Opinion
NO. 2017-CA-001051-MR
07-27-2018
KENNETH BROWN APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Kelsey Doren Assistant Public Advocate LaGrange, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Andy Beshear Attorney General of Kentucky Courtney J. Hightower Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GEOFFREY P. MORRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 10-CR-002631 & 11-CR-001107 OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: CLAYTON, CHIEF JUDGE; KRAMER AND NICKELL, JUDGES. NICKELL, JUDGE: A jury convicted Kenneth Brown of murder, first-degree wanton endangerment (two counts), tampering with physical evidence, and trafficking in marijuana five pounds or more while in possession of a firearm. Brown was sentenced to serve twenty-four years' imprisonment. He now challenges the Jefferson Circuit Court's denial, without an evidentiary hearing, of a pro se motion—supplemented by appointed counsel—to vacate judgment pursuant to RCr 11.42 due to multiple allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Following review of the record, the briefs and the law, we affirm.
With the exception of dismissal of an additional charge of being a felon in possession of a handgun, Brown was convicted of all crimes charged in two separate indictments which were subsequently consolidated.
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Brown's direct appeal was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Kentucky. We quote the basic facts of this drug buy gone awry from Brown v. Commonwealth, 416 S.W.3d 302, 304-05 (Ky. 2013).
On August 17, 2010, Appellant, Kenneth Brown, made an agreement to sell David Curd eight pounds of marijuana for the price of $8,000. This was not the first time Appellant had sold drugs to Curd. As usual, Appellant and Curd decided to meet the following afternoon at Autosmart 3, located in Louisville, Kentucky. Since Appellant had no mode of transportation, he asked his friend, Stewart Grice, to drive him to the car lot. Once there, Appellant, with the marijuana in tow, entered the backseat of Curd's vehicle. Appellant was immediately surprised to see an unknown male by the name of Lashawn Talbert in the front passenger's seat. Talbert expressed concern over the presence of Grice, who was waiting in the car next to them. Accordingly, Curd started his vehicle and exited the lot. Appellant repeatedly asked Curd to pull into various parking lots they passed. Curd, however, continued driving.
At some point during this surprise excursion, Talbert pulled out his gun and pointed it at Appellant. Curd then
parked in the driveway of an abandoned house. Once parked, Appellant jumped out of the vehicle to make his escape, leaving the marijuana behind. Appellant's flight was delayed as he attempted to retrieve his cell phone that was dropped upon his exit from the car.
The events which occurred after Appellant's departure from the vehicle are in dispute. Appellant maintains that Talbert, while holding the gun in his hand, leaned outside the passenger's side door and told Appellant to come back to the vehicle. As a result, Appellant swiftly reached for his own gun and began shooting at the vehicle. Without hesitation, Curd pushed on the gas and left the scene. Appellant continued shooting as the vehicle drove away. The bullets not only hit Talbert's head, but also entered a nearby house. Talbert died at a Louisville hospital three days later.
After the shooting, Brown called Grice asking for a ride. Brown told Grice he had been robbed and told Grice where to drive. Grice told police he saw Brown give the gun used in the shooting to a man named Johnny within one hour of the shooting. Grice would later testify Brown said he had been robbed and shot at the car as it drove off. According to Grice, Brown said he was trying to stop the car because "they had taken his stuff" and he "wanted to get his weed back." Brown also told Grice he wanted Talbert dead.
When located and arrested in September 2010, Brown gave a statement to police—much of which was played for the jury at trial. In the statement, Brown admitted: shooting at Talbert while the car pulled away; firing his weapon "to stop the car because, you know, them f------ eight pounds [of marijuana] is my life. If I didn't come back with that bag or the money I was dead[;]" Brown "emptied the clip in his ass 'cause he wouldn't stop, he just kept goin'[;]" Talbert closed the car door before Brown began shooting; Brown "wanted to stop the car" and knew he had "15 rounds[;]" "I knew if I can stop that car the first few rounds then he can get out and shoot out, I got a chance to save my life" by getting the marijuana back; Brown could not let them "get away with" stealing his marijuana because if he did, he would be killed by people who fronted him the marijuana; and, Brown believed he had to do something to try to get the marijuana back or his own life, his girlfriend's, his child's, or Curd's life might be in danger because he would be unable to pay back the individuals who fronted him the drugs. In addition to jurors hearing Brown's own statement to police, four eyewitnesses testified they saw Brown pursue the vehicle and shoot at it. Physical evidence showed the only bullet defects to the vehicle were in the passenger side—none were consistent with shooting at the rear or any other portion of the vehicle.
