Opinion
Decided June 4, 1935.
No action can be brought upon a sheriff's bond until a judgment has first been obtained against him or his deputy for breach of duty. (P. L., c. 37, s. 10). An action for such breach having been brought against the administrator of a deceased deputy, whose estate had been administered in the insolvent course, the court may grant leave to prosecute such action (P. L., c. 302, s. 8) where the plaintiff disclaims any right to satisfy a judgment out of the decedent's estate. In such case the obligors of the bond are entitled to notice and opportunity to appear and defend before leave to prosecute further is given. A declaration on the common counts may be amended by adding a count for negligence, though more than six years had elapsed since the cause of action accrued, where justice so requires. (P. L., c. 334, s. 9).
ACTION, commenced on the common counts against the defendant's testator. He was a deputy sheriff and the cause of action is for his negligence in caring for the plaintiffs' property attached by him on a writ against them. His estate has been administered in the insolvent course. All plaintiffs save one have become nonsuited. This one did not present his claim to the commissioner in insolvency, and he relies wholly for satisfaction of any judgment upon the public bond of the sheriff under whom the decedent was a deputy.
A referee allowed the declaration in the action to be amended by adding a count for negligence, although the motion to amend was not made until more than six years had elapsed after the cause of action accrued. To such allowance and to the denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss the action, exceptions were taken; and a bill of exceptions was allowed by Burque, J.
Wason, Guertin Leahy (Mr. Guertin orally), for the plaintiff.
Samuel T. Holmgren and Doyle Doyle (Mr. Robert J. Doyle orally), for the defendant.
The statute (P. L., c. 302, s. 8) requires the leave of court to further prosecute an action pending against a defendant who has died and whose estate is administered in the insolvent course. The plaintiff disclaims any right to satisfy from the decedent's estate any judgment he may obtain, and he depends wholly upon the sheriff's bond for satisfaction. He cannot bring suit upon the bond except upon a judgment as the cause of action. P. L., c. 37, s. 10. In this situation, as matter of law, the plaintiff is entitled as against the defendant to receive leave to proceed with his action. It is too late to make the sheriff a party to the action, but the bond is security for the wrongs of his deputies as well as for his own. Since recovery upon the bond is ultimately sought, the obligors thereon are entitled to notice and an opportunity to appear and defend the action before leave to prosecute it further is granted.
The statute of limitations did not bar the amendment. Amendments of substance may be permitted "in any stage of the proceedings." P. L., c. 334, s. 9. They have retroactive effect so far as justice requires. The action was brought within the prescribed time, and when brought it became amendable at any time during its pendency.
Exceptions overruled.