Opinion
No. 01-2394 Ma.
February 28, 2003.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Before the court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment filed on October 30, 2002. Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to this motion on January 17, 2003. Defendant filed a reply on February 4, 2003 to which Plaintiff responded on February 12, 2003. For the following reasons, the court GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary judgment and DISMISSES this action.
I. Background
Plaintiff Margarita Bronski ("Bronski") is an Hispanic female who, at all times relevant to this action, was employed by Defendant. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 4.) Defendant, Northwest Airlines, Inc. ("Northwest") is a corporation doing business in the state of Tennessee at all times relevant to this action. (Id. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff filed this action on August 16, 2001. In her complaint, she alleges six causes of action: (1) hostile working environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"); (2) wrongful discharge in violation of Title VII; (3) retaliation in violation of Title VII; (4) violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (the "ADA"); (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (6) negligent supervision. (Id.) The court has jurisdiction over these claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 18 U.S.C. § 1332, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). (Id. at 1.) Northwest seeks summary judgment on all of Bronski's claims.
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise stated. Bronski began her employment with Northwest on August 1, 1988. (Def.'s Statement of Facts ¶ 2.) She worked as an Aircraft Cleaner from the beginning of her employment through November 2, 1997, when she injured her knee while cleaning a plane. (Id. ¶¶ 3-4.) As a result of Bronski's injury, her doctor placed physical restrictions on the work she could perform. (Id. ¶¶ 5-6.) Bronski then underwent surgery and an evaluation at Health South Rehabilitation ("Health South"). (Id. ¶¶ 7-8.) Health South stated that Bronski was unable to fulfill the responsibilities of an Aircraft Cleaner because she was limited in her ability to perform the following activities: walking, standing, pushing, pulling, climbing ladders, and twisting. (Id. ¶¶ 10-11.)
In March 1998, Northwest placed Bronski in a limited duty position in the laundry department. (Id. ¶ 13.) Northwest's policy states, and Northwest maintains, that its limited duty program is temporary and participation in the program is limited to ninety (90) calendar days with a possible extension to one hundred twenty (120) calendar days with approval from the Regional Claims Coordinator. (Bronski Dep. Ex. 17.) Bronski disputes that this accommodation was temporary. She alleges that two managers allowed her to remain in the position for approximately eighteen months and that those managers intended for her position in the laundry department to be permanent. (Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 9.) Bronski further claims that a union representative also believed that the position was permanent. (Id.)
Bronski alleges that, while she was working in the laundry department, she began finding objectionable items in the laundry bags that she handled. (Bronski Dep. At 116, 121, 127, 129.) These items included sanitary napkins and towels containing human excrement. (Id.) Bronski believes that someone was deliberately placing these items in the laundry bags. (Id. at 129.) This suspicion arose because the objectionable material began appearing with increasing frequency. (Id. at 132.) Bronski, however, does not know who placed the items in the laundry bags. (Id. at 129.) Furthermore, Bronski admits that if people were doing this deliberately, they would have no way of knowing which laundry bags she would handle and which bags would be handled by another person in the laundry department. (Id. at 127, 129.) Others in the laundry department encountered the same objectionable material in the laundry bags. (Id. at 129.) Although she does not know the identity of the alleged perpetrators, and thus could not speculate about whether they were motivated by race, national origin, or gender bias, Bronski suspects that they were motivated by their objection to her placement on limited duty. (Id. at 139.)
Upset at finding this debris in the laundry bags, Bronski and a male co-worker, who was likewise confronted with the debris and disturbed by the situation, approached a supervisor, Lillie Alexander ("Alexander"), to inform her of the situation. ( Id. at 134.) A few days later, Alexander held a meeting with the fleet service lead cleaners during which she instructed them to instruct their subordinates not to mix dirty blankets (those containing the objectionable material) with clean blankets. (Id. at 137.) Bronski does not dispute that Alexander convened this meeting, but Bronski maintains that the situation did not improve. (Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 8.)
