Opinion
CV125034199.
12-26-2012
Michael BRAHM v. Richard NEWBOULD et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ZEMETIS, J.
The court grants the defendants' motion to dismiss because sovereign, statutory and qualified immunity deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction over the state and federal claims against the defendants in both their official and individual capacities.
FACTS
The pro se plaintiff, Michael Brahm, an inmate at Cheshire Correctional Institution, brought suit against the defendants, Richard Newbould, Richard Bush and Catherine Durato, who are identified as health services administrators at the Correctional Managed Health Care division of the University of Connecticut Health Center (CMHC), Sheryl Estrom, a nurse at CMHC, and Valerie Boykins, an office assistant at CMHC, by service of a summons and complaint on April 17, 2012. The first count, alleging a violation of the plaintiff's eighth amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Article one, section eight of the Connecticut Constitution, is based on the defendants' interference with the plaintiff's medical treatment. The plaintiff has experienced life long astigmatism and nearsightedness. Sometime in early 2006 the right hinge on the plaintiff's glasses broke, which caused his current glasses to sit askew on his face. He requested an appointment with the clinic's optometrist, and on April 5, 2006, the plaintiff was examined by the optometrist, who prescribed an updated prescription for corrective eyeglasses. On the same day, the plaintiff signed an inmate fee form, allegedly authorizing a three-dollar deduction from his inmate account for his new prescription, which had to be prepared and were thus not available on that date.
On May 12, 2006, the plaintiff was notified that his prescription was available, but upon his arrival at health services was asked to sign another Inmate Fee Form authorizing a three-dollar deduction. The plaintiff refused, stating that he had never been charged more than one co-pay in the past, to which Boykins responded that the charge was according to a new rule. The plaintiff appealed the charge to Durato, via an Inmate Grievance on May 15, 2006, but the appeal was denied. The plaintiff immediately appealed that decision on the same day, which was also denied. The plaintiff continued to file grievances on December 8, 2006, January 12, 2007, February 17, 2007 and March 28, 2007, all to no avail. The plaintiff finally agreed to sign the additional fee form under physical duress sometime after March 28, 2007. Count one concludes that the defendant's actions were deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's serious medical needs and were reckless, wanton, willful and malicious towards the plaintiff, in violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights.
Count two, sounding in intentional infliction of emotional distress, further alleges that the defendants knew or should have known that their conduct would result in the plaintiff's tremendous emotional distress and physical pain and suffering, that the plaintiff in fact suffered such distress, including humiliation, embarrassment, isolation from fellow prisoners, loss of sleep and appetite and depression, and that the defendants' actions constituted extreme and outrageous conduct because their withholding was done to satisfy their sadistic egos. Count three, sounding in negligent infliction of emotional distress, alleges that the defendants' conduct created a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of the plaintiff's emotional distress, and that such distress was severe enough that it resulted in the plaintiff experiencing illness, bodily harm and economic loss. Count four, sounding in medical malpractice, alleges that the defendants' acts and omissions prevented the plaintiff from the benefit of corrective glasses, in accordance with the applicable standard of care, which caused the plaintiff mental anguish, pain and suffering, extreme emotional distress, and economic loss. Count five, sounding in negligence, alleges that the defendants had an obligation to ensure that the plaintiff received his eyeglasses, yet willfully, maliciously, recklessly, wantonly and intentionally failed to deliver those glasses in breach of their obligation to do so, causing the plaintiff economic loss. Count six, sounding in extortion and coercion, alleges that the defendants' actions were undertaken to coerce and extort an unlawful co-pay fee from the plaintiff.
The complaint names each defendant in their official and individual capacities, and each count seeks relief in the form of money damages, punitive damages and " injunctive relief, including, but not limited to an order directing the defendants to cease and desist from committing tortious conduct against the plaintiff."
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on June 6, 2012, on the grounds that the issues in this action are precluded under the doctrine of res judicata. The plaintiff had previously brought an administrative appeal on the same issues and against all of the same defendants along with one additional defendant not named in the present case, which was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court (Wilson, J.) denied the motion for summary judgment on August 3, 2012, because the previous dismissal did not constitute a final judgment on the merits.
The defendants then filed the present motion to dismiss with an accompanying memorandum of law on August 9, 2012, to which the plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition on August 30, 2012. The matter came before the court for argument at short calendar (Zemetis, J.) on September 17, 2012.
