Brooks v. Starr Commonwealth

Full title: SHARON BROOKS, Personal Representative of the Estate of Dominique Wade…

Court: Supreme Court of Michigan

Date published: May 7, 2010

486 Mich. 910 (Mich. 2010)

486 Mich. 910

Opinion

781 N.W.2d 305 (Mich. 2010) 486 Mich. 910 Sharon BROOKS, Personal Representative of the Estate of Dominique Wade, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STARR COMMONWEALTH., Defendant/Cross-Defendant-Appellant, and Bridgeway Services, L.L.C., Defendant/Cross-Plaintiff-Appellee. No. 139144. Supreme Court of Michigan. May 7, 2010

         Prior report: 2009 WL 1507320.

         Order

         On order of the Court, leave to appeal having been granted, and the briefs and oral argument of the parties having been considered by the Court, we REVERSE that part of the judgment of the Court of Appeals that reversed in part the summary disposition order of the Oakland Circuit Court and we REINSTATE the summary disposition order of the Oakland Circuit Court. Generally, a person has no duty to protect another from the dangerous or criminal conduct of a third person. Murdock v. Higgins, 454 Mich. 46, 54, 559 N.W.2d 639 (1997); Graves v. Warner Bros., 253 Mich.App. 486, 493, 656 N.W.2d 195 (2002), lv. den 469 Mich. 853, 666 N.W.2d 665 (2003). There is no special relationship here that creates an exception to this general rule. MCL 803.306a, which is part of the youth rehabilitation services act, MCL 803.301 et seq., and which requires a facility to immediately notify a police agency of a public ward's escape and requires the notified police agency to enter that information on the law enforcement information network without undue delay, does not create an actionable duty in favor of the general public. The principal purpose of the act is to provide for public wards. Further, as the circuit court concluded, under the facts of this case there is no proximate cause, and only speculation, that links the delay in reporting the escape of the public ward and the ward's intentional killing of the decedent 11 days later.

          MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).

          I would affirm the Court of Appeals result because, on the facts of this case, the evidence of Starr Commonwealth's violation of MCL 803.306a was sufficient to create a rebuttable presumption of negligence under Klanseck v. Anderson Sales & Service, Inc., 426 Mich. 78, 393 N.W.2d 356 (1986). The issue of proximate cause should be submitted to a jury. See id. at 90, 393 N.W.2d 356 and McMillan v. State Hwy. Comm, 426 Mich. 46, 63 n. 8, 393 N.W.2d 332 (1986).

          MARILYN J. KELLY, C.J., and HATHAWAY, J., join the statement of MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH, J.