In May 1999, Bronski was informed that she could no longer continue in her limited duty position. (Def.'s Statement of Facts ¶ 19.) Therefore, she was required to provide information to determine whether Northwest could make an accommodation that would permit her to continue in her position as Aircraft Cleaner. (Id.) In August 1999, Northwest employed Work Solutions, a third party, to perform a job task analysis to determine whether Bronski could return to her Aircraft Cleaner position. ( Id. ¶ 20.) Work Solutions determined that Bronski was unable to perform the required duties of an Aircraft Cleaner because of her medical restrictions. (Id. ¶ 21.) In September 1999, Bronski was medically disqualified from her position as Aircraft Cleaner and was informed that, if she desired to continue employment with Northwest, she would have to seek a position through the Alternate Duty Exploration Program. (Id. ¶¶ 23-30.)
Bronski avers that she was subjected to the objectionable debris in the laundry and was removed from her limited duty position for discriminatory reasons. First, Bronski alleges that her supervisor, Lillie Alexander, was prejudiced against Bronski because of her race (Hispanic) and national origin (Spanish). (Bronski Dep. at 197.) Bronski has no knowledge that Alexander made any discriminatory statements about "Hispanics" or "Spanish people." (Id. at 200-02.) Nevertheless, Bronski believes that Alexander failed to correct the situation regarding the debris in the laundry and participated in the decision to end Bronski's limited duty position because of race or national origin bias. (Id.)
Bronski also maintains that Northwest failed to accommodate her disability because of her sex. (Id. at 196.) She notes that Northwest failed to accommodate her in a permanent limited duty position while accommodating two white males by allowing them to continue in limited duty positions in excess of 120 days. Northwest admits that it accommodated two male employees and did not accommodate Bronski, but maintains that the two male employees were accommodated under Northwest's Growing Old in Service Program (the "GOS Program"). (Alexander Dep. ¶¶ 4-5.) An employee qualifies for the GOS Program if the combined (1) age of the employee and (2) number of years of service of the employee exceeds eighty (80). (Id. ¶ 3.) The two male employees that Bronski alleges were accommodated because of their gender each had combined age and years of service that exceeded eighty and thus qualified for the GOS Program. (Id. ¶¶ 4-5.) When Northwest refused to accommodate Bronski, she was fifty-one (51) years old and had eleven (11) years of service with Northwest. (Id. ¶ 6.) Thus, under the formula used to determine eligibility for the GOS program, Bronski had a total score of only sixty-two and did not qualify for accommodation.(Id.)
Bronski filed a charge with the Tennessee Human Rights Commission ("THRC") and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on January 26, 2000. (Bronski Dep. Ex. 10.) In the charge, she alleged discrimination based on sex, national origin, and disability. (Id.) The EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter to Bronski on February 28, 2001. (Def.'s Statement of Facts ¶ 111.)
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper "if . . . there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The movant must meet its initial burden of "demonstrat[ing] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
In considering a motion for summary judgment, "the evidence as well as all inferences drawn therefrom must be read in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Kochins v. Linden-Alimak, Inc., 799 F.2d 1128, 1133 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). "[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute is about a material fact that is `genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
III. Analysis
A. Title VII Hostile Working Environment Claim
Bronski's claim that she was subjected to a hostile working environment because of her race, color, and national origin is based on her allegations that objectionable debris was improperly mixed with the regular laundry brought to the laundry department and that her supervisor failed to take the necessary steps to rectify this situation. Bronski has not presented any direct evidence of discrimination. Therefore, the court will analyze her discrimination claim under the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework. See Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 803 (1973); McDonald v. Union Camp Corp., 898 F.2d 1155, 1159 (6th Cir. 1990). Under that analysis, the Plaintiff must prove a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Wilson v. Stroh Cos., Inc., 952 F.2d 942, 945 (6th Cir. 1992) (citingBurdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53)).