DISCUSSION
" A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 301 Conn. 759, 774, 23 A.3d 1192 (2012). " [J]urisdiction over the person, jurisdiction over the [subject matter], and jurisdiction to render the particular judgment are three separate elements of the jurisdiction of a court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Morgan v. Hartford Hospital, 301 Conn. 388, 401, 21 A.3d 451 (2011). The court is presently faced with a motion to dismiss due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which " is the power [of the court] to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong ... A court has subject matter jurisdiction if it has the authority to adjudicate a particular type of legal controversy ... [O]nce the question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised, [it] must be disposed of no matter in what form it is presented ... and the court must fully resolve it before proceeding further with the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Milford Power Co., LLC v. Alstom Power, Inc., 263 Conn. 616, 624-25, 822 A.2d 196 (2003). " [T]he question of subject matter jurisdiction, because it addresses the basic competency of the court, can be raised by any of the parties, or by the court sua sponte, at any time ... Moreover, [t]he parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court, either by waiver or by consent." (Internal quotation marks omitted .) New Hartford v. Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority, 291 Conn. 511, 518, 970 A.2d 583 (2009).
Thus, because the presently argued doctrines of sovereign immunity, statutory immunity and exhaustion of administrative remedies each implicate the court's subject matter jurisdiction, they are appropriate grounds for the present motion to dismiss. See Cox v. Aiken, 278 Conn. 204, 211, 897 A.2d 71 (2006) (" [S]overeign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss"); Martin v.. Brady, 261 Conn. 372, 376, 802 A.2d 814 (2002) (" [T]he doctrine of [statutory] immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction"); and Levine v. Sterling, 300 Conn. 521, 528, 16 A.3d 664 (2011) (" Under our exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine, a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an action that seeks a remedy that could be provided through an administrative proceeding, unless and until that remedy has been sought in the administrative forum ... In the absence of exhaustion of that remedy, the action must be dismissed"). " When ... a court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light ... In this regard, a court must take the facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a matter most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cox v. Aiken, supra, 278 Conn. at 211.
The court must next consider the burdens required of the parties by a motion to dismiss. " The plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n. 12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003). " The burden rests with the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor ... clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Goodyear v. Discala, 269 Conn. 507, 511, 849 A.2d 791 (2004). Keeping the plaintiff's burden in mind, the court takes up the issue of the defendants' claim that sovereign immunity bars the present action.
A. Sovereign Immunity— State Law Claims against Official Capacity
Turning first to the state law claims which make up the bulk of the complaint, the court begins by examining the defendants' claim that sovereign immunity deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Since the complaint names the defendants in their official and individual capacities, the court must consider the doctrine of sovereign immunity as it applies to state agents acting under both capacities.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides " that the state cannot be sued without its consent." C.R. Klewin Northeast, LLC v. Fleming, 284 Conn. 250, 258, 932 A.2d 1053 (2007). " This rule had its origin in the ancient common law, predicated on the principal that the king, being the fountainhead of justice, could not be sued in his own courts ... While the principle of sovereign immunity is deeply rooted in our common law, it has, nevertheless, been modified and adapted to the American concept of constitutional government where the source of governmental power and authority is not vested by divine right in a ruler but rests in the people themselves who have adopted constitutions creating governments with defined and limited powers and courts to interpret these basic laws." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 623, 376 A.2d 359 (1977).
Based upon this rationale, the court has explained: " A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 314, 828 A.2d 549 (2003). " The practical and logical basis of the doctrine is today recognized to rest on this principle and on the hazard that the subjection of the state and federal governments to private litigation might constitute a serious interference with the performance of their functions and with their control over their respective instrumentalities, funds and property." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lyon v. Jones, 291 Conn. 384, 396-97, 968 A.2d 416 (2009).
The courts have also extended the protection of sovereign immunity to state agents, ruling " that because the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning ‘ a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Colombia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, 293 Conn. 342, 349, 977 A.2d 636 (2009). " Because an action against state employees in their official capacities is, in effect, an action against the state ... the only immunity that can apply is the immunity claimed by the state itself sovereign immunity ... In an official capacity action, [individual capacity] defenses are unavailable ... While not exhaustive, this list illustrates the basic distinction between personal and official capacity actions." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mercer v. Strange, 96 Conn.App. 123, 128-29, 899 A.2d 683 (2006). Therefore, the basic difference between a suit brought against a defendant in his official capacity and one brought against him in his individual capacity is the extent of the applicable defenses. The court therefore considers the claims collectively according to the capacities in which they name the defendants. Claims against the defendants' official capacity should be considered first, as sovereign immunity is applicable to such claims, and is the first ground argued in support of the defendants' motion.
