Opinion
NO. 2013-CA-001053-MR
04-10-2015
ANGELA BRASSER APPELLANT v. MIKE DEATON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SUPERINTENDENT OF THE CAMPBELLSVILLE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, AND THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CAMPBELLSVILLE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT APPELLEES
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: J. Follace Fields, II Lexington, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Suzanne Cassidy Eric Rottinghaus Covington, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM TAYLOR CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ALLAN RAY BERTRAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 11-CI-00498
OPINION
AFFIRMING
BEFORE: DIXON, NICKELL, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES. NICKELL, JUDGE: Angela Brasser, a non-tenured teacher, challenges the grounds advanced by Mike Deaton, Superintendent of the Campbellsville Independent School District (CISD), and the Board of Education of CISD, for nonrenewal of her teaching contract. The Taylor Circuit Court granted summary judgment to Deaton and the Board—dismissing Brasser's complaint with prejudice—finding Deaton and the Board had fully complied with KRS 161.750(2), requiring a superintendent to furnish to the teacher, upon request, a written statement of the grounds for nonrenewal of her limited contract. Upon review of the record, the briefs and the law, we affirm.
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
A "limited contract" is defined as "a contract for the employment of a teacher for a term of one (1) year only or for that portion of the school year that remains at the time of employment." KRS 161.720(3).
FACTS
Beginning in July 2007, Brasser was employed by CISD in a series of one-year limited contracts as an art teacher for both middle and high school students. Brasser holds a master's degree and has achieved National Board Certification for Early Adolescence through Young Adulthood/Art, but has not acquired tenure. While employed by CISD, Brasser received positive annual evaluations from her school principals. According to Brasser, she attended and organized multiple activities at and for the middle and high schools.
During the first two years Brasser taught in CISD, Deaton was principal at Campbellsville High School and had firsthand knowledge of Brasser's strengths and weaknesses.
In March 2011, consistent with long-standing CISD practice, Deaton sent a letter to all non-tenured teachers telling each his/her teaching contract would not be renewed for the upcoming school year. Brasser admits receiving such a letter. Timeliness and legal sufficiency of the notice are undisputed.
After discussing the art teacher position with one another, both principals recommended Deaton post the slot to allow CISD to explore other options for art education. Based in part on the recommendation of the principals, Deaton posted Brasser's position for the 2011-2012 school year. Brasser was invited to reapply, which she did, but a different candidate—one with less teaching experience and education—was hired.
Brasser requested a written statement identifying "the specific, detailed, and complete statement of grounds" for nonrenewal of her contract, as permitted by KRS 161.750(2). Through counsel, Deaton responded as follows:
In his capacity as superintendent of the Campbellsville Independent School District, it is one of Mr. Deaton's responsibilities to recruit, identify and retain the highest quality teachers who demonstrate their ability in the district setting. Among the expectations, teachers are expected to exhibit a positive attitude toward students and staff, participate in collaborative efforts to improve the academic and cultural environment, and make efforts to attend extra-curricular events in the district as a means of supporting students and developing a rapport with fellow employees. The retention is (sic) process becomes especially difficult in an era of reduced budgets and correspondingly diminished staffing population.
After Mr. Deaton consulted with the building Principals, it was their desire to open the position previously held by Ms. Brasser for applicants to determine if improvements might be made to the district. Mr. Deaton concurred and after the position was posted, Ms. Brasser was offered, and accepted, the opportunity to re-apply for the position. However, after the evaluation process was complete, it was determined that other applicants exceeded Ms. Brasser's qualifications in meeting the objectives set forth above.
Arguing the grounds stated in Deaton's letter were not the real reasons her contract was not renewed, Brasser filed suit in Taylor Circuit Court seeking a declaration of rights, reinstatement, lost wages and other relief. The circuit court awarded summary judgment to Deaton and the Board after concluding Brasser had failed to offer any proof the grounds stated for non-renewal of her limited teaching contract were untrue. This appeal follows.
