Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 00-03637.
May 4, 2004
MEMORANDUM
Petitioner filed a pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint against corrections officials Martin F. Horn, Donald T. Vaughn, David DiGugliemo, John K. Murray, Russell Marshall, Mary Canino, Edward Dennis, Donna Hale, Julia Knauer and Robert Fagan in their individual and official capacities alleging that defendants' actions violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12102 et seq. On April 7, 2004, I granted the motion for summary judgment of defendants Donna Hale, Julie Knauer and Robert Fagan and entered judgment in their favor. Now before me is plaintiff's motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). For the reasons stated herein, plaintiff's motion is denied.
Motions for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) are intended "to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence." Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985). "Motions under Rule 59(e) should be granted sparingly because of the interests in finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources."Jones v. Dalton, No. 95-7940, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12484, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 1998). They "may not be used by litigants to `rehash' the same arguments and facts previously presented to the court" and are not available to provide unhappy parties an additional opportunity to sway the court. Stepanuk v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 92-6095, 1993 WL 166748, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 14, 1993). See also, Cohen v. Zarwin Baum, P.C., No. 93-2145, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18055 at *4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 1993). A motion for reconsideration is generally allowed on only one of three grounds: (1) where there has been an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) where new evidence that was not previously available has become available; or (3) where it is necessary to correct a clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice. See, e.g. Malaysia Intern. Shipping Co. v. Sinochem Intern. Co., No. 03-3771, 2004 WL 825466, at *2 (E.D. Pa. April 13, 2004). "Any litigant considering bringing a motion to reconsider based upon [the third] ground should evaluate whether what may seem to be a clear error of law is in fact simply a point of disagreement between the Court and the litigant." Bouie v. Varner, No. 00-4846, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8132, at * 3 (E.D. Pa. May 7, 2002), quoting Dodge v. Susquehanna University, 796 F. Supp. 829, 830 (M.D. Pa. 1992).
Plaintiff has not alleged a change in controlling law or the existence of new evidence. His motion can survive only if he can establish there is a need to correct a clear legal error or a manifest injustice in my previous order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment. He has not done so. Plaintiff asserts I should not have considered Frank Botto's statement that plaintiff's physician, Dr. Boris Klyashtorny reported that plaintiff's prescriptions should not affect his ability to wake up for the morning count because it is "unsworn hearsay." However, even if Klyashtorny did not inform Botto that plaintiff's prescriptions would not interfere with his ability to wake up, plaintiff still has not established that defendants' actions subjected him to a sufficiently substantial risk of harm to establish his claims under the Eighth Amendment. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 (1994).
Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to show that the sedative effects of his antidepressant made it impossible to comply with the standing count policy or that he was subjected to a substantial risk of serious damage to his future health by being required to stand for the morning count while taking his medication. Other than during his brief stay in disciplinary custody, there is no evidence that defendants denied plaintiff's access to medication or treatment for his depression; instead, plaintiff opted to refuse his medications for a period of five months after his release from disciplinary custody. "Occasional missed doses of medication do not implicate the Constitution."Gresh v. Berks Co., No. 00-5697, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13347, at *19 (E.D. Pa. Jul. 18, 2002), citing, Herndon v. Whitworth, 924 F. Supp. 1171 (N.D. Ga. 1995). A trier of fact could not find from the evidence presented that plaintiff, whose depression was monitored by prison medical personnel and treated with prescription medication until he chose to refuse such medication, has demonstrated that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his condition in a manner that caused "an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" or was "repugnant to the conscience of mankind." Estelle, Corrections Director, et al. v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06.
The other arguments in plaintiff's motion merely expound upon his previous contentions and assert my decision was wrong. Little would be gained by a detailed reiteration of the reasons for the conclusions already set forth in my prior opinion. Plaintiff's disagreement with my application of the facts to the applicable law is not enough for me to alter or amend my prior judgment. Accordingly, his motion will be denied.