Opinion
Case No. 3:02 CV 7064
July 9, 2002
ORDER
This is a civil rights and tort case in which plaintiff Linda Breckler, mother and guardian of the deceased, Charles Breckler Plummer, alleges that defendant Marvin Martin, Jr. ("Martin") wrongfully caused the death of Charles Breckler Plummer. The suit further alleges that defendant Hon. James Beutler, Sheriff of Putnam County ("Beutler"), and his officers were grossly indifferent to the criminal behavior of defendant and the foreseeable harm to plaintiff. This suit is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), 28 U.S.C. § 1343, and was removed to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1443 and 1446. Pending is plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to Martin. For the following reasons, the motion shall be denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges a string of violent and threatening incidents regarding Martin. Plaintiff broadly alleges that Martin "burned property owned by the plaintiff and caused other damages . . . trespassed upon plaintiff's property and harassed her and members of her family, [and] attempted to kill the plaintiff." (Doc. 1 Compl. at 4). Plaintiff specifically alleges that Martin kidnaped plaintiff's granddaughter in 1999. Plaintiff further alleges that, subsequent to that event, Martin came to plaintiff's residence armed with a shotgun, threatened to kill her son, Charles Breckler Plummer, and fired 5-6 bullets.
On December 26, 1999, Martin allegedly cut the wires to plaintiff's car and twice fired at her. In the summer of 2000, Martin allegedly entered plaintiff's house and threw a burning sock onto a sofa where several family members were sleeping. Plaintiff alleges an ongoing pattern of harassment from the summer of 2000 onward, despite upwards of twenty calls to Beutler. From March to June, 2000, Martin allegedly twice burned the home of plaintiff's daughter. Plaintiff also alleges that Martin slashed eight car tires in plaintiff's garage.
Plaintiff alleges that, on May 9, 2001, Martin murdered Charles Breckler Plummer by shooting him in the head. Plaintiff alleges that Beutler then failed to make a proper investigation of the murder, causing plaintiff's family to "live in campgrounds and drive around only during the day because they feared for their lives at the hands of [Martin]." (Doc. 1 Compl. at 6). On August 2, 2001, Martin was found guilty both of aggravated murder in the course of aggravated burglary for the death of Charles Breckler Plummer on May 9, 2001, and aggravated menacing for an incident between Martin and plaintiff on December 26, 2000. Martin was sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole.
Plaintiff now brings this action alleging wrongful death and conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of her civil rights.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment must be entered "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e)).
Once the burden of production shifts, the party opposing summary judgment cannot rest on its pleadings or merely reassert its previous allegations. It is insufficient "simply [to] show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, Rule 56(e) "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the [unverified] pleadings" and present some type of evidentiary material in support of its position. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
In deciding the motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party will be believed as true, all doubts will be resolved against the moving party, all evidence will be construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences will be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456 (1992).
Summary judgment shall be rendered only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff's complaint alleges that Martin wrongfully caused the death of Charles Breckler Plummer. Plaintiff argues that Martin's prior criminal conviction on the same set of events entitles plaintiff to summary judgment. Martin maintains his innocence and argues that the factual record indicates suicide, not homicide.
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment shall not be granted. While many states give preclusive effect to a criminal conviction in subsequent civil proceedings, Ohio is not among them. Issues determined in a criminal trial may be re-litigated in a subsequent civil trial. Phillips v. Rayburn, 113 Ohio App.3d 374, 381-82 (1996); see also Bukowski v. Hall, 165 F. Supp.2d 674, 679 (N.D.Ohio. 2001); Chapman v. Chapman, 228 B.R. 899, 905 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1998).
Ohio law does not allow collateral estoppel in a civil case subsequent to a criminal conviction for two reasons. The first reason is that Ohio law requires mutuality of parties for collateral estoppel. Unless all parties to the present proceeding were bound by the earlier judgment, collateral estoppel is inappropriate. Chapman, 228 B.R. at 905; Ohio v. Williams, 76 Ohio St.3d 290, 294-95; Phillips, 113 Ohio App.3d at 380. Because the family of the deceased was neither a party to the criminal trial nor bound by its verdict (as they could still bring this action had the trial court acquitted Martin), the required mutuality of parties is not present.
The second reason Ohio does not give preclusive effect to criminal convictions is the various substantive differences between criminal and civil proceedings. Walden v. Ohio, 47 Ohio St.3d 47, 52 (1989). In Phillips, the court wrote, "Procedural and discovery differences between the criminal and civil forums coupled with the defendant's dilemma over whether to testify in his own behalf or present any defense at the criminal trial make [issue] preclusion . . . a precarious and, we believe, unwise practice." Phillips, 113 Ohio App.3d at 381-82. Plaintiff is correct to point out the higher burden of proof in a criminal trial, but that argument is not responsive to the other procedural discrepancies between the two forums.
Record of a criminal conviction may be entered as evidence and "accorded whatever weight the factfinder deems appropriate," but such evidence is not conclusive, and the factual issues may be re-litigated in civil proceedings. Id. at 381. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment relies entirely on Martin's criminal conviction. The motion for summary judgment shall not, therefore, be granted.
CONCLUSION
It is therefore,
ORDERED THAT
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be, and hereby is, denied.
So ordered.