ANALYSIS
This being a case resolved on summary judgment, we begin with a statement of the applicable standard of review. CR 56.03 authorizes a circuit court to award summary judgment to a party,
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
The benchmark case of Paintsville Hospital v. Rose, [683 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1985),] specifically held that the proper function of summary judgment is to terminate litigation when, as a matter of law, it appears that it would be impossible for the respondent to produce evidence at the trial warranting a judgment in his favor. We further declared that such a judgment is only proper where the movant shows that the adverse party could not prevail under any circumstances. Finally, in that opinion, we recognize that summary judgment is not a substitute for trial nor is it the functional equivalent of a motion for directed verdict.
While it has been recognized that summary judgment is designed to expedite the disposition of cases and avoid unnecessary trials when no genuine issues of material fact are raised, see, Dossett v. New York Mining and Manufacturing Co., Ky., 451 S.W.2d 843 (1970), this Court has also repeatedly admonished that the rule is to be cautiously applied. See, Rowland v. Miller's Adm'r, Ky. 307 S.W.2d 3 (1956). The record must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his favor. Dossett v. New York Mining and Manufacturing Co., supra; Rowland v. Miller's Adm'r, supra. Even though a trial court may believe the party opposing the motion may not succeed at trial, it should not render a summary judgment if there is any issue of material fact. Puckett v. Elsner, Ky., 303 S.W.2d 250 (1957). The trial judge must examine the evidence, not to decide any issue of fact, but to discover if a real issue exists. It clearly is not the purpose of the summary judgment rule, as we have often declared, to cut litigants off from their right of trial if they have issues to try. See, Bonded Elevator, Inc. v. First National Bank of Louisville, Ky., 680 S.W.2d 124 (1983); Hill v. Fiscal Court of Warren County, Ky., 429 S.W.2d 419 (1968); Williams v. Ehman, Ky., 394 S.W.2d 905 (1965); Rowland v. Miller's Adm'r, supra.Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991).
As stated in a more recent case, our standard of appellate review is "whether the trial court correctly found there were no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Hallahan v. The Courier-Journal, 138 S.W.3d 699, 704 (Ky. App. 2004) (internal citations omitted). It is the movant's initial burden to convince "the court by evidence of record that no genuine issue of fact is in dispute, and then the burden shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to present 'at least some affirmative evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.'" Id. at 705. When opposing summary judgment, a party cannot simply rely on her own claims and arguments, she must introduce significant evidence to avoid summary judgment. Wymer v. JH Properties, Inc., 50 S.W.3d 195, 199 (Ky. 2001) (internal citations omitted). We review legal issues de novo since factual findings are not at issue. See Lewis v. B & R Corp., 56 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Ky. App. 2001). With the foregoing standards in mind, we begin our review.
Kentucky courts have long recognized superintendents and school boards have broad discretion in administering schools. Phillips v. Board of Ed. of Muhlenberg County, 580 S.W.2d 730, 731-32 (Ky. App. 1979); Snapp v. Deskins, 450 S.W.2d 246, 252 (Ky. 1970). In Phillips, we specifically recognized a "Board is under no compulsion to hire a nontenured teacher for a forthcoming school year . . . ." Phillips, at 731.
More than two decades later, addressing the topic of non-tenured teachers again, we wrote:
Non-tenured teachers have very few rights under our statutory scheme. A school board neither has to rehire a teacher on a limited contract nor provide him with a hearing if he is not rehired. KRS 161.750 gives the non-tenured teacher only the right to (1) notice of nonrenewal before April 30, and (2) a written statement "containing the specific, detailed and complete" grounds for nonrenewal, if requested. The legislative intent for requiring the statement of "specific, detailed and complete" reasons for nonrenewal was discussed in Gaines v. Board of Education of Dayton, Independent School District, Ky. App., 554 S.W.2d 394, 395 (1977), as follows:
Gibson v. Board of Education of Jackson County, 805 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Ky. App. 1991). Additionally, in Sparks v. Board of Ed. of Ashland Independent School Dist., 549 S.W.2d 323, 326 (Ky. App. 1977), we noted a board's decision not to renew a limited contract is final so long as notice of nonrenewal is given prior to May 15—as required by KRS 161.750(2). In punctuating the finality of such a school decision we wrote,It would seem obvious that the underlying intent of KRS 161.750(2) is to insure teachers, who have not reached tenure stature, ample notice of not being re-employed so that they will have adequate time to obtain employment elsewhere for the coming school year, and that the teacher has a right to know why he is not being re-employed, so that the situation may be corrected if it is within the power of the teacher to do so. (Emphasis ours.)