If the Plaintiff proves a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the Defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.Galbraith v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 944 F.2d 275, 279 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253)). Even if the Defendant produces such a reason, the Plaintiff may still prevail if she establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason was a pretext for discrimination on the basis of the prohibited consideration. Wilson, 952 F.2d at 945.
To establish a prima facie case under Title VII based upon a hostile working environment, Bronski must establish that: (1) she was a member of a protected group, (2) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment, (3) the harassment was based upon her protected status, (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment, and (5) the defendant knew or should have known about the harassing conduct but failed to take any corrective or preventive actions. Farmer v. Cleveland Pub. Power, 295 F.3d 593, 604-05 (6th Cir. 2002).
Bronski cannot establish a prima facie case because she has not produced any evidence with respect to the third element: that she experienced the allegedly harassing conditions because of her protected status. Bronski admits that she was treated the same as similarly situated non-Spanish, non-Hispanic individuals. Although she believes that people were intentionally placing debris in the laundry, she admits that those people would have no way of knowing which laundry worker would handle a given bag of laundry. Bronski also admits that co-workers were likewise subjected to the objectionable debris. Therefore, she cannot establish the third element of a prima facie case for hostile working environment based on race, color, or national origin, because she has presented no evidence that individuals outside the protected classes experienced superior treatment. Accordingly, Northwest is entitled to summary judgment on Bronski's hostile working environment claim.
B. Title VII Wrongful Discharge Claim
Bronski's wrongful discharge claim is based on her allegations that Northwest medically disqualified her because of her disability while it accommodated the disabilities of two white male workers. Bronski has no direct evidence of sex discrimination to support this claim, so the court must again employ the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework to determine whether she has adduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to survive Northwest's motion for summary judgement.
Based on the undisputed facts, Bronski has established aprima facie case of sex discrimination: 1) she is the member of a protected class, women; 2) she was qualified for her laundry position; 3) despite her qualifications, Northwest did not accommodate Bronski by permitting her to continue in her limited duty position; 4) Northwest accommodated two white males by permitting them to continue to participated in the limited duty program for a period in excess of the general maximum period allowed under the limited duty program.
Northwest maintains that Bronski cannot establish the fourth element of the prima facie case because the white males that Bronski identified were not similarly situated to Bronski. Northwest contends that those white males were accommodated because they qualified for the GOS Program and Bronski did not. The court cannot take this into account when evaluating Bronski's prima facie case, however, because Northwest has advanced the GOS Program both as the reason that Bronski cannot establish a prima facie case and the reason that Northwest's decision to medically disqualify Bronski, and not the two white males, was not pretextual. Under Sixth Circuit law, a Defendant is not permitted to use its non-discriminatory reason, from the second part of the tri partite analysis, to negate an element of the prima facie case. See Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 660 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that court improperly had "conflated the distinct stages of the McDonnell Douglas inquiry by using [Defendant's] `nondiscriminatory reason' as a predicate for finding [Plaintiff] to have failed to make a prima facie case."). Thus, the court does not consider the GOS Program in evaluating Plaintiff's prima facie case.
Because Bronski has established a prima facie case of sex discrimination, the burden shifts to Defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions.Galbraith, 944 F.2d at 279. Defendant's articulated reason for refusing to accommodate Bronski's disability, while accommodating two medically disqualified white males, is that the two men qualified for the GOS Program. The two males who were accommodated had a sufficiently high age/years of service combination to qualify for the GOS Program while Bronski did not. Defendant has provided uncontroverted evidence: (1) of the existence and nature of the GOS Program; (2) that the white males in question qualified for the GOS Program; and (3) that Bronski did not qualify for the GOS Program. Thus, Northwest has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for failing to accommodate Bronski.
Because Defendants have articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, the burden now shifts back to Plaintiff to show that this reason was pretextual. Wilson, 952 F.2d at 945. In order to establish pretext, a Plaintiff must prove that the articulated reason: 1) had no basis in fact; 2) did not actually motivate the challenged action; or 3) was insufficient to warrant the challenged conduct. Manzer, 29 F.3d at 1084. Notably, "establishing that the employer's reason was a pretext requires that a plaintiff do more than simply impugn the legitimacy of the asserted justification; in addition, the plaintiff must also adduce evidence of the employer's discriminatory animus." Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 804 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S.Ct. 2747, 2751-52 (1993)).
