Opinion
B228583 B228627
11-29-2011
JOSEPH PHILLIP BROWN, SR., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Respondents. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ONE 2005 INFINITI G35, Defendant; JOSEPH PHILLIP BROWN, JR., Defendant and Respondent; JOSEPH PHILLIP BROWN, SR., Claimant and Appellant.
Joseph Phillip Brown, Sr., in pro. per., and Loren Nizinski for Plaintiff and Appellant and Claimant and Appellant. Carmen A. Trutanich, City Attorney, Amy Jo Field and Kjehl T. Johansen, Deputy City Attorneys for Defendants and Respondents City of Los Angeles and Los Angeles Police Department. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, James William Bilderback II and Alene M. Games, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent The People of the State of California. No appearance for Defendant and Respondent Joseph Phillip Brown, Jr.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC441057)
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. LA064840)
APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Kevin C. Brazile and Jessica P. Silvers, Judges. Affirmed.
Joseph Phillip Brown, Sr., in pro. per., and Loren Nizinski for Plaintiff and Appellant and Claimant and Appellant.
Carmen A. Trutanich, City Attorney, Amy Jo Field and Kjehl T. Johansen, Deputy City Attorneys for Defendants and Respondents City of Los Angeles and Los Angeles Police Department.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, James William Bilderback II and Alene M. Games, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent The People of the State of California.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent Joseph Phillip Brown, Jr.
Joseph Phillip Brown, Sr. (appellant) appeals from the order and judgment entered in his complaint for declaratory relief after the trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend in favor of defendant City of Los Angeles (the City). Appellant also appeals from the order striking and dismissing his claim opposing forfeiture of a 2005 Infiniti G35, California License No. 5LHW035 (the Infiniti) on the ground that he lacked legal standing to submit the claim. On January 21, 2011, this court granted appellant's motion to consolidate the appeals.
Appellant raises on appeal issues relating to the validity of the seizure and impound of the Infiniti, alleged violations of due process, the taking of property without just compensation, lack of jurisdiction, and civil rights violations. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Joseph Phillip Brown, Jr. (Brown Jr.), appellant's son, was arrested after a shooting incident in which witnesses reported hearing a gunshot and seeing a man with a bleeding arm running away from Brown Jr.'s apartment on Sherman Way in Reseda.Shortly thereafter, witnesses saw Brown Jr. fleeing his apartment with a female and entering the Infiniti. Police searched the apartment after obtaining a warrant and found numerous items that appeared to be stolen, as well as a firearm and ammunition. On the day after the shooting, April 12, 2010, police saw Brown Jr. driving along Ventura Boulevard and arrested him when he exited his car.
Since Brown Jr. pleaded "no contest" prior to a preliminary hearing, we obtain the facts from the probation report in case No. B228627.
On April 16, 2010, notice was mailed to Brown Jr. at six different addresses, including appellant's address and the IRC terminal annex, informing him of the impound of the Infiniti and his right to contest the legality of the impound. Brown Jr. was given notice that the vehicle was subject to forfeiture pursuant to Vehicle Code section 14607.6 and informed of the procedure for contesting the forfeiture.
On April 22, 2010, appellant filed a claim opposing forfeiture of the Infiniti. Appellant claimed to be the legal owner of the car. On July 2, 2010, appellant filed a complaint against the City for declaratory relief to determine the validity and application of Vehicle Code section 14607.6 and his right to a hearing.
On September 17, 2010, in case No. LA064840-01, Brown Jr. pleaded "no contest" before Judge Jessica P. Silvers to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of Penal Code section 12021, subdivision (a)(1) and one count of receiving stolen property in violation of Penal Code section 496, subdivision (a). Judge Silvers sentenced Brown Jr. to concurrent midterms of two years on each count.
On September 21, 2010, the district attorney filed a petition for forfeiture of the Infiniti. The People asserted that Brown Jr. was driving the Infiniti while unlicensed and that he had suffered a prior misdemeanor conviction for violating Vehicle Code section 14601.1, subdivision (a). The petition stated that Brown Jr. was the registered owner of the vehicle and that the legal and registered owners had received due notice that the vehicle was subject to forfeiture and would be sold or otherwise disposed of under Vehicle Code section 14607.6.
