Opinion
No. CV 06 5002055
May 4, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO STRIKE
The issue before this court is whether the court should grant the defendant's motion to strike count two of the plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that Connecticut General Statutes § 46b-37 violates the equal protection clauses of the United States and Connecticut constitutions.
The facts alleged are fairly straightforward. The dispute in this case revolves around unpaid hospital bills. The plaintiff, Bristol Hospital, Inc., in a revised two-count complaint, alleges first in Count one that on several dates in 2004 and 2005, the plaintiff provided hospital services to the defendant, Michael Smith. The balance due for those hospital services is $51,788.68. As of the filing date of the complaint, Michael Smith had not paid the balance due. Count two alleges that pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 46b-37, the defendant, Laurie Smith, by virtue of her marriage to Michael Smith, is obligated on her husband's debts for those provided hospital services. As of the filing date of the complaint, the defendant, Laurie Smith, has not paid the balance due.
Subsequently, the term "defendant" will refer to Laurie Smith, as her husband, Michael Smith, does not join in the motion to strike.
On November 15, 2006, the defendant Laurie Smith filed a motion to strike count two of the plaintiff's revised complaint on the grounds that § 46b-37 violates the equal protection clauses of the United States and Connecticut constitutions. The plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to strike on December 7, 2006.
DISCUSSION
"This Court finds a motion to strike to be a proper vehicle by which to test the constitutionality of a statute." Diviney v. Smith, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV91 0287011 (February 26, 1992, Katz, J.) ( 6 Conn. L. Rptr. 82); but see Lee v. Empire State Nut Co., Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV 87 0334199 (October 9, 1987, Norko, J.) ( 2 C.S.C.R. 1141) (holding that the constitutionality of a statute should be raised by way of special defense).
"The [defendant bears] a heavy burden when they challenge the constitutionality of a statute. [B]ecause a validly enacted statute carries with it a strong presumption of constitutionality, those who challenge its constitutionality must sustain the heavy burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt . . . In construing a statute, moreover, we will search for an effective and constitutional construction that reasonably accords with the legislature's underlying intent." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Alexander v. Commissioner of Administrative Services, 86 Conn.App. 677, 684, 862 A.2d 851 (2004).
In its motion to strike, the defendant argues that as applied to her, § 46b-37 violates article first, § 20 of the constitution of Connecticut. The basis for this argument is that in requiring heterosexual persons who are married to be responsible for certain liabilities incurred by their spouses, married persons are treated differently than similarly situated civil union partners. Additionally, the defendant argues that as applied to her, § 46b-37 violates article first, §§ 1 and 20 of the constitution of Connecticut and the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution, in that it imposes a greater burden on individuals choosing to exercise their fundamental right to marry, while not imposing a like burden on individuals who choose to remain unmarried.
General Statutes § 46b-37 states, in relevant part: "(a) Any purchase made by either a husband or wife in his or her own name shall be presumed, in the absence of notice to the contrary, to be made by him or her as an individual and he or she shall be liable for the purchase. (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, it shall be the joint duty of each spouse to support his or her family, and both shall be liable for . . . hospital expenses rendered the husband or wife . . ." (Emphasis added.)
Article first, § 20 of the constitution of Connecticut, as amended by article five and twenty-one of the amendments, states: "No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his civil or political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry, national origin or sex." (Emphasis added.)
The fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution states, in relevant part: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." (Emphasis added.)
In opposition, the plaintiff argues, first, that civil union partners are invested with the same responsibilities by statute as that of married spouses, and thus civil union partners in Connecticut would have the same liability under § 46b-37 as do married spouses. Secondly, the plaintiff responds that Connecticut law does not recognize the status of unmarried persons and, thus, they are not accorded equal status with married or civil union couples. This court agrees.
As to the defendant's first claim, our legislature has provided a statutory response to any claim of an equal protection violation based on gender discrimination via General Statutes §§ 46b-38aa et seq. In particular, §§ 46b-38nn states: "Parties to a civil union shall have all the same benefits, protections and responsibilities under law, whether derived from the general statutes, administrative regulations or court rules, policy, common law or any other source of civil law, as are granted to spouses in a marriage, which is defined as the union of one man and one woman." (Emphasis added.) Furthermore, Section 46b-38oo states, in relevant part: "Wherever in the general statutes the terms `spouse,' `family,' `immediate family,' `dependent,' `next of kin' or any other term that denotes the spousal relationship are used or defined, a party to a civil union shall be included in such use or definition, and wherever in the general statutes . . . the term `marriage' is used or defined, a civil union shall be included in such use or definition."
