Opinion
UWYCV176036775S
10-15-2018
BRASS CITY LOCAL, CACP v. CITY OF WATERBURY
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Brazzel-Massaro, J.
INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff, Brass City Local, CACP has filed an application dated October 30, 2017 with this court to confirm an arbitration award. The defendant, City of Waterbury, filed a motion to dismiss the application with a memorandum in support of the motion. The plaintiff has filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion. The court heard argument on July 30, 2018.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The plaintiff, Brass City Local, CACP (hereinafter "CACP"), filed an application to confirm an arbitration award pursuant to General Statutes § 52-417 and § 52-420, against the defendant, City of Waterbury. The plaintiff moves to confirm an interest arbitration award issued pursuant to General Statutes § 7-473c. The plaintiff’s application, filed with the court on October 30, 2017, asserts the following facts. The plaintiff and the defendant were parties to a collective bargaining agreement governing the terms of employment of union members in the Waterbury Police Department, which expired on June 30, 2012. Hence, the parties began negotiating a successor agreement on February 28, 2013. These negotiations, however, ultimately came to an impasse. Subsequently, the parties selected an arbitration panel and began interest arbitration before a panel of the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration. The arbitration panel issued the arbitration award and the parties received notice on November 10, 2016.
On May 17, 2018, the defendant moved to dismiss on the basis that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider the application. The plaintiff objected on June 20, 2018. The matter was heard by the court at short calendar on July 30, 2018.
DISCUSSION
"A motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santoroso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 350, 63 A.3d 940 (2013). "[T]he court in deciding a motion to dismiss must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light." Savage v. Aronson, 214 Conn. 256, 63, 571 A.2d 696 (1990). "The grounds which may be asserted in [a motion to dismiss] are 1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; 2) lack of jurisdiction over the person; 3) improper venue; 4) insufficiency of process; and 5) insufficiency of service of process." Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 195 Conn. 682, 687, 490 A.2d 509 (1985), citing Practice Book (1978-97) § 143 (now § 10-30[a] ). "Pursuant to the rules of practice, a motion to dismiss is the appropriate motion for raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction." St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 545, 825 A.2d 90 (2003).
In its memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss, the defendant argues that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking because, inter alia, the court has no statutory authority to confirm an interest arbitration award. Specifically, the defendant contends that Chapter 909, General Statutes § § 52-408 to 52-424, does not apply to the award at issue because it does not arise from a written agreement to arbitrate assumed by those statutes. Moreover, the defendant contends that General Statutes § 7-473c does not authorize judicial review via an application to confirm. Accordingly, the defendant argues the plaintiff’s application to confirm should be dismissed. In its objection, the plaintiff contends that the court has the authority to hear the application to confirm. The plaintiff argues that a written agreement to arbitrate is simply one type of arbitration agreement covered by chapter 909, and that the scheme is not exclusive to written agreements. The plaintiff asserts that because other provisions of chapter 909 are referenced within § 7-473c, it can be imputed that an application to confirm is the mechanism through which the arbitration decision becomes final and binding. Thus, the plaintiff asserts the motion to dismiss should be denied.
The defendant advanced several alternative theories for dismissal including mootness, and lack of exhaustion of remedies. Having decided that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking on the basis that this court lacks authority to confirm the interest arbitration award, the court need not reach these other issues.
The plaintiff contends that the defendant’s motion to dismiss is untimely, and, thus, it should not be heard. The court is unpersuaded. The defendant’s motion raises the issue of subject matter jurisdiction and "[t]he question of subject matter jurisdiction, because it addressed the basic competency of the court, can be raised by any of the parties, or by the court sua sponte, at any time." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) New Hartford v. Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority, 291 Conn. 511, 518, 970 A.2d 583 (2009). Accordingly, the court will consider the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
If the court is without the authority to confirm this award then subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. "There is no common-law right to judicial review of a collective bargaining agreement ... There is similarly no common-law right to judicial review of a compulsory arbitral award that is itself the creature of statute. The absence of compliance with the statutory requirements for such an award deprived[s] the trial court of jurisdiction just as the absence of compliance with statutory requirements for administrative appeals deprives trial courts of jurisdiction." (Footnote omitted.) International Brotherhood of Police Officers, Local 564 v. Jewett City, 234 Conn. 123, 139, 661 A.2d 573 (1995).