The notices indicate that the legal owner was Infiniti Funding Services.
Vehicle Code section 14607.6 provides in pertinent part: "(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, . . . a motor vehicle is subject to forfeiture as a nuisance if it is driven on a highway in this state by a driver with a suspended or revoked license, or by an unlicensed driver, who is a registered owner of the vehicle at the time of impoundment and has a previous misdemeanor conviction for a violation of subdivision (a) of Section 12500 or Section 14601, 14601.1, 14601.2, 14601.3, 14601.4, or 14601.5. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (e)(2) The impounding agency, within two days of impoundment, shall send a notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, to all legal and registered owners of the vehicle, . . . informing them the vehicle is subject to forfeiture and will be sold or otherwise disposed of pursuant to this section. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (e)(4) If a claim is timely filed and served, then the district attorney shall file a petition of forfeiture with the appropriate juvenile or superior court within 10 days of the receipt of the claim. . . ."
DISCUSSION
I. Post-Plea Forfeiture Hearing in Criminal Case
On October 13, 2010, Judge Silvers heard appellant's motion opposing the forfeiture of the Infiniti. Appellant argued that the vehicle was his and was registered under his name at his home address. It was not registered under Brown Jr.'s address, which was in Oklahoma City.
The People produced exhibits showing that the car was purchased on March 8, 2009, by an individual with driver's license No. 082757609, which corresponded to an Oklahoma driver's license. Exhibit 2 contains a photocopy of an Oklahoma driver's license bearing the name of "BROWN, JOSEPH PHILLIP JR.," the license number of 082757609, and a date of birth of "03-07-1974." Brown Jr.'s birth date is March 7, 1974. The driver's license number is an exact match for the number on the purchase agreement ("Vehicle Transfer Form") for the Infiniti. The transaction date is March 8, 2009. The purchase agreement is in the name of "Phillip P. Brown." The driver's license bears an Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, address. The DMV records showed the registered owner as "BROWN, JOSEPH P," with a Van Nuys address but the date of birth of "03-07-1974."
The People's exhibits were not part of the record in case No. B228627, but they appear in the clerk's transcript for the civil appeal, case No. B228583.
The district attorney informed the court that, when confronted with the contents of these exhibits in a telephone call, appellant acknowledged that his son was the driver and purchaser, and that he, appellant, was not listed as a registered owner or legal owner.
Appellant denied telling the district attorney that his son owned the car. He stated that he paid for the car, and his son picked it up for him. He claimed to have paid off the lien on the car and pointed out the certificate of title he had attached to his paperwork. The court observed that the certificate of title to which appellant referred was issued on September 24, 2010, and the date of Brown Jr.'s arrest was April 12, 2010. Appellant claimed the issue date reflected that it was a duplicate, and that the police had taken the original certificate of title from the Infiniti, obliging him to obtain a replacement. Appellant told the court that his driver's license was now listed as that of the owner. The court pointed out that, on the date of the relevant offense, all of the paperwork was in Brown Jr.'s name and bore his driver's license and date of birth, even though appellant's home address was listed as Brown Jr.'s address. After having the prosecutor read Vehicle Code section 14607.6 aloud, the court asked appellant if he had any documentation showing he was the registered owner on the date of the offense in April 2010. Appellant replied that the police took all of the paperwork when they took the car. The court pointed out that the DMV records did not support that claim. The trial court struck and dismissed appellant's claim opposing forfeiture on the ground that he lacked legal standing to submit the claim, since he failed to prove he was the registered owner, legal owner, or that he possessed a community property interest in the Infiniti.
There is no driver's license number on the September 24, 2010 certificate of title.
