Opinion
No. 2010-03121.
March 8, 2011.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Rosengarten, J.), dated March 1, 2010, which granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).
Helen F. Dalton Associates, P.C., Forest Hills, N.Y. (Natia Shalolashvili of counsel), for appellant.
Mendolia Stenz (Montfort, Healy, McGuire Salley, Garden City, N.Y. [Donald S. Neumann, Jr.], of counsel), for respondent.
Before:Mastro, J.P., Angiolillo, Balkin, Lott and Miller, JJ.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). The defendant met her prima facie burden of demonstrating her entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by showing, through the affirmed reports of her medical experts, that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject motor vehicle accident ( see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957). The admissible evidence which the plaintiff presented in opposition to the defendant's motion did not raise a triable issue of fact ( see CPLR 3212 [b]; Grasso v Angerami, 79 NY2d 813, 814-815; Vilomar v Castillo, 73 AD3d 758, 759; Pagano v Kingsbury, 182 AD2d 268, 270). The plaintiff presented no competent, objective medical evidence of any limitations of motion associated with any of the plaintiff's pleaded injuries contemporaneous with the accident ( see Srebnick v Quinn, 75 AD3d 637). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.