The teacher does not need more specificity in order to prepare a defense. There is no defense nor forum for defense provided for by this section. In [KRS 161.750,] the legislature gives no reason for requiring specific reasons upon request, and we will not conjecture as to what it was. This requirement of giving specific reasons falls in the same category as those discussed in Snapp v. Deskins, Ky., 450 S.W.2d 246 (1970) wherein the court held that the presentation of reasons was not a condition of the validity of the transfer. Here the action of the board not to reemploy was final upon the giving of the notice of its action prior to May the fifteenth. Since the section contemplates no further action on the specific reasons and since they are not a condition of the validity of the board's action, this requirement of specificity has been met in this case.Applying the foregoing case law to the facts under current review, notice was sent to Brasser in March 2011—well in advance of the deadline of May 15, 2011, and indeed no complaint is made about the timeliness or sufficiency of the notice. Additionally, Brasser requested the grounds for nonrenewal, as allowed by statute, and they were provided to her through counsel after consulting with Deaton. Again, no complaint is made about the timeliness of the statement of grounds.
Instead, Brasser attacks the grounds stated in Deaton's letter as not being the real reason her contract was not renewed. Her brief suggests her contract was not renewed because she did not attend more school basketball games and complaints had been received about her job performance—even though she was never told she needed to make changes to protect her job and her evaluations "praised" her in the same areas Deaton's letter says the District wanted to explore its options in hopes of improving. Deaton's letter may not have parroted the precise words he and the principals used in deciding to post Brasser's position or the words they spoke during their subsequent depositions, but the concepts discussed are generally the same.
In his deposition, Deaton mentioned classroom management, parent complaints, peer group complaints and other teacher complaints of negativity as reasons for nonrenewal.
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As noted by the circuit court, the only legal challenge available to Brasser was an attack on the truthfulness of the reasons Deaton gave in the letter for not renewing her contract. Kidd v. Board of Education of McCreary County, 29 S.W.3d 374, 377 (Ky. App. 2000). Kidd further explains the purpose of providing a statement of grounds for nonrenewal is not to allow the teacher to improve her performance and retain her current job, but "to enable the teacher to correct the deficiency as a benefit to future employment." (Emphasis added).
When given the opportunity during her deposition to refute Deaton's statement of the reasons for nonrenewal, Brasser responded:
I don't know the real reasons. I certainly don't think the real reasons are in this letter.This question was the perfect opening for Brasser to present the "significant evidence" required by Wymer, 50 S.W.3d at 199, to avoid summary judgment. Alas, she did not present such evidence, and certainly not "significant evidence." Furthermore, when asked whether she disagreed with any of the expectations of an art teacher listed in Deaton's letter, Brasser stated, "Oh no. I think they definitely need that exact type of person." As argued by Deaton and the Board, Brasser's disagreement with the decision not to renew her limited contract does not make the stated reasons for their decision untrue. Due to an absence of proof on Brasser's part, we hold summary judgment was properly granted.
The Board and Deaton have made additional arguments which are not determinative of today's result. The Board argues it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Deaton alone, as superintendent, makes all hiring and firing decisions under KRS 160.290 and 160.345. Deaton, sued only in his official capacity, argues he is entitled to official immunity under Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 519, 519-21 (Ky. 2001). Because we are convinced the award of summary judgment was proper, we need not—and do not—comment on these arguments.
In light of Brasser's own testimony, we must agree with the circuit court and conclude Brasser did not carry her burden of showing the stated reasons for nonrenewal were untrue. Therefore, we affirm the award of summary judgment to Deaton and the Board.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: J. Follace Fields, II
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Suzanne Cassidy
Eric Rottinghaus
Covington, Kentucky