Trial spanned seven days in January 2012. Several facts were undisputed. Brown shot and killed Talbert during a planned marijuana sale. Both Brown and Talbert had firearms. Talbert stole marijuana from Brown. When the shots were fired, Brown was outside the vehicle and Talbert was inside the vehicle.
The medical examiner testified Talbert suffered a single gunshot wound, with no exit wound; the projectile remaining in Talbert's skull. The bullet was distorted, typically the result of the bullet hitting something inside the body or something before it hits the body. The medical examiner could neither exclude Talbert's wound being caused after the projectile ricocheted off another object, nor trace the bullet's path before striking Talbert. The medical examiner stated had the bullet ricocheted or passed through another object before striking Talbert, it would have lost velocity. Beveling on the wound showed the bullet traveled front to back at a downward angle and would have immediately incapacitated Talbert. According to the medical examiner, on being shot, Talbert likely lost immediate consciousness and probably made no conscious or volitional movement afterward.
Following a thorough review of the record and pleadings, the trial court denied relief on twelve separate claims of ineffective representation without convening a requested evidentiary hearing. The trial court determined a hearing was unnecessary under Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448 (Ky. 2001). Citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and Centers v. Commonwealth, 799 S.W.2d 51 (Ky. App. 1990), the trial court concluded trial counsel's performance was not so deficient as to have deprived Brown a fair trial, and the jury's verdict would have been the same had counsel not made the alleged errors. Brown timely appealed.
In his pro se RCr 11.42 motion, Brown raised several allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Only a few of those claims were argued by counsel in the supplemental motion filed on Brown's behalf. We confine our review to the three claims addressed in the briefs. It is alleged counsel did not: request disclosure of expert witnesses by the Commonwealth; impeach Curd with testimony from his own trial on charges of murder, tampering with physical evidence and trafficking as a result of this drug deal; and, review Brown's redacted statement to police to confirm all requested defense changes had been made by the Commonwealth before the statement was played for the jury. A recurring theme is the trial court should have convened an evidentiary hearing before denying relief.
A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See also Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1985) (recognizing Strickland). Stated succinctly, to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a convicted defendant must establish serious attorney error prejudicing the defense.
Attorneys are expected to render "reasonably effective assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064 (citing Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 151-52 (2d Cir. 1983)). Perfection is not the standard and hindsight is not the lens.
To show an attorney's performance was deficient, the convicted defendant must demonstrate "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064.
[T]he proper inquiry when assessing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is whether the "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." In this reasonableness analysis, we are directed to "indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance" because, given the surrounding circumstances, "the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy.'" We employ this presumption to prevent the "harsh light of hindsight" from distorting counsel's act or omission, making it appear unreasonable.
A defendant is prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance when the "errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is unreliable." Prejudice is found under this standard when the defendant has shown that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."
This reasonable probability is a probability "sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."Commonwealth v. Searight, 423 S.W.3d 226, 230 (Ky. 2014).
Brown's claims are not to be considered in a vacuum. "We must consider the totality of evidence before the jury and assess the overall performance of counsel throughout the case in order to determine whether the identified acts or omissions overcome the presumption that counsel rendered reasonable professional assistance." Mills v. Commonwealth, 170 S.W.3d 310, 328 (Ky. 2005), overruled on other grounds by Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2009). We also recognize "[t]here are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way." Hodge v. Commonwealth, 116 S.W.3d 463, 469 (Ky. 2003), as amended (Aug. 25, 2003), overruled on other grounds by Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2009).
Brown's first claim is trial counsel should have filed a written request for the Commonwealth to disclose all expert witnesses and summarize their anticipated testimony pursuant to RCr 7.24(1)(c). Under this claim, Brown argues counsel erred in not retaining a crime scene reconstruction expert to: 1) help her "understand the state of forensic science underlying the Commonwealth's case" and present Brown's self-defense theory of the case; and, 2) prepare counsel to effectively cross-examine Detective Jack Jawor who appeared as an expert witness for the Commonwealth and testified about bullet ricochet inside Curd's vehicle.
In determining the trial court properly qualified Detective Jawor as an expert witness and allowed him to testify, the Supreme Court described Detective Jawor's path to the witness stand as follows:
During [Brown's] trial, the Commonwealth called Louisville Metro Police Detective Jack Jawor as an expert witness in the area of penetrability of windshield glass by bullets. [Brown's] counsel was unaware that Detective Jawor was being called as a witness. Since [Brown's] counsel was unprepared to question the witness, the trial court allowed Detective Jawor to testify the following morning. At that time, [Brown] argued that the Commonwealth violated the spirit of RCr 7.24 due to its failure to disclose, prior to trial, the identity of its expert witness along with the expert's anticipated testimony. The trial court ruled that the Commonwealth had complied with RCr 7.24 since [Brown] failed to submit a written request.Brown, 416 S.W.3d at 308. While the Supreme Court found counsel should have requested disclosure, it did not hold counsel's failure required reversal.
