Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-1725 Section "T"(4)
May 7, 2002
Before the Court is a "Motion to Dismiss as Moot" filed on behalf of the defendants, Ochsner Clinic, L.L.C., Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation, and St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, seeking to dismiss the claims of plaintiff, Dr. Michelle Brochner, M.D., and plaintiffs-in-intervention, Office of Risk Management, Division of Administration, Office of the Governor and the Louisiana State University Eye Center. The parties waived oral argument and the matter was submitted for the Court's consideration on the briefs alone, January 30, 2002. The Court, having considered the arguments of counsel, the evidence presented, the applicable law and jurisprudence, is fully advised in the premises and ready to rule.
ORDER AND REASONS
I. BACKGROUND:
Plaintiff, Dr. Michele Brochner (herein referred to as "Dr. Brochner"), a medical resident, brought this action to recover damages for personal injuries she sustained while working at Ochsner Clinic L.L.C., against Ochsner Clinic, L.L.C., Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation (herein collectively referred to as "Ochsner"), and St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company. Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation is the owner and operator of Ochsner Hospital and the owner of Ochsner Clinic L.L.C. The Office of Risk Management, Division of Administration, Office of the Governor and the Louisiana State University Eye Center (herein collectively referred to as "plaintiffs-in-intervention" or "intervenors") intervened in this matter seeking to recover workers' compensation benefits paid to and on behalf of plaintiff.
Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking a determination that plaintiff was a borrowed servant or joint employee of defendants and Louisiana State University ("LSU"). A Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on behalf of the plaintiff asserting that plaintiff was the sole employee of LSU. The plaintiffs-in-intervention likewise filed a Motion for Summary Judgment joining the plaintiff in arguing that Dr. Brochner was the sole employee of LSU, or in the alternative, that should the Court find that she was a borrowed servant, that it be allowed to recover one-half of all past, present, and future workers' compensation benefits paid. This Court granted defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment finding that Dr. Brochner was a borrowed servant of defendants when she allegedly sustained personal injuries on defendants' property; and therefore denied the cross-motion of the plaintiff. The intervenors' motion was denied to the extent it sought to have plaintiff declared the sole employee of LSU, but a ruling was deferred with respect to its request for recovery of one-half of all monies paid in compensation benefits. Defendants now seek to have the claims of the plaintiff and the plaintiffs-in-intervention dismissed as moot based upon the Order and Reasons issued by this Court.
II. ARGUMENTS OF THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES:
Defendants contend that the plaintiffs claims against the defendants in tort are rendered moot and thus must be dismissed. A borrowed servant is barred from bringing a tort action against the borrowing employer because the employees sole remedy lies in worker's compensation. See, Johnson v. Rogers Phillips, Inc., 753 So.2d 286 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1999). As this Court has determined that defendants were the statutory employers of plaintiff, it is immune from tort liability. See, La. R.S. § 23:1061. Accordingly, the plaintiffs claims against the defendants must be dismissed with prejudice.
Next, defendants argue that the claims of the plaintiffs-in-intervention should likewise be dismissed. Defendants contend that an intervention is permissible only in cases where the plaintiff sues "third person[s]". See, La. R.S. § 23:1101. A statutory employer, however, is not a third person against whom an intervention may be filed. See, Ledet v. Seasafe, Inc., 783 So.2d 611 (2001). As such, the intervenors' claims were rendered moot by this Court's determination that plaintiff was a borrowed servant at the time of her alleged injury.
Office of Risk Management, Division of Administration, Office of the Governor and the Louisiana State University Eye Center, seek to establish that the LSU Eye Center is entitled to recover one-half of all past, present, and future workers' compensation benefits paid to or on behalf of Dr. Brochner. It is submitted that La. R.S. § 23:1031(C) governs this situation which provides that in situations involving a borrowed employee, both the special and immediate employer are liable jointly and in solido for workers' compensation benefits. It further provides for the right of contribution between the special and general employers for any payments made on behalf of the employee, unless there is a contract between them expressing a different method of sharing liability. La. R.S. § 23:1031(C); Maryland Casualty Company v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 224 So.2d 465 (La. 1969).
Intervenors submit that defendants have been found to be the borrowed employer of Dr. Brochner, and as such, LSU Eye Center is entitled to contribution in the amount of one-half of all past, present, and future workers' compensation benefits that Dr. Brochner has been paid and may be entitled to in the future. Moreover, it is submitted that there is no contractual provision between the parties expressing any arrangement regarding payment of workers' compensation benefits by Ochsner to LSU for claims asserted by LSU students in the Joint Opthamology Residency Program. Additionally, there is no evidence to show that any money paid by Ochsner to LSU was specifically designated for payment of workers' compensation benefits or that said money was at any time applied by LSU for workers' compensation benefits paid to Dr. Brochner as a result of the accident giving rise to this litigation. As such, LSU requests that the Motion to Dismiss be denied and that LSU's Motion for Summary Judgment against Ochsner for contribution of workers' compensation benefits be granted.