The determination of whether an application to confirm an interest arbitration award is authorized requires the court to analyze the various statutory schemes governing arbitration. "When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature ... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous, and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extra textual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered ... The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation ... [W]ith all issues of statutory interpretation, we look first to the language of the statute[s] ... In construing a statute, common sense must be sued and courts must assume that a reasonable and rational result was intended ... Furthermore, [i]t is a basic tenet of statutory construction that the legislature [does] not intend to enact meaningless provisions ... [i]n construing statues, we presume that there is a purpose behind every sentence, clause, or phrase used in an act and that no part of a statute is superfluous." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Megos v. Ranta, 179 Conn.App. 546, 552, 180 A.3d 645, 648, cert. denied, 328 Conn. 917, 180 A.3d 961 (2018).
Generally speaking, arbitration takes place pursuant to a written agreement; this much is presumed by the governing statutory scheme. "The statutes relating to, and governing arbitration in this state are set out in chapter 909 of the General Statutes. The basis for arbitration in a particular case is to be found in the written agreement between the parties ." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bennell v. Meader, 208 Conn. 352, 360, 545 A.2d 553 (1988). Other agreements "are not included, implicitly or explicitly, in the description of valid arbitration agreements. This is exemplified in General Statutes § 52-421 which requires that any party seeking to modify, confirm or correct an arbitration award in court, a procedure that was prohibited at common law, must file certain papers with the court, one of which is the agreement to arbitrate." (Emphasis added; footnote omitted.) Id., 359-60.
Thus, a written agreement to arbitrate is required to fall within the purview of chapter 909. While arbitration awards that take place pursuant to statute may be subject to judicial review, the enabling statute at issue must specifically authorize it. See e.g., General Statutes § 381-9(b)(2) (arbitration between claimants and insurance company allows court to confirm, vacate, or modify, or correct and award pursuant to chapter 909); General Statutes § 42-181(c)(4) (disputes between consumers and manufacturers of motor vehicles allows confirmation vacatur, modification or correction of an award by court). This conclusion is in accordance with the principle that statutes in derogation of common law should be strictly construed. See Fennelly v. Norton, 294 Conn. 584, 504-05, 985 A.2d 1026 (2010). Accordingly, the type of arbitration at issue, and the statute enabling it, warrant examination. The award at issue in this case resulted from interest arbitration. "Interest arbitration is a process in which the terms and conditions of the employment contract are established by a final and binding decision of the arbitration panel. It differs from grievance arbitration which involves the interpretation of the employment contract to determine whether the conditions of employment have been breached. Thus, interest arbitration essentially is a legislative process, while grievance arbitration essentially is a judicial process." (Footnotes omitted.) A. Loren, "Interest Arbitration: The Alternative to the Strike," 56 Fordham L.Rev. 153 (1987). See also, annot. 68 A.L.R.3d 885, § 113(a) (1976) (noting that interest arbitration is a delegation of legislative power).
Interest arbitration between municipalities and their employees has been codified by our legislature. "The Municipal Employees Relations Act (MERA), General Statutes § 7-467 et seq., imposes compulsory arbitration on a municipality and the representatives of its employees whenever the parties have reached an impasse in their collective bargaining." International Brotherhood of Police Officers, Local 564 v. Jewett City, supra, 234 Conn. 124-25.
"MERA empowers the state board of mediation and arbitration to impose mandatory binding arbitration whenever collective bargaining negotiations between municipalities and the representatives of their employees have reached an impasse ... The evident purpose of the compulsory arbitration feature of § 7-473c is to avoid strikes and their attendant disruptions of municipal services by providing a mechanism to resolve by arbitration those issues concerning which the parties to an expiring municipal collective bargaining agreement have been unable to reach agreement by negotiations." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 131.