Detective Jawor's testimony was based entirely on his specialized training and experience. He reviewed photos of the scene the day before he testified, but conducted no independent testing in Brown's case. The substance of his testimony was described by the Supreme Court as:
Detective Jawor's testimony mostly concerned the results of different ammunition hitting various types of car windshields. Detective Jawor stated that, after reviewing
photos of Curd's vehicle, it was his opinion that a bullet hit the inside of the windshield. Since the bullet failed to penetrate the glass, causing a "spider web" type of break, it was his opinion that the bullet likely ricocheted. Detective Jawor's testimony is relevant because it gives more weight to the Commonwealth's case that [Brown] was not acting in self-defense. It was [Brown's] contention that the victim was hanging out of Curd's vehicle when he was shot, while the Commonwealth theorized that Curd was sitting in the passenger's seat when the bullet was fired, hitting the windshield and ricocheting into the victim's head.Id. at 309.
The trial court denied RCr 11.42 relief because advance disclosure of Detective Jawor's testimony would not have changed counsel's ability to cross-examine and impeach him. The Commonwealth did not contact Detective Jawor until very near the start of trial. Had counsel submitted a written request for notice, counsel would have had very little additional opportunity—if any—to prepare to refute the detective's testimony. Furthermore, the trial court recessed court for the afternoon to afford counsel time to meet with Detective Jawor and learn his impressions of the case. The record reveals defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined the witness, highlighting weaknesses in his testimony including not personally conducting any tests, reviewing only photos, and, inability to determine the velocity of any ricochet, its path, or where it would land.
Detective Jawor testified only about twenty minutes during a trial that spanned seven days. Coupled with his testimony was Brown's own statement to police in which he admitted firing at the vehicle in a strong desire to recover eight pounds of marijuana he repeatedly called his "life." Four eyewitnesses also testified they saw Brown pursue the vehicle and shoot at it. Additionally, Brown's friend, Grice, testified when he picked up Brown after the shooting, Brown told him he had been robbed and shot at the car as Curd drove off, trying to stop the car to recover his marijuana. Brown also told Grice he wanted Talbert dead. Finally, the medical examiner established Talbert was immediately incapacitated by a head wound and most likely was unable to return fire. While relevant, Detective Jawor's testimony was just one component of the Commonwealth's strong case. A more complete cross-examination would not have resulted in Brown's acquittal. Thus, we cannot say the failure to file a written request for notice of experts was prejudicial, especially since the Commonwealth had provided summaries of the testimony of other experts without the filing of such a request.
Brown next claims counsel was ineffective in failing to hire a crime scene reconstructionist. In support of this claim, post-conviction counsel tendered an affidavit from Shelly Rice, a crime scene reconstruction expert who at the time of trial in 2012 was not working in that field and would not have qualified as an expert witness on this topic.
The Commonwealth argues any testimony a defense expert could have provided would have been cumulative to testimony given by Detective Brenda Wescott and CSU Technician Stacey Davenport, both of whom processed Curd's vehicle. Davenport testified all shots were to the passenger side of the vehicle; there was no damage to the driver's side or rear of the vehicle. Davenport's testimony supported Brown's claim he shot Talbert on the passenger side of the vehicle in self-defense. Because jurors heard this evidence, it was their duty to determine its weight and credibility. Not having another witness repeat it does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
Crime Scene Unit.
Brown also suggests a reconstruction expert could have explained how trace evidence located on the windshield (based on a photo of the vehicle) supports Talbert being shot before the defect occurred in the windshield. Neither Detectives Jawor nor Wescott, nor Officer Davenport commented on this trace evidence. It is mentioned for the first time in Rice's affidavit and is unsupported by any evidence introduced at trial.
Brown speculates a defense expert could have testified the force of the gunshot, coupled with Curd driving away, would have caused Talbert's body to slump and his body to hit the gearshift. The Commonwealth argues such testimony would have supported the Commonwealth's theory—that Talbert was facing forward when struck by the bullet; not Brown's theory—that Talbert was shot while leaning out the passenger side door pointing a gun at Brown. Based on the medical examiner's testimony, Talbert would have been incapacitated immediately, losing both consciousness and volitional motor movement. We cannot say trial counsel was ineffective for not hiring a reconstruction expert who would have provided only cumulative testimony and strengthened the Commonwealth's already strong case.
