. Likewise, the circuit court found Brown's argument unconvincing. It found Brown presented no new evidence to support her argument. This appeal and cross-appeal followed.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
On appeal, Brown argues the circuit court erred in granting judgment in favor Fenwick Place because: (1) Fenwick Place terminated the lease without showing fair and good faith discretion; and (2) the circuit court's findings of fact were biased and his final decision was an abuse of discretion.
On cross-appeal, Fenwick Place argues the circuit court abused its discretion by: (1) considering inadmissible extrinsic evidence to reduce its damages; and (2) failing to apply the 18% interest rate in the lease.
We apply the following standard of review:
As this is an appeal from a bench trial, our standard of review is set forth in Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01. Under CR 52.01, the trial court is required to make specific findings of fact and state separately its conclusions of law relied upon to render the court's judgment. Further, those "[f]indings of fact, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." CR 52.01. In fact, "judging the credibility of witnesses and weighing evidence are tasks within the exclusive province of the trial court." Vinson v. Sorrell, 136 S.W.3d 465, 470 (Ky. 2004)
(quoting Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003)).
"If the trial judge's findings of fact in the underlying action are not clearly erroneous, i.e., are supported by substantial evidence, then the appellate court's role is confined to determining whether those facts support the trial judge's legal conclusion." Commonwealth v. Deloney, 20 S.W.3d 471, 473-74 (Ky. 2000). However, while deferential to the lower court's factual findings, appellate review of legal determinations and conclusions from a bench trial is de novo. Sawyers v. Better, 384 S.W.3d 107, 110 (Ky. 2012).Barber v. Bradley, 505 S.W.3d 749, 754 (Ky. 2016).
First, we address Brown's argument that the circuit court erred in finding she breached the lease because she made reasonable efforts to contact Fenwick Place and negotiate paying her rent in two installments, with the final installment being paid on November 19. The circuit court found that although Brown testified there was an oral modification of the lease, the express terms of the lease only permitted written modifications and awarded Fenwick Place two months' rent, plus 20% of the entire amount due under the lease. The circuit court cited no law in support of its conclusion.
KRS 383.660(2) provides: "If rent is unpaid when due and the tenant fails to pay rent within seven (7) days after written notice by the landlord of nonpayment and his intention to terminate the rental agreement if the rent is not paid within that period, the landlord may terminate the rental agreement." Under KRS 383.660(3), "the landlord may recover damages and obtain injunctive relief for any noncompliance by the tenant with the rental agreement or KRS 383.605 or 383.610. If the tenant's noncompliance is willful the landlord may recover actual damages and reasonable attorney's fees."
Here, after Brown notified Fenwick Place that her rent would be late and attempted to negotiate late payment, Fenwick Place provided seven days' notice of its intention to terminate the lease under this section. Though Brown made efforts to reach a verbal agreement to modify the agreement, the express terms of the contract required any modifications to be made in writing. Brown attempted to remedy her breach, and Fenwick Place chose to terminate the agreement instead.
Based on our review, the circuit court correctly assessed Fenwick Place's damages under the lease. Paragraph 18 of the lease clearly provided that Brown could terminate the lease early upon giving 60-days written notice, and she would be required to pay Fenwick Place the sum of two months' rent plus 20% of the entire amount of rent due under the lease . R. at 175. This is the amount Fenwick Place sent to collections and the amount of damages stated in its counterclaim. Thus, we affirm the circuit court's grant of judgment in favor of Fenwick Place and the amount of damages awarded.
On cross-appeal, Fenwick Place argues the circuit court abused its discretion in considering inadmissible extrinsic evidence to reduce Fenwick's damages and in failing to apply the contractual interest rate to its damages. Fenwick Place failed to raise these claims in its counterclaim and never moved to amend it. These claims were first raised in the written record in Fenwick Place's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. There, Fenwick Place sought a total of $11,565.00 for the remaining monthly rent due and failure to give 60 days' notice under the lease terms. It also made a claim for the contractual interest rate of 18%, as well as attorney's fees and costs from Brown.
The circuit court stated equitable grounds for denying Fenwick Place's claim for a larger damages amount and the contractual interest rate. However, we need not address any arguments regarding equities or inadmissible extrinsic evidence because Fenwick Place failed to make a claim for $11,565.00 in damages and the 18% contractual interest rate in its counterclaim. "[W]e are free 'to affirm a lower court for any reason supported by the record.'" Deal v. First and Farmers National Bank, Inc., 518 S.W.3d 159, 173 n.13 (Ky. App. 2017) (citation omitted).
In its answer and counterclaim, Fenwick Place only made a claim for damages of $5,274.81 and attorney's fees and costs. "Kentucky is a notice pleading jurisdiction, where the 'central purpose of pleadings remains notice of claims and defenses.'" Pete v. Anderson, 413 S.W.3d 291, 301 (Ky. 2013) (citing Hoke v. Cullinan, 914 S.W.2d 335, 339 (Ky. 1995)). Per CR 8.01(1), "[a] pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain (a) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and (b) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled." As interpreted by this Court, "[i]t is not necessary to state a claim with technical precision under this rule, as long as a complaint gives a defendant fair notice and identifies the claim." Grand Aerie Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Carneyhan, 169 S.W.3d 840, 844 (Ky. 2005) (citing Cincinnati, Newport, &Covington Transp. Co. v. Fischer, 357 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Ky. 1962)).
Fenwick Place failed to state a claim for the larger amount of $11,565.00 or the 18% contractual interest in its counterclaim and never moved to amend it. Fenwick Place's counterclaim did not provide Brown with fair notice of its intent to claim this larger amount of damages and a contractual interest rate. Thus, based on our review, we affirm the circuit court's award of $5,274.81 to Fenwick Place as this was the amount pled in its counterclaim, and we affirm the circuit court's denial of an award of $11,565.00 and 18% interest as the counterclaim did not provide Brown fair notice of this amount or interest rate.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court.