Opinion
May 9, 1952. Rehearing Denied June 13, 1952.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Martin County, A.O. Kanner, J.
Carroll Dunscombe, Stuart, for appellant.
Sumner Sumner, Fort Pierce, for appellee.
This is an appeal from a final decree in a suit to foreclose a lien under the Mechanic's Lien Law and also from an order made by the Chancellor denying a motion to set aside the final decree because of a failure to comply with Section 610.11, F.S.A., as amended in 1949.
The cause was personally heard by the Chancellor on the merits. The decree is presumed to be correct. Laramore v. Laramore, Fla., 49 So.2d 517; Smith v. Biscayne Park Estates, Fla., 42 So.2d 442; Hall v. Adams, 155 Fla. 1, 19 So.2d 412; Wilson v. T.A. Monk, Inc., 140 Fla. 797, 192 So. 407; Jernigan v. Harrison, 136 Fla. 320, 186 So. 511.
We have carefully considered all the assignments of error attacking the correctness of the decree and we do not find any reversible error.
The final decree was entered on the 15th day of November, 1951. On the same day a petition for a rehearing was filed. On December 21, 1951, an order was made denying the petition for rehearing. On the 20th day of November, 1951, a motion to set aside the final decree and declare the same null and void was filed by the appellant on the ground that at the time of the entry of the final decree the appellee was in default for more than six months in the payment of its stock tax for the year 1950, in violation of Section 610.11, F.S.A., as amended in 1949. This Section, as amended, is:
"Any corporation failing to comply with the provisions of this law for six months shall not be permitted to maintain or defend any action in any court of this state until such reports are filed and all fees due under this chapter paid. As amended Laws 1949, c. 25377, § 1."
The record does not show the date of the institution of the suit. It merely recites that a motion to dismiss the original bill of complaint was sustained with leave to file an amended bill of complaint. The record shows that the amended bill of complaint was filed on November 10th, 1950. The Statute did not apply until six months after July 1st, 1950.
No question of the failure of the corporation to comply with the Statute in question had been brought to the Court's attention at the time the appellant filed a motion for a rehearing. The first time this matter was called to the Court's attention was in the motion to set aside the final decree filed on November 20, 1951. The hearing on the motion to set aside the final decree and declare same null and void was on December 18th, 1951, and at the time of such hearing, the appellee introduced before the Chancellor conclusive proof that it had satisfied the Statute by having filed its report and made complete payment of the tax on November 30th, 1951. At the time of the filing of this motion to vacate the final decree and the entry of the order thereon, the cause had been heard and decided by the Chancellor on the merits.
The order of the Chancellor denying the motion to set aside the final decree and declare same null and void was without error. See Christie v. Highland Waterfront Co., 114 Fla. 263, 153 So. 784; Irwin v. Gilson Realty Co., 117 Fla. 394, 158 So. 77.
Affirmed.
SEBRING, C.J., and CHAPMAN and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.