Additionally, Brown's fatal failing on this particular allegation was seized on by the trial court. Brown failed to identify any
specific expert who is willing to testify in a manner helpful to the defense or what such testimony would consist of. Discovery is not authorized in an RCr 11.42 proceeding. Appellant has, in effect, asked this Court to allow him to engage in the sort of "fishing expedition" that we have consistently rejected. We refuse to alter the rule on this matter.Mills v. Commonwealth, 170 S.W.3d at 329-30. Having failed to abide by the specificity requirement of RCr 11.42(2), relief is unavailable to Brown.
Brown also argues a reconstruction expert could have shed light on the Commonwealth's mishandling of the scene and whether evidence collected at the scene was reliable. First, there was no evidence the Commonwealth mishandled evidence. Second, "[a] claim that certain facts might be true, in essence an admission that [Brown] does not know whether the claim is true, cannot be the basis for RCr 11.42 relief." Mills, at 328. (Emphasis in original.)
The shooting occurred around 3:30 p.m. Trial testimony showed Officer Billie Shaw responded to a report of shots being fired at 1130 Clay Avenue. When she arrived, Officer Shaw did not realize anyone had been struck by the reported gunfire. In the driveway, Officer Shaw located and collected three shell casings which she gave to a detective. Officer Shaw also located glass at the end of the driveway. Curd transported Talbert to the hospital, but falsified information about what had transpired. Later that day, police realized they were probably investigating a homicide.
Talbert lingered in intensive care until he expired on August 21, 2010.
On cross-examination, Officer Shaw acknowledged she would have used a different protocol at the scene had she known there was a victim. She would have marked the location of the shell casings, left the casings where she discovered them, and secured the perimeter. Testimony from an expert about how to properly process a crime scene and its effect on the reliability of evidence would have been merely cumulative. Even though relevant, cumulative evidence, may be excluded. KRE 403. Moreover, failure of a criminal defense attorney to offer "merely cumulative" evidence does not equate to a constitutional violation. Broom v. Mitchell, 441 F.3d 392, 410 (6th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
Brown's next claim is counsel should have impeached Curd with prior inconsistent testimony Curd had given at his own trial which ended in conviction. Brown maintains Curd could not recall—or testified differently—on five points leading Curd to paint Brown to jurors as the mastermind of this marijuana transaction. Brown argues Curd could not recall whether Brown called him or he called Brown to arrange this deal. That was not terribly surprising. Brown and Curd had worked many drug deals together. Curd acknowledged he arranged this deal with Brown at Talbert's request, he just did not recall whether he or Brown initiated the contact the day before this particular transaction. Trial counsel knew Brown and Curd had orchestrated numerous drug deals and likely made a strategic choice not to pursue this point further.
Moreover, Brown—not the Commonwealth—had called Curd as a witness, but Curd was not particularly cooperative. Defense counsel needed to carefully extract valuable testimony from Curd without making jurors totally disbelieve him or worse, eliciting details damaging to the defense.
Curd could also not recall who decided to move the transaction away from the car lot for greater privacy, but admitted he had testified in a July 2011 proceeding Talbert was the first to say they should move the deal away. Curd testified Brown suggested moving the deal to Clay Avenue, but under questioning by defense counsel, explained Talbert and Brown were discussing where to move the deal for privacy, and he was pretty sure it was Brown's idea to move to Clay Avenue. Finally, Curd did not consider Talbert to have issued an ultimatum to Brown when he pulled out a gun and told Brown to get out of the vehicle. When defense counsel asked about this detail, Curd testified he could not recall.
Consistent with KRE 613, each time Curd's testimony differed from a prior statement he had made, defense counsel reminded Curd of the differences and gave him the opportunity to explain the deviations. Curd admitted the inconsistencies in his testimony. Having followed the procedure dictated by the rule, we discern no attorney error and no resulting prejudice.
Brown's next claim is counsel failed to ensure the Commonwealth fully redacted a statement Brown had given to police before it was played for the jury. This claim was reviewed on direct appeal in the context of whether a mistrial was properly denied. The Supreme Court wrote:
[l]astly, Appellant maintains that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial after the Commonwealth failed to redact portions of Appellant's recorded interview with Detectives Cohn and Lesher. The record reflects that Appellant initially provided the Commonwealth with a list of requested redactions. However, prior to jury selection, Appellant's counsel notified the Commonwealth that she had discovered additionally needed redactions. This portion of the interview contained a statement by Detective Cohn, wherein he states his opinion of what Appellant should have done. It is Appellant's position that Detective Cohn was implying that Appellant was wrong in his actions.