"The mandatory binding arbitration that is authorized by MERA does not permit the arbitration panel to exercise the broad discretion normally associated with consensual arbitration. Section 7-473c(d) limits the discretion of the arbitration panel in two significant respects. First, with regard to any issue that the parties have not been able to resolve themselves, the statute confines the discretion of the arbitration panel to a choice between the ‘last best offer’ of one party or another. General Statutes § 7-473c(d)(1). This narrowing of the scope of arbitrator discretion to a choice between two proposals as formulated by the parties upon an unresolved issue significantly circumscribes what might otherwise be deemed [an unconstitutionally] broad delegation of legislative power ... Second, in the exercise of a choice between one or another ‘last best offer,’ the arbitration panel must give priority to the public interest and the financial capability of the municipal employer ... This further limitation on arbitral discretion lends additional support to the constitutional validity of MERA." (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 132.
In resolving this matter, the extent to which MERA permits judicial review must be examined. General Statutes § 7-473c(d)(10) provides: "The decision of the panel and the resolved issues shall be final and binding upon the municipal employer and the municipal employee organization except as provided in subdivision (12) of this subsection and, if such award is not rejected by the legislative body pursuant to said subdivision, except that a motion to vacate or modify such decision may be made in accordance with sections 52-418 and 52-419." Pursuant to subdivision (12), the legislative body of the municipal employer may reject the award by two-third majority of its members. See § 7-473c(d)(12). Such a rejection triggers further arbitral review of each ‘rejected’ issue by a new panel. § 7-473c(d)(14). As noted previously, however, the award of the new arbitration panel, or of the original panel in the absence of a legislative rejection, may be vacated or modified upon appeal to the Superior Court on one of the limited grounds for judicial review stated in General Statutes § § 52-418 and 52-419." See § 7-473c(d)(10) and (15).
In the present case, the court determines that judicial review of an interest arbitration award via an application to confirm is not authorized, and, thus, subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. Chapter 909 does not apply on its own terms, as it requires a written agreement to arbitrate from which the basis for arbitration flows. See Bennett v. Meader, supra, 208 Conn. 360. It is undisputed a written agreement to arbitrate does not exist here, and that arbitration took place pursuant to MERA.
Although MERA does authorize the judicial review of an interest arbitration award pursuant to an application to vacate, or modify, it does not authorize an application to confirm. See General Statutes § 7-473c(d)(10) and (15). In the court’s view, this omission is telling. If the legislature wished to allow judicial review of an interest arbitration award via an application to confirm, they would have simply stated so, Compare General Statutes § 38A-9(b)(2) (arbitration between claimants and insurance company); General Statutes § 42-181(c)(4) (disputes between consumers and manufacturers of motor vehicles). This interpretation is in accordance with the proposition that judicial review of an arbitration award is in derogation of common law; Bennet v. Meader, supra, 208 Conn. 359; and as such, the statutes authorizing it must be strictly construed. See Fennely v. Norton, supra, 294 Conn. 504-05. In view of the foregoing, the court declines to "read into clearly expressed legislation provisions which do not find expression in its words." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faiz v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 40 Conn.Supp. 74, 76, 481 A.2d 113 (1984). See also Garvey v. Valencis, 177 Conn.App. 578, 588, 173 A.3d 51 (2017) ("[w]e reject the plaintiff’s invocation to read words into a statute that are not there"). Consequently, the court concludes that an application to confirm an interest arbitration award is not authorized by the plain language of § 7-473c.
Moreover, in determining that an application to confirm an interest arbitration award is not authorized, the court concludes that the more specific language of MERA should prevail over the more general language of chapter 909. See Miller’s Pond Co., LLC v. New London, 273 Conn. 786, 809, 873 A.2d 965, 979 (2005) ("[w]here statutes contain specific and general references covering the same subject matter, the specific references prevail over the general" [internal quotation marks omitted] ).
Lastly, the court notes that MERA explicitly provides that an interest arbitration award "shall be final and binding." General Statutes § 7-473c(d)(10) and (15). The plain language of this enactment indicates no further action is required. This accords with the principle that an interest arbitration award is essentially a legislative act. See A. Lore, supra, 56 Fordham L.Rev. 153. Consequently, because the court is without authority to confirm the interest arbitration award, subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. See International Brotherhood of Police Officers, Local 564 v. Jewett City, supra, 234 Conn. 139.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted.