Summary
In Brandt v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 2011 WL 6016086, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2011) (unpublished), the court specifically noted that "plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging a single cause of action for wrongful termination, and requesting back pay, reinstatement of benefits, exemplary damages and pre-judgment interest.
Summary of this case from Madani v. Cnty. of Santa ClaraOpinion
B230184
12-05-2011
DAVID BRANDT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.
Law Office of Matthew Kohn, Matthew D. Kohn for Plaintiff and Appellant. Los Angeles Unified School District, Office of the General Counsel, Richard Ettensohn, Assistant General Counsel, for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. SC106827
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Linda K. Lefkowitz, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Office of Matthew Kohn, Matthew D. Kohn for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Los Angeles Unified School District, Office of the General Counsel, Richard Ettensohn, Assistant General Counsel, for Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff David Brandt appeals dismissal of his complaint for wrongful termination following the trial court's order sustaining the demurrer of defendant Los Angeles Unified School District ("LAUSD"). Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
As alleged in his first amended complaint, plaintiff worked for three days as a substitute kindergarten teacher in February of 2008 at an unnamed elementary school in the LAUSD. During that assignment, a student teacher complained that plaintiff had inappropriately touched her and two female students around the waist and had asked her, as part of a class assignment, to pose so that he could draw or sketch her face. Plaintiff was also accused of using LAUSD computer equipment to view or print online dating service information.
The school's assistant principal interviewed plaintiff concerning the allegations; plaintiff denied any inappropriate conduct. The following week, the school's principal issued an "Inadequate Service Report," in which she recommended termination of plaintiff's employment. On March 20, 2008, the LAUSD dismissed plaintiff from employment as a substitute teacher.
The complaint of the student teacher was investigated by the LAUSD's Equal Opportunity Section. The investigator concluded that the administrative actions taken against plaintiff were justified. The complaint on behalf of plaintiff's students was investigated by an Operations Coordinator, who concluded that plaintiff's conduct did not rise to the level of sexual harassment, but that he did not treat the students with respect, fairness, and just consideration.
On June 12, 2008, LAUSD's Interim Field Director convened an appeal hearing on "all complaints and accusations against Mr. Brandt." No written decision was issued after the June 12 hearing.
Plaintiff filed his original complaint alleging "breach of employment, wrongful termination in violation of public policy" based on the lack of a written decision in his administrative appeal, in violation of District Bulletin 1893.1. LAUSD demurred. Prior to the hearing on that demurrer, plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging a single cause of action for wrongful termination, and requesting back pay, reinstatement of benefits, exemplary damages and pre-judgment interest. LAUSD both demurred and moved to strike from the amended complaint the prayer for exemplary damages and pre-judgment interest.
The trial court granted both LAUSD's demurrer and motion to strike. The court ruled that Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876 ("Miklosy") bars plaintiff's sole cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Plaintiff appeals that ruling.
DISCUSSION
A claim of wrongful termination in violation of public policy was first recognized in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167. In that case, the Supreme Court stated: "[W]hen an employer's discharge of an employee violates fundamental principles of public policy, the discharged employee may maintain a tort action and recover damages traditionally available in such actions." (Id. at p. 170.) The Supreme Court later clarified that a Tameny cause of action must be "carefully tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions." (Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1095.)
As our Supreme Court explained in Miklosy, supra, 44 Cal.4th at page 899, "The Government Claims Act ([Gov. Code,] § 810 et sq.) establishes the limits of common law liability for public entities, stating: 'Except as otherwise provided by statute: [¶] (a) A public entity is not liable for an injury whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.' (§ 815, subd. (a), italics added.) The Legislative Committee Comment to section 815 states: 'This section abolishes all common law or judicially declared forms of liability for public entities, except for such liability as may be required by the state or federal constitution, e.g., inverse condemnation. . . .' (Legis. Com. com., 32 West's Ann. Gov. Code (1995) foll. § 815, p. 167, italics added.) Moreover, our own decisions confirm that section 815 abolishes common law tort liability for public entities." Thus, because plaintiff's sole cause of action, for wrongful termination, is founded in the common law rather than in statute, the Government Claims Act bars his lawsuit.
Plaintiff also argues that his due process rights were violated: "The issue is whether the mechanism for evaluating the teacher's termination was fundamentally fair under constitutional standards . . . . For any state-run administrative procedure that intentional[ly] leaves a claimant in limbo, by-passes constitutional standards of fairness, and fails to do something that would result in finality, is unjust per se." The argument lacks merit.
Plaintiff had no due process right to continued employment. "Governing boards of school districts may dismiss substitute employees at any time at the pleasure of the board." (Ed. Code, § 44953.) As a substitute teacher, plaintiff was an at-will employee subject to dismissal with or without cause. (See, e.g., Carter v. Escondido Union High School Dist. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 922, 929.) Runyon v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2010) 48 Cal.4th 760, upon which plaintiff relies, is inapposite for a number of reasons, not least because the plaintiff in that case was a tenured professor with due process rights, while plaintiff was a substitute teacher without such rights. In short, plaintiff received all of the process due him.
The holding of Runyon, that "under the terms of [Government Code] section 8547.12, subdivision (c), plaintiff was entitled to seek a damages remedy for retaliation against him as a whistleblower once he had filed his retaliation complaint with CSU and CSU had rejected it" (48 Cal.4th at p. 773), has no bearing on plaintiff's wrongful termination claim.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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ARMSTRONG, J.
We concur:
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TURNER, P. J.
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KRIEGLER, J.