Standing is an issue of law subject to our independent review, as is the interpretation of a statute. (Bilafer v. Bilafer (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 363, 368; McKee v. Orange Unified School Dist. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1316.) We conclude Judge Silvers's ruling was correct. The record shows that Brown Jr. was the purchaser and registered owner of the Infiniti. The purchase agreement shows Brown Jr.'s birth date as that of the purchaser. We also observe that the signature of the Joseph Brown who purchased the vehicle does not match appellant's signature as seen on court documents. Appellant may have provided his son with the money to purchase the Infiniti, but the documents regarding the purchase of the Infiniti do not support his claim that his son merely "pick[ed] up the car" for appellant. And giving or lending his son a sum of money to buy the Infiniti did not confer upon appellant an ownership interest in the Infiniti. (See, e.g., People v. $28,500 United States Currency (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 447, 469 [once claimant lent cash to person deemed to have forfeited the cash, the claimant no longer retained an ownership interest in the money but rather was an unsecured creditor who lacked standing to oppose forfeiture].) The fact that appellant apparently paid off the lien possessed by Infiniti Funding Services, the legal owner at the time of Brown Jr.'s arrest, does not change the outcome. Appellant may have paid off the lien and thereby obtained a certificate of title in the name of Brown, Joseph P. (without a generational suffix) on September 24, 2010, but this did not affect the ownership of the vehicle on April 12, 2010. We conclude appellant had no standing to contest the forfeiture of the Infiniti, since he was not a registered or legal owner of the Infiniti, nor did he possess a community property interest in the car. (Veh. Code, 14607.6, subds. (c)(4), (d)(2).)
The manner of signing the surname "Brown" on the purchase documents matches that of Brown Jr. on his Oklahoma driver's license.
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II. Civil Proceeding Against City of Los Angeles
As previously noted, on July 2, 2010, appellant filed a complaint for declaratory relief against the City to determine the validity and application of Vehicle Code section 14607.6 and his right to a hearing. In response to the complaint, the City filed a demurrer on the ground there was no actual case or controversy between the parties. The City asserted, inter alia, that the motions for return of property were addressed to the district attorney's office and filed in the superior court, which were separate public entities of the County of Los Angeles. Thus, there was no actual case or controversy between appellant and the City because the City had no connection with the hearings. Appellant filed an opposition to the demurrer, to which the City replied, reiterating that the City was not a party to the motions for return of property. On October 8, 2010, appellant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. On November 8, 2010, Judge Kevin C. Brazile sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. He dismissed the case with prejudice.
A signed order of dismissal constitutes an appealable judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 581d; Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 342, 345, fn. 3.) A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's claims. (Traders Sports, Inc. v. City of San Leandro (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 37, 43.) We review de novo the ruling on the demurrer, exercising our independent judgment to determine whether a cause of action has been stated. (Ibid.; Desai v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1115.) The trial court's refusal to grant leave to amend the pleading is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (Traders Sports, Inc. v. City of San Leandro, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 43.) "If there is a reasonable possibility that the defect in a complaint can be cured by amendment, it is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend. [Citation.] The burden is on the plaintiff, however, to demonstrate the manner in which the complaint might be amended. [Citation.]" (Hendy v. Losse (1991) 54 Cal.3d 723, 742; accord, Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.)
We conclude the trial court correctly sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. As the record of appellant's efforts to regain possession of the Infiniti shows, the petition for forfeiture of the Infiniti was filed by the district attorney, who is a county officer and who acts on behalf of the county and the State of California. (Gov. Code, § 24000, subd. (a); Nguyen v. Superior Court (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1781, 1787; Pitchess v. Superior Court (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 653, 657.) Accordingly, the City was not a party to the proceedings to determine the validity of appellant's claims arising from the district attorney's petition for forfeiture. "The judgment must be affirmed 'if any one of the several grounds of demurrer is well taken. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) Moreover, as the City notes in its respondent's brief, the criminal court ruled against appellant's claim that he was the registered owner of the Infiniti at the relevant time and held that he therefore lacked standing. "Without standing, there is no actual or justiciable controversy, and courts will not entertain such cases." (Clifford S. v. Superior Court (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 747, 751; see also Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 438 ["contentions based on lack of standing involve jurisdictional challenges and may be raised at any time in the proceeding"]; McKinny v. Board of Trustees (1982) 31 Cal.3d 79, 90 [standing issue properly raised on appeal].) And, although "the allegations of a complaint are deemed true in ruling upon demurrers, where an allegation is contrary to law or to a fact of which a court may take judicial notice, it is to be treated as a nullity. [Citation.]" (Taliaferro v. County of Contra Costa (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 587, 592.)
We conclude the trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrer and did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant leave to amend.
DISPOSITION
The judgments are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
BOREN, P.J. We concur:
ASHMANN-GERST, J.
CHAVEZ, J.