In the case at bar, Bronski has done no more than impugn the legitimacy of Northwest's asserted justification. Bronski admits that she has no evidence that Northwest was motivated by an animus toward women. Therefore, she has not proven that Northwest's asserted reason for failing to accommodate her is pretextual and her Title VII wrongful discharge claim based on sex discrimination claim must fail.
C. Title VII Retaliation Claim
Bronski claims that Northwest retaliated against her because she had complained about Northwest's discrimination. Specifically, she avers that "her loss of the accommodated position in September 1999 was a direct result of her complaints concerning her hostile working environment under her new supervisor, which began around May 1999." (Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 11.) Her retaliation claim, however, is barred, because she failed to raise this claim in her charge with the THRC and EEOC.
Under Sixth Circuit law, "the judicial complaint must be limited to the scope of the EEOC investigation reasonably expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination." Ang v. Proctor Gamble Co., 932 F.2d 540, 545 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439, 446 (6th Cir. 1977)). In determining whether a retaliation claim must be alleged in an EEOC charge, courts distinguish between cases in which the retaliation allegedly occurred prior to the filing of the EEOC charge and those in which the retaliation allegedly occurred after the filing of the EEOC charge. Id. at 546-47. The former must be identified in the EEOC charge while the latter need not have been alleged in the charge (and cannot be identified in the charge) because the retaliation would not yet have taken place at the time the Plaintiff filed the EEOC charge. Bronski's retaliation claim falls into the first category.
Bronski avers that Northwest retaliated against her in September 1999 when she was medically disqualified from her Aircraft Cleaner position. Bronski filed her charge with the THRC and the EEOC on January 26, 2000, but failed to allege retaliation in that charge. Bronski did not check the "retaliation" box on the THRC/EEOC form. She also does not mention any of the activity in the narrative portion of the form that she now maintains led to the alleged retaliation. Therefore, her retaliation claim exceeds the scope of her THRC/EEOC charge and is barred.
Northwest avers that Bronski's harassment and national origin claims are likewise barred by Bronski's failure to include them in her THRC/EEOC charge. The court disagrees. Bronski's harassment claim is within the scope of the EEOC investigation reasonably expected to grow out of the other charges of discrimination. This is true especially because there was no separate box to check for harassment. Therefore, her harassment claim is not barred. Bronski's race discrimination claim is within the scope of the EEOC investigation reasonably expected to grow out of the claim of national origin discrimination in her THRC/EEOC claim. The court notes that although the Anq court affirmed a district court decision that refused to construe an EEOC charge of national origin discrimination to include a claim of race discrimination, the court stated that the district court could reasonably have concluded otherwise. 932 F.2d at 546.
D. ADA Claims
Bronski contends that Northwest violated the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) by (1) failing to provide her an accommodation required by the ADA and (2) terminating her because of her disability. Northwest maintains, however, that it did accommodate Bronski to the extent required under the ADA by providing Bronski with a temporary limited duty position. Furthermore, Northwest states that it could not have terminated her in violation of the ADA, because, although Northwest medically disqualified Bronski, it did not terminate her.
1. Failure to Accommodate Claim
Bronski claims that Northwest violated the ADA when it failed to accommodate her disability by allowing her to remain permanently in the limited duty laundry position. The ADA requires covered entities to provide "reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). The Sixth Circuit, however, has held that converting a temporary "rotating or relief position into a permanent position" is not a reasonable accommodation and thus is not required by the ADA. Hoskins v. Oakland County Sheriff's Dept., 227 F.3d 719, 730 (6th Cir. 2000) (citingHendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 1998)).
