Opinion
99 Civ. 4922 (SWK)
March 15, 2001.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This is a diversity action in negligence arising out of injuries allegedly caused by a rear-end collision on the Bruckner Expressway, in the Bronx, New York. Plaintiff Dennis Brown ("Brown") moves for partial summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
On or about April 23, 1999, Gerardo Brenes ("Brenes"), the operator of a tractor-trailer registered to Swap Meet Delivery Corp. (collectively "the defendants"), collided with Willmore Allen's ("Allen") stopped car in which Brown was a passenger. See Certification in Opp. to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Cert. in Opp.") at 2; Defendant's Memo. of Law in Opp. ("Defendant's Memo.") at 5. After coming around a curve, traveling approximately thirty-five miles per hour, Brenes allegedly attempted to brake but skidded into Allen's car thereby damaging the trunk. See Deposition of Gerardo Brenes, dated 6/13/00 ("Brenes Depo.") at 18-29. At the time of the accident, it was raining, the roads were wet and slippery, see id. at 12, and the traffic was heavy. See id. at 20.
Brown commenced this action for personal injuries on July 2, 1999. On August 8, 2000, Brown brought the instant motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability on the basis that the deposition testimony of the parties clearly shows that the defendant was wholly liable for striking the rear of Allen's vehicle. See Plaintiff's Mem. at 3.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Law
Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party must initially satisfy a burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, which can be done merely by pointing to an absence of evidence in support of the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25, (1986). The nonmoving party must then come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 (e), by "a showing sufficient to establish the existence of [every] element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 322.
The Court "must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party defending against the motion." Eastway Constr. Corp. v. New York, 762 F.2d 243, 249 (2d Cir. 1985); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970); Hathaway v. Coughlin, 841 F.2d 48, 50 (2d Cir. 1988); Knight v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 932 (1987). But the Court is to inquire whether "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party," Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986), and to grant summary judgment where the nonmovant's evidence is merely colorable, conclusory, speculative or not significantly probative. See id. at 249-50; Knight v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d at 12, 15; Argus Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 801 F.2d 38, 45 (2d Cir. 1986),cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1088 (1987). To determine whether the nonmoving party has met his or her burden, the court must focus on both the materiality and the genuineness of the factual issues raised by the nonmovant. As to materiality, "it is the substantive law's identification of which facts are critical and which facts are irrelevant that governs."Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude summary judgment, see id., but the presence of unresolved factual issues that are material to the outcome of the litigation mandates a denial of the summary judgment motion. See, e.g., Knight v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d at 11-12. In sum, if the court determines that "the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, (1986) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1969)).
II. Plaintiff's Motion
Under New York law, a rear-end collision establishes a prima facie case of liability against the following vehicle and imposes a duty of explanation on the operator of that vehicle. See Sekuler v. Limnos Taxi, Inc., 694 N.Y.S.2d 100, 101 (N.Y.App.Div. 1999); Itingen v. Weinstein, 688 N.Y.S.2d 582, 583 (N.Y.App.Div. 1999); Inzano v. Brucculeri, 684 N.Y.S.2d 260, 260 (N.Y.App.Div. 1999); Barba v. Best Security Corp., 652 N.Y.S.2d 71, 71 (N.Y.App.Div. 1997). Accordingly, "[t]he operator of the moving vehicle is required to rebut the inference of negligence created by an unexplained rear-end collision." Lopez v. Minot, 685 N.Y.S.2d 469, 470 (N.Y.App.Div. 1999) (internal citations omitted). "If the operator cannot come forward with any evidence to rebut the inference of negligence, the plaintiff may properly be awarded judgment as a matter of law." Barile v. Lazzarini, 635 N.Y.S.2d 694, 696 (N.Y.App.Div. 1995) (internal citations omitted). If, however, the offending driver provides a non-negligent explanation for the collision, the inference of negligence is overcome and a motion for summary judgment is precluded. See Riley v. County of Broome, 681 N.Y.S.2d 851, 851-852 (N.Y.App.Div. 1999). Such a non-negligent explanation may include mechanical failure, unavoidable skidding on wet pavement, a sudden stop of the vehicle ahead, or any other reasonable cause. See Power v. Hupart, 688 N.Y.S.2d 194, 195 (N.Y.App.Div. 1999); Marsella v. Sound Distributing Corp., 670 N.Y.S.2d 559, 560 (N.Y.App.Div. 1998); Barile v. Lazzarini, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
The defendants allege that upon seeing Allen's vehicle Brenes "immediately applied the brakes of the tractor-trailer, but began to skid on the wet and slippery roadway." Certification in Opp. at 3. Defendants cite Brenes' deposition during which he stated that he "diminished the speed and brake [sic] the car, but the car skidded." Brenes Depo. at 22. Though Brenes does state that the roads were slippery, id. at 16, he never claims that his skid was a result of the wet roadway. In fact, the skid could have been a result of Brenes' applying the brakes, "hard, I mean hard." Id. at 22.
