Opinion
No. 3-548 / 02-2075
Filed September 10, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court forDubuque County, Lawrence H. Fautsch, Judge.
Go America Auto Insurance Company appeals the dismissal of its action under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.944. AFFIRMED.
Charles Litow and Ryan Tang of Litow Law Office, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Les Reddick and MaryBeth Fleming of Kane, Norby Reddick, P.C., Dubuque, for appellees.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Mahan and Zimmer, JJ.
Go America Auto Insurance Company (Go America) appeals the dismissal of its action under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.944 (formerly rule 215.1). Go America claims the try-or-dismiss order did not apply to it because its action was severed and was no longer subject to the order. We affirm.
I. Background Facts Proceedings
In October 1999, David and Tammy Brimeyer filed a tort action against Rachel Ryan and Jeffrey Gruber, claiming damages arising from an automobile accident. The Brimeyers had automobile insurance through Go America. The district court sustained Go America's motion to join the action, and on March 24, 2000, Go America filed a petition against Ryan and Gruber, seeking to recover for payments it had made to David Brimeyer and his two passengers.
On April 27, 2001, the district court ruled:
The plaintiffs moved to remove this case from the operation of Rule [1.944]. The motion is granted. The date for a Rule [1.944] continuance is continued and set for March 1, 2002. If the case is not tried or otherwise finally disposed of by that date, the matter stands as dismissed.
In November 2001, Go America filed a motion to sever in order to effectuate a stipulation that Go America agreed to be bound by the decisions reached in a trial as to the other plaintiffs. On November 30, 2001, the district court entered an order sustaining the motion to sever. The court also ruled that Go America's petition would be scheduled for trial after a settlement or final decree in the underlying suit.
In January 2002, the Brimeyers and defendants entered into a settlement, and the Brimeyers dismissed their action. In May 2002, Go America filed a motion for a determination of the distribution of the settlement proceeds.
Defendants filed a motion seeking to have the court formally dismiss the matter because the case had been automatically dismissed on March 1, 2002, under the try-or-dismiss order. Go America resisted, pointing out that it had been severed from the case. The district court ruled the case had been dismissed by operation of law on March 1, 2002. The court noted more than six months had passed, and Go America was precluded from seeking to reinstate under rule 1.944(6). The court denied Go America's motion to enlarge or amend under rule 1.904(2). Go America appeals.
II. Standard of Review
Our standard of review is for corrections of errors at law. Iowa R.App.P. 6.4. The findings of the district court are binding on us if they are supported by substantial evidence. Iowa R.App.P. 6.14(6)( a). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment. Tiffany v. Brenton State Bank, 508 N.W.2d 87, 90 (Iowa Ct.App. 1993).
III. Merits
Go America claims that because its action was severed from that of the Brimeyers, the order of April 27, 2001, had no legal consequences as to it. Go America asserts that once its action was severed, it was an entirely separate action, and the try-or-dismiss notice no longer applied. It contends the district court erred by finding its action was automatically dismissed on March 1, 2002.
At first glance, the dismissal of Go America's claims seems patently unfair and inequitable. Our review of the law in this area, however, leads us to the conclusion that the district court correctly applied that law. Under controlling legal principles regarding rule 1.944, we determine Go America's claims were properly dismissed.
The district court relied upon City of Muscatine v. U.S. Enviro-Con., Inc., 374 N.W.2d 405 (Iowa 1985). In that case, a defendant, Stanley Consultants, Inc. (SCI), cross-petitioned against third parties for indemnity in the event it was liable on plaintiff's claims. After SCI's claims were severed, a try-or-dismiss notice was sent to all parties, stating the case would be dismissed if not tried by a certain date. SCI's claims were not tried or continued within the applicable time frame, and the district court determined the claims were automatically dismissed.
Like Go America, SCI claimed that because its case had been severed, the try-or-dismiss notice did not apply to it. The supreme court found "an order for severance and separate trial of third-party claims will normally be an important consideration for the court in ruling on a motion for continuance . . . ." City of Muscatine, 374 N.W.2d at 409. The court concluded, "We do not agree, however, that the act of the court in severing the third-party claims for a separate trial makes rule [1.944] inapplicable to those claims." Id. The court determined that for new claims, counterclaims, cross-petitions, or petitions of intervention, the time for trial under rule 1.944 should be measured from the date on which the original petition was filed. Id. at 410.
We conclude the severance of Go America's claims did not make the April 27, 2001, try-or-dismiss order inapplicable to Go America. See id. at 409. The district court did not err in finding Go America's claims were automatically dismissed on March 1, 2002. We affirm the decision of the district court.