Northwest has provided evidence that the limited duty program allowed an injured employee to serve in a limited duty position for a maximum of 120 days. Bronski was permitted to remain in the program beyond the maximum period, but there is no evidence that the program provides for accommodation in excess of 120 days. Bronski contends that, notwithstanding these provisions, her limited duty position was permanent because two managers had represented to her that it was permanent. This bare assertion is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact on this issue, however, because Bronski does not support this assertion with any evidence and because she admits that these managers did not have the authority to grant her a permanent limited duty position. Because Northwest is not required to convert a temporary limited duty position into a permanent one in order reasonably to accommodate a disabled employee under the ADA, Northwest is entitled to summary judgment on Bronski's accommodation claim.
The court also grants some deference to the findings of the arbitrator in a related action between these two parties. The arbitrator held that Bronski's laundry position was not permanent and that she was aware there was no guarantee that the laundry position was permanent. (Def.'s Statement of Facts ¶ 110.).
2. Unlawful Termination Claim
To establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination based on disability, Bronski must show that: (1) she is a disabled person within the meaning of the Act, (2) she is qualified to perform the essential functions of her job with or without reasonable accommodation, and (3) she suffered an adverse employment decision because of her disability. See Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 762 (6th Cir. 1997);McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., U.S.A., 110 F.3d 369, 371 (6th Cir. 1997). If Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to Defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action. Monette, 90 F.3d at 1179. If Defendant meets that burden, Plaintiff must show that the proffered explanation is a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Id.
Bronski cannot establish the second element of the prima facie case because she was not qualified to perform the essential functions of her Aircraft Cleaner position with or without a reasonable accommodation. After allowing Bronski to take a temporary limited duty position after her accident, Northwest allowed her to remain in a limited duty position for a period in excess of the technical maximum. When Northwest determined that Bronski could no longer remain in the limited duty program, it solicited information from Bronski, and hired a third party, Work Solutions, to determine whether Bronski had recovered to the extent that she could perform the tasks of Aircraft Cleaner with an accommodation. Only after this process did Northwest medically disqualify Bronski.
Northwest argues that Bronski cannot establish the third element of the prima facie case because she was not discharged. The evidence supports the assertion that Bronski was never formally discharged. The court, however, declines to deny Bronski's claim on this basis because Northwest's medical disqualification of Bronski prevented her from working, at least temporarily, and thus may be construed as an actionable adverse employment decision.
Bronski does not challenge Northwest's claim that she was not in a physical condition to work as an Aircraft Cleaner at the time she was medically disqualified. Instead, she relies on the fact that she was able to perform the duties of the temporary limited duty position in the laundry department to support her assertion that she was qualified for her position. Her ability to perform the duties of the laundry position is not relevant because that is not the position from which she was medically disqualified. Thus, the undisputed evidence indicates that Bronksi was not qualified to perform the essential functions of her Aircraft Cleaner job at the time she was medically disqualified, with or without reasonable accommodation. Therefore, she has failed to establish a prima facie case of unlawful termination under the ADA, and Northwest is entitled to summary judgment on that claim.
E. Negligent Supervision
Bronski's state law claim for negligent supervision is based on her allegations that Northwest failed to prevent its employees from intentionally placing objectionable debris in the bags containing the rest of the dirty laundry. This claim arises under Tennessee law. Northwest maintains alternatively that (1) this claim is barred by the exclusivity provision of the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-108 (the "Workers' Comp. Statute") and (2) Bronski cannot establish a prima facie case of negligent supervision. The court concludes that this claim is barred by the Workers' Comp. Statute. Therefore, the court need not examine the sufficiency of the underlying negligent supervision claim.