Even assuming, however, that the skid was caused by the wet roadway, it is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence. See e.g.,Mitchell v. Gonzalez, 703 N.Y.S.2d 124, 126 (N.Y.App.Div. 2000) (finding that driver's claim that he failed to stop because of wet roadway is insufficient to rebut presumption of negligence in a rear-end collision); Hurley v. Cavitolo, 658 N.Y.S.2d 90, 91 (N.Y.App.Div. 1997) (holding that defendant's "sparse testimony" that accident was caused by wet pavement and plaintiff's sudden stop was insufficient to rebut presumption of negligence); Pincus v. Cohen, 604 N.Y.S.2d 139 (N.Y.App. Div. 1993) (stating that braking but nevertheless skidding on a wet roadway is not a "sudden or unavoidable circumstance" that would rebut a presumption of negligence). "A driver is expected to drive at a sufficiently safe speed and to maintain enough distance between himself and cars ahead of him so as to avoid collisions with stopped vehicles, taking into account the weather and road conditions." Mitchell v. Gonzalez, 703 N.Y.S.2d at 126.
The defendants cite Pace v. State of New York, 705 N.Y.S.2d 687 (N.Y.App.Div. 2000), in which the New York Supreme Court held that the denial of summary judgment was appropriate, and argue that the "facts concerning this accident are remarkably similar." See Defendant's Memo. at 5. In Pace, the plaintiff was driving along a curved ramp when he came to a complete stop because of two disabled vehicles in the roadway ahead of him. See Pace v. State of New York, 705 N.Y.S.2d at 688. The plaintiff's vehicle was subsequently struck in the rear by a driver a who claimed that he was unable to avoid the collision because he didn't see the stopped vehicles "until he had rounded the curve" and upon seeing them he braked but skidded as a result of a wet roadway. Id. In the instant case, however, Allen's car was not stopped as a result of disabled vehicles and at the time of the accident there was, by Brenes' own admission, "heavy traffic." See Brenes Depo. at 20. Unlike the situation in Pace where the driver could not have known what lay around the curve, Brenes should have been aware that because there was "heavy traffic" cars could be stopped on the other side of the curve. See Diller v. City of New York Police Depart., 701 N.Y.S.2d 432, 433 (N.Y.App.Div. 2000) (holding that because it can easily be anticipated that cars up ahead will make frequent stops in rush hour traffic, "defendant driver's failure to anticipate and react to the slow and cautious movement of plaintiff's vehicle" is not an adequate, non-negligent explanation for the accident); Johnson v. Phillips, 690 N.Y.S.2d 545, 547 (N.Y.App.Div. 1999) (holding that drivers have a duty to be aware of traffic conditions, including vehicle stoppages)
The defendants also allege that "there were no traffic directional signals illuminated on the rear of [Allen's] vehicle." Cert. in Opp. at 3. Questions of fact regarding whether brake lights were illuminated at the time of the accident may rebut an inference of negligence. See Hurley v. Izzo, 670 N.Y.S.2d 575, 576 (N.Y.App.Div. 1998). The defendants, however, do not allege that the brake lights were not illuminated. The fact that Allen's car, which was stopped in "heavy traffic", had no signal lights illuminated is not sufficient to rebut the inference of negligence.
This Court finds that the defendants have not offered an explanation for the collision sufficient to rebut the inference of negligence created by a rear-end collision. As a result, Brown is entitled to partial summary judgment on the question of the negligence of the operator. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion is granted.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Brown's motion for partial summary judgment on liability is granted. Trial on the issue of damages shall commence on June 25, 2001, at 10:00 a.m. in Room 906, 40 Centre Street, New York, New York. The parties' joint pre-trial order, proposed voir dire, jury charges, and in limine motions must be filed and served on or before May 28, 2001. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment for the plaintiff in accordance with the rulings in this Opinion.