Thereafter, the Commonwealth provided Appellant with a copy of the transcript and recording with the final redactions included. The requested redaction was not removed. Even though Appellant's counsel was provided with a copy of the final redactions, she did not inform the trial court that part of her requested redactions had not been removed. Accordingly, the recorded interview was played for the jury, including the following portion:
Detective Cohn: I'll tell you what you were supposed to do, when that car pulled off you were supposed to run away. Thank God, I'm free, that car is gone. I got my life now . . . . The right thing to do would have been to let that car leave and run this way, the opposite direction of the car.
Appellant immediately objected and moved for a mistrial. The Commonwealth, however, argued that it did not agree to redact that portion of the interview, nor had Appellant complained after being provided with the final redactions. The trial court ruled in favor of the Commonwealth. Appellant did not request an admonition.
A mistrial should only be granted when the error is "of such magnitude that a litigant would be denied a fair and impartial trial and the prejudicial effect could be removed in no other way." Matthews v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 11, 17 (Ky. 2005). Indeed, "a mistrial is an extreme remedy and should be resorted to only when there is a fundamental defect in the proceedings and there is a 'manifest necessity for such an action.'" Woodard v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 63, 68 (Ky. 2004) (quoting Bray v. Commonwealth, 68 S.W.3d 375, 383 (Ky. 2002)). When reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion for a mistrial, we look for an abuse of discretion. Shabazz v. Commonwealth, 153 S.W.3d 806, 810 (Ky. 2005).
While we believe the introduction of Detective Cohn's statement was likely improper, we do not believe it was of such magnitude that it deprived Appellant of a fair trial. Appellant did not dispute that he was the individual who shot and killed the victim. Appellant's defense was that he shot at Curd's vehicle because he was in fear of his life. Yet, during the interview with Detective Cohn, Appellant plainly stated that he shot at the vehicle so that he could retrieve the stolen marijuana. Detective Cohn's statements were made after Appellant questioned what he was supposed to do in that situation. Therefore, we find that Detective Cohn's opinion had minimal prejudicial effect, as his opinion was based on different factual circumstances than those of Appellant's defense. Moreover, Detective Cohn did not disclose his opinion regarding the appropriateness of Appellant's actions as it concerns Appellant's self-defense theory.Brown, 416 S.W.3d at 311-12. The Supreme Court having determined the statement had "minimal prejudicial effect," Brown cannot demonstrate counsel's error deprived him of a fair trial. Therefore, he cannot satisfy Strickland's prejudice prong.
Finally, we address whether an evidentiary hearing was required.
After the answer is filed, the trial judge shall determine whether the allegations in the motion can be resolved on the face of the record, in which event an evidentiary hearing is not required. A hearing is required if there is a material issue of fact that cannot be conclusively resolved, i.e., conclusively proved or disproved, by an examination of the record. Stanford v. Commonwealth, Ky., 854 S.W.2d 742, 743-44 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1049, 114 S.Ct. 703, 126 L.Ed.2d 669 (1994); Lewis v. Commonwealth, Ky., 411 S.W.2d 321, 322 (1967). The trial judge may not simply
disbelieve factual allegations in the absence of evidence in the record refuting them. Drake v. United States, 439 F.2d 1319, 1320 (6th Cir. 1971).Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 452-53 (Ky. 2001). This case turned on Brown's motive for shooting and killing Talbert. He claimed self-defense, but his own statement to police—confirming he shot at Talbert as Curd drove away in an attempt to retrieve eight pounds of marijuana he described as his "life"—was too much to overcome, especially when coupled with testimony from four eyewitnesses and Grice to whom he admitted he wanted Talbert dead. In addition to compelling testimony, there was a trove of physical evidence including defects to only the passenger side of Curd's vehicle and a single bullet striking Talbert's head and instantly incapacitating him.
Because Brown admitted firing at Talbert to get his marijuana back, self-defense was unavailable to him. Based on the record before us, all allegations of attorney ineffectiveness were refuted by the record, making an evidentiary hearing unnecessary. Id. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Brown's motion to vacate without a hearing.
The opinion and order of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Kelsey Doren
Assistant Public Advocate
LaGrange, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Andy Beshear
Attorney General of Kentucky Courtney J. Hightower
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky