Opinion
March 10, 1986
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Levine, J.).
Order affirmed, insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The plaintiff's decedent Andrew Braun was a carpenter employed by the third-party defendant D L Carpentry and Cabinet Making Corp. On February 22, 1984, while working on the construction of a building on property owned by the appellant, Andrew Braun suffered fatal injuries when the scaffolding upon which he was working collapsed, causing him to fall two stories. The plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment, claiming that the appellant is absolutely liable pursuant to Labor Law § 240 (1), (3) and § 241 (6). The evidence proffered by the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of violation of Labor Law § 240 since it is unlikely that the scaffolding would have collapsed if properly constructed. The appellant does not deny the plaintiff's allegations as to the circumstances of the accident. That being so, there are no factual issues as to whether the scaffolding was "so constructed, placed and operated as to give [Andrew Braun] proper protection" (Labor Law § 240; Weaver v. Lazarus, 93 A.D.2d 859; Rea v. Elia Bldg. Co., 79 A.D.2d 1102) and the appellant, as owner of the premises, is absolutely liable under § 240 for the injuries sustained (see, Haimes v. New York Tel. Co., 46 N.Y.2d 132; Kalofonos v. State of New York, 104 A.D.2d 75; Crawford v. Leimzider, 100 A.D.2d 568). Nor may the imposition of liability pursuant to Labor Law § 240 be avoided by asserting the injured worker's contributory fault or assumption of risk (see, Bland v. Manocherian, 66 N.Y.2d 452; Zimmer v. Chemung County Performing Arts, 65 N.Y.2d 513, 521; Crawford v. Leimzider, supra). Although the liability of a defendant under Labor Law § 241 (6) is determined pursuant to general principles of negligence and is subject to the defense of comparative negligence (Long v. Forest-Fehlhaber, 55 N.Y.2d 154, 160; Monroe v. City of New York, 67 A.D.2d 89), in light of our determination that the appellant is strictly liable pursuant to Labor Law § 240, we do not reach the additional issues raised with respect to the alleged violation of Labor Law § 241 (6) (see, Kalofonos v. State of New York, supra, p 80, n). Lastly, the appellant's contention that there is an absence of proof that the statutory violation, if any, was the proximate cause of the accident is without merit (cf. Mack v. Altmans Stage Light. Co., 98 A.D.2d 468). Mangano, J.P., Thompson, Brown and Weinstein, JJ., concur.