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS:
There appears to be no opposition that, with respect to the claims of the plaintiff, her sole remedy against defendants lie in workers' compensation based upon the prior ruling of this Court. As such, to the extent that the present motion seeks to have the plaintiffs claims in tort dismissed, the motion shall be granted.
What, however, remain at issue are the claims of the plaintiffs-in-intervention. The Court believes that La. R.S. § 23:1031 (C) speaks to this issue, wherein it is provided:
. . . In case of any employee for whose injury or death payments are due and who is, at the time of injury, employed by a borrowing employer in this Section referred to as a "special employer", and is under the control and direction of the special employer in the performance of the work, both the special employer and the immediate employer, referred to in this Section as a "general employer", shall be liable jointly and in solido to pay benefits as provided under this Chapter. As between the special and general employers, each shall have the right to seek contribution from the other for any payments made on behalf of the employee unless there is a contract between them expressing a different method of sharing the liability . . .
(Emphasis Added). As such, defendants are bound jointly and solidarily for the workers' compensation benefits. As the LSU Eye Center and its insurers have thus far paid the entire debt, the plaintiffs-in-intervention have the right to seek contribution from defendants for any payments made on behalf of Dr. Brochner unless there is a contract between them expressing a different method of sharing the liability. R.S. § 23:1031; Maryland Casualty, supra.
There has been no evidence submitted to suggest that a contract exists which would affect said right to seek contribution.
Additionally, this Court notes that the defendants have not argued that they do not owe a portion of the workers' compensation benefits paid; rather, defendants rely on La. R.S. § 23:1101 and contend that the intervention in this instance is not allowed as they do not constitute a "third party." In essence therefore, this Court is asked to determine the appropriate procedural devise to achieve these ends.
It is the opinion of this Court that the law and jurisprudence in no way prevents the plaintiffs-in-intervention from seeking contribution from the defendants by way of an intervention in the underlying dispute. Defendants have relied on the Ledet case asserting that it provides that a statutory employer is not a "third person" for which an intervention is permissible under La. R.S. 23:1101. This Court however does not read theLedet case in the same way. In Ledet, the plaintiff filed suit against his direct employer and statutory employer for injuries sustained as a result of an intentional tort. The plaintiff was paid workers' compensation benefits by his direct employer's insurer. That insurer intervened into the lawsuit seeking reimbursement from the statutory employer. A motion to dismiss the intervention was filed arguing that the statutory employer's insurer could not be considered a "third person" under La. R.S. 23:1101. The trial court denied the motion and the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The Third Circuit determined that because the case involved an intentional tort, the plaintiffs rights and remedies were not limited to workers' compensation and as such, the statutory employer's insurer was treated as a "third person", and the intervention was allowed to stand. Id.
In this case, there is no intentional tort at issue and thus this Court does not find Ledet to lend support to defendant's argument. Moreover, this Court does not read La. R.S. 23:1101 to prevent an intervention, as presented under the circumstances in this case, to seek contribution. La. R.S. 23:1101 deals only with cases where a party has paid compensation benefits and seeks to recover from a "third party", in other words, a party which is not liable in workers' compensation. In this case, the Court has previously found that the defendants were the borrowed employer of Dr. Brochner and thus the plaintiffs exclusive remedy would be in worker's compensation; therefore, defendants do not fall within the definition of a "third party" and La. R.S. 23:1101 has no application to this case. As stated above, the applicable provision in the present case is found in La. R.S. 23:1061, which in no way prevents recovery by way of an intervention.
Additionally, this Court believes that it is in the interests of judicial efficiency and economy to allow the intervention to stand and allow the parties to proceed in this way. This Court sees no benefit in dismissing the intervenors' complaint and requiring them to file an entirely new lawsuit so that it may then seek contribution from the defendants.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss as Moot of defendants, Ochsner Clinic L.L.C., Ochsner Hospital, Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation, and St. Paul Fire and Marine Casualty Insurance Company, be and the same is hereby GRANTED as it relates to the claims of the plaintiff, Dr. Michelle Brochner, M.D., and DENIED as it relates to the claims of the plaintiffs-in-intervention, Office of Risk Management, Division of Administration, Office of the Governor and the Louisiana State University Eye Center. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the claims of the plaintiff, Dr. Michelle Brochner, M.D., against defendants, Ochsner Clinic L.L.C., Ochsner Hospital, Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation, and St. Paul Fire and Marine Casualty Insurance Company, be and the same are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Attached to the opposition memorandum of plaintiffs-in-intervention was evidence purported to substantiate payments made by the LSU Eye Center to or on behalf of Dr. Brochner. The LSU Eye Center then requested that this Court find in favor of intervenors on their previously filed Motion for Summary Judgment and that this Court allow for supplementation of the evidence relative to additional benefits paid. The Court does not have the intervenors' previously filed motion currently before it and will not rule on any such request at this time. Intervenors should instead move to have said motion reset for hearing, allowing for each side to submit appropriate memoranda and evidence, in accordance with the current status of these proceedings.