Summary
opining that Hurst overruled the decisional foundations of Harris v. Alabama, but that she "nonetheless vote to deny certiorari in this particular case because I believe procedural obstacles would have prevented us from granting relief" in a case where petitioner's direct appeals concluded and his conviction and sentence became final on direct review in 1997
Summary of this case from Taylor v. DunnOpinion
Nos. 15–7786.
01-21-2016
Christopher Eugene BROOKS v. ALABAMA.
Virginia A. Vinson, Wilkinson & Vinson, Birmingham, Alabama, for petitioner. Jeff Sessions Attorney General, P. David Bjurberg Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Division, Montgomery, Alabama, for appellee.
Virginia A. Vinson, Wilkinson & Vinson, Birmingham, Alabama, for petitioner.
Jeff Sessions Attorney General, P. David Bjurberg Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Division, Montgomery, Alabama, for appellee.
The application for stay of execution of sentence of death presented to Justice THOMAS and by him referred to the Court is denied. The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
Justice SOTOMAYOR, with whom Justice GINSBURG joins, concurring in the denial of certiorari.
This Court's opinion upholding Alabama's capital sentencing scheme was based on Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 109 S.Ct. 2055, 104 L.Ed.2d 728 (1989) (per curiam ), and Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984), two decisions we recently overruled in Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 616, ––– L.Ed.2d ––––, 2016 WL 112683 (2016). See Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 115 S.Ct. 1031, 130 L.Ed.2d 1004 (1995). I nonetheless vote to deny certiorari in this particular case because I believe procedural obstacles would have prevented us from granting relief.
Justice BREYER, dissenting from denial of application for stay of execution and petition for certiorari.
Christopher Eugene Brooks was sentenced to death in accordance with Alabama's procedures, which allow a jury to render an "advisory verdict" that "is not binding on the court." Ala.Code § 13A–5–47(e) (2006). For the reasons explained in my opinions concurring in the judgment in Hurst v. Florida, –––U.S., at ––––, 136 S.Ct., at 624, ante, at *9, and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 613–619, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), and my dissenting opinion in Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358–366, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004), I dissent from the order of the Court to deny the application for stay of execution and the petition for a writ of certiorari.
Moreover, we have recognized that Alabama's sentencing scheme is "much like" and "based on Florida's sentencing scheme." Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 508, 115 S.Ct. 1031, 130 L.Ed.2d 1004 (1995). Florida's scheme is unconstitutional. See Hurst, ––– U.S., at ––––, 136 S.Ct., at 624, ante, at *9 (BREYER, J., concurring in judgment). The unfairness inherent in treating this case differently from others which used similarly unconstitutional procedures only underscores the need to reconsider the validity of capital punishment under the Eighth Amendment. See Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. ––––, ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2726, 2755–2756, 192 L.Ed.2d 761 (2015) (BREYER, J., dissenting). I respectfully dissent.