A federal district court is required to apply the "choice of law" rules of the state in which it sits. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). "Otherwise the accident of diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb equal administration of justice in coordinate state and federal courts sitting side by side." Id. Therefore, this court must apply the Tennessee rule to determine which jurisdiction's law to apply. Tennessee Courts apply the "most significant relationship" approach of the Second Restatement of Conflicts (the "Second Restatement"). Glennon v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 83 F.3d 132, 136 (6th Cir. 1996) (citingHataway v. McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53 (Tenn. 1992)). As Defendant's alleged negligence and Plaintiff's alleged injury took place in Tennessee, the court finds that Tennessee has the most significant relationship to the alleged tort. Accordingly, Tennessee law applies to both of the state law torts alleged in this action: negligent supervision and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The Worker's Comp. Statute provides in pertinent part: "The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee subject to the Workers' Compensation Law on account of personal injury or death by accident . . . shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee . . ., at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury or death." Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-108(a). Bronski's claim of negligent supervision is a personal injury claim arising from the alleged negligence of her employer, Northwest. Therefore, her claim is barred by the clear language of the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Comp. Statute. Accordingly, the court grants Northwest summary judgment on Bronski's negligent supervision claim.
Although there are no reported Tennessee cases on point, the court notes that its conclusion is supported by a Tennessee case, applying an almost identical Mississippi law. See Rampy v. ICI Acrylics, Inc., 898 S.W.2d 196, 211 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1994). In Rampy, the court held that the exclusive remedy provision of the Mississippi workers' compensation statute precluded the Plaintiff from bringing a negligent supervision claim against its employer. Id.
F. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Bronski's state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is based on the same allegations as her negligent supervision claim: that Northwest employees intentionally placed objectionable debris in the bags containing the rest of the dirty laundry. Northwest maintains alternatively that this claim is (1) barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Comp. Statute and (2) Bronski cannot establish aprima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The exclusivity provision of the Workers' Comp. Statute does not bar Bronski's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, because the exclusivity provision does not apply to intentional torts. See Gonzales v. Alman Constr. Co., 857 S.W.2d 42, 46 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1993). Therefore, the court must determine whether Bronski has established a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress by Northwest.
To establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a Plaintiff must prove that Defendant's conduct was intentional or reckless. Lyons v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 26 S.W.3d 888, 893 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2000). Nevertheless, Bronski must do more than demonstrate that the alleged objectionable conduct was intentional to establish a viable claim against Northwest. Bronski must also establish that Northwest is liable for the acts of those employees who allegedly placed the objectionable debris in the bags of dirty laundry.
In this case, Bronski must prove that the action was intentional and not merely reckless. If the conduct was merely reckless, her claim is barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Tennessee Worker's Compensation Act.
An employer may not be held liable for the tortious acts of its employees if those acts are performed outside the scope of employment "in a spirit of vindictiveness or to gratify personal animosity, or to carry out an independent purpose of [the employee's] own" unless the servant's conduct is ratified by the master. Averill v. Luttrell, 311 S.W.2d 812, 815 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1958) (holding that a baseball club could not be held liable for an assault by its catcher against one of the opposing team's batters during the course of a baseball game). Assuming for purposes of this order that Northwest employees intentionally placed objectionable debris in bags with conventional dirty laundry to spite those working in the laundry department, Bronski has still failed to establish that Northwest was responsible for these acts.
The alleged acts are clearly not within the scope of the alleged perpetrators' employment with Northwest. Northwest does not employ people to place objectionable debris in bags of generally unstained laundry consisting of blankets intended for reuse on later flights. Therefore, the alleged actions are not consistent with the scope of the alleged perpetrators' employment with Northwest. Furthermore, Northwest did not ratify these actions. It is Northwest's position that the debris was not deliberately placed in the laundry bags, but ended up in bags of laundry on rags used for lavatory cleaning. Nevertheless, Northwest supervisor Lillie Alexander held a meeting in response to Bronski's concerns in which Alexander ordered that, if this alleged behavior was occurring, it must cease. Thus, even if Bronski could show that the conduct she has alleged rises to the level of outrageousness necessary to prove a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, she cannot prove that Northwest is liable for the conduct. Accordingly, Northwest is entitled to summary judgment on Bronski's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS Northwest's motion for summary judgment in its entirety. Accordingly, the court DISMISSES this case.
So ORDERED.