In Kerrigan v. State, 49 Conn.Sup. 644, 909 A.2d 89 (2006) [ 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 709], the court had reason to evaluate the differential treatment of same sex couples who believed themselves to be similarly situated to heterosexual married couples and wished to receive marriage licenses. "Connecticut law is clear that it is only after it has been shown as a threshold matter that the statutory scheme, on its face or applied, treats similarly situated individuals differently that the court will consider whether such differential treatment is constitutionally valid." Id., 654-55. During the pendancy of the decision in Kerrigan, the Connecticut legislature passed P.A. 05-10, which would become General Statutes § 46b-38aa et seq. Id., 650. The court noted that "[t]he effect of P.A. 05-10 has been to create an identical set of legal rights in Connecticut for same sex couples and opposite sex couples." Id., 655.
The court did note that "the legislature passed P.A. 05-10 free of any judicial mandate or command." State v. Kerrigan, supra, 49 Conn.Sup. 651.
As noted in Kerrigan, this court must first find that similarly situated individuals are treated differently before it may consider whether such differential treatment is constitutionally valid. Id., 654-55. Based on the legislature's adoption of particular statutes providing that civil union partners are entitled to the same legal benefits, protections and responsibilities as married heterosexual couples, § 46b-37 contains no differential treatment between same sex civil union partners and heterosexual married couples. Pursuant to § 46b-38oo, a civil union partner may be substituted in § 46b-37 in place of either "husband" or "wife." Such substitution of terminology makes evident that the statute applies equally to both civil unions and married couples and thus requires that civil union partners be responsible for any hospital expenses rendered to their partner during the length of the civil union. Assuming same sex civil union partners and heterosexual married couples are similarly situated individuals, this court finds that there is no differential treatment of such individuals under § 46b-37. No further analysis is needed to determine if there is an equal protection violation under the constitution of Connecticut. For these reasons, the defendant's motion to strike on this ground is denied.
The defendant next claims as a basis for the her motion to strike that § 46b-37 violates the equal protection clause of both the United States and Connecticut constitutions in that it imposes an unfair burden on an individual's fundamental right to marry by not imposing a similar burden on unmarried individuals.
"The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid classifications. It simply keeps governmental decision makers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike . . . As a general rule, legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality . . . Accordingly, [the United States Supreme Court's] cases are clear that, unless a classification warrants some form of heightened review because it jeopardizes exercise of a fundamental right or categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the classification rationally further a legitimate state interest." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992). In order for this court to find that § 46b-37 violates the fundamental right to marry by imposing an unfair burden on those who choose to marry, there must be a system of inequitable classification that has been implicated. The defendant must prove that individuals similarly situated to married persons are not impacted by the statute and that this class of individuals is of a similar nature in the classification scheme.
Although decided in the context of a divorce action, our Appellate Court in Loughlin v. Loughlin, 93 Conn.App. 618, 889 A.2d 902, aff'd, 280 Conn. 632, 910 A.2d 963 (2006) had occasion to state: "Although other jurisdictions may recognize common-law marriage or accord legal consequences to informal marriage relationships, Connecticut definitely does not . . . It follows that although two persons cohabit and conduct themselves as a married couple, our law neither grants to nor imposes upon them marital status . . . The rights and obligations that attend a valid marriage simply do not arise where the parties choose to cohabit outside the marital relationship." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 628-29.
Connecticut does not recognize the validity of non-marital relationships between heterosexual couples in any manner. Without the recognition afforded civil union partnerships by the legislature, cohabitation relationships enjoy no legal recognition. As such, the participants in such relationships are not similarly situated individuals to the participants in traditional opposite sex marriages. There being no equality of status between the two groups of individuals, the equal protection clause of the United States and Connecticut constitutions is not implicated by § 46b-37's requirement that married spouses are responsible for the hospital expenses of each other, while unmarried cohabitants have no similar burden. Consequently, the defendant's motion to strike on this ground is denied as well.