The protection provided by sovereign immunity is not absolute. Three exceptions have been shown to enable the plaintiff to pierce the state's mantle of invulnerability: " (1) when the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waives the state's sovereign immunity ... (2) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial claim that the state or one of its officers has violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights ... and (3) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in excess of the officer's statutory authority." (Citations omitted.) Tuchman v. State, 89 Conn.App. 745, 753, 878 A.2d 384, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 920, 883 A.2d 1252 (2005). Because the exceptions to sovereign immunity are predicated upon the type of relief sought, the court must further separate the claims based on the factor, and then determine whether the claims fall under potential exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
I. Claims for Money Damages
" For a claim made pursuant to the first exception, this court has recognized the well-established principle that statutes in derogation of sovereign immunity should be strictly construed ... Where there is any doubt about their meaning or intent they are given the effect which makes the least rather than the most change in sovereign immunity." Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, supra, 293 Conn. at 349-50. " A plaintiff who seeks to bring an action for monetary damages against the state must first obtain authorization from the claims commissioner ... General Statutes § 4-160(a) provides as follows: When the claims commissioner deems it just and equitable, the claims commissioner may authorize suit against the state on any claims which, in the opinion of the claims commissioner, presents an issue of law or fact under which the state, were it a private person, could be liable. When sovereign immunity has not been waived, the claims commissioner is authorized by statute to hear monetary claims against the state and determine whether the claimant has a cognizable claim ... This legislation expressly bars suit upon claims cognizable by the claims commissioner except as he may authorize, an indication of the legislative determination to preserve sovereign immunity as a defense to monetary claims against the state not sanctioned by the [claims] commissioner or other statutory provisions ... Since we are not aware of any legal barrier to the presentation of the plaintiff's claim to the [claims] commissioner or to his favorable action upon it, we cannot assume that recourse to that procedure would necessarily have been futile or inadequate." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 351-52.
The defendants' motion to dismiss argues that the claims in the complaint are barred by sovereign immunity because the plaintiff has failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies since he never brought this action before the claims commissioner. The complaint is silent as to whether the action was ever brought before the claims commissioner, and the plaintiff only argues in his memorandum in opposition that he has exhausted the administrative remedies required by federal law to bring a case under § 1983 by appealing through the inmate grievance process. In this case, the plaintiff has failed to allege that either the legislature or the claims commissioner has authorized an action for the plaintiff's state law claims. Accordingly, the court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's state law claims for money damages brought against the defendants acting in their official capacity.
ii. Constitutional Claims for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
" For a claim made pursuant to the second exception, complaining of unconstitutional acts, [the court] require[s] that the allegations of such a complaint and the factual underpinnings if placed in issue, must clearly demonstrate an incursion upon constitutionally protected interests." Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, supra, 293 Conn. at 350. The plaintiff cannot rely merely on the invocation of constitutional protections to defeat a claim of sovereign immunity, but rather must " clearly demonstrate an incursion upon constitutionally protected interests." Barde v. Board of Trustees, 207 Conn. 59, 64, 539 A.2d 1000 (1988).
Preliminarily, the court should note that each count of the complaint seeks injunctive relief, and therefore a consideration of the claims under the second and third exceptions is proper. The first count of the plaintiff's complaint alleges that the defendants violated the eighth amendment of the Constitution by their deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's serious medical needs, and caused the plaintiff physical injury in violation of the fourth and fourteenth amendments, as well as article one, section eight of the Connecticut Constitution. The federal claims will be dealt with in a separate portion of this memorandum according to the federal rules governing sovereign immunity, but the state constitutional claim may be addressed concurrently with the other state law claims.
Neither of the parties mentions the due process protections provided by article one, section eight of the Connecticut Constitution in the motion or its objection, but because the party claiming to assert jurisdiction has the burden to prove it; Goodyear v. Discala, supra, 269 Conn. at 511; the plaintiff's failure to clearly demonstrate a violation of his due process rights prevents such a claim from surviving the present motion to dismiss. " In order to prevail on his due process claim, the plaintiff must prove that: (1) he has been deprived of a property interest cognizable under the due process clause; and (2) the deprivation of the property interest has occurred without due process of law." Johnson v. Meehan, 225 Conn. 528, 546, 626 A.2d 244 (1993). The plaintiff has not argued either of these requirements; accordingly, sovereign immunity must act to bar the court from exerting subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim under the Connecticut Constitution.
iii. Actions in Excess of Statutory Authority
The third exception to the protection of sovereign immunity requires a claim for declaratory or injunctive relief based on the wrongful conduct of an officer in excess of his statutory authority. " For a claim under the third exception, the plaintiffs must do more than allege that the defendants' conduct was in excess of their statutory authority; they must allege or otherwise establish facts that reasonably support those allegations ... In the absence of a proper factual basis in the complaint to support the applicability of these exceptions, the granting of a motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds is proper." Columbia Air Services v. Dept. of Transportation, supra, 293 Conn. at 350.
In the present matter, the plaintiff alleges in the complaint that the defendant Valerie Boykins acted in excess of her statutory authority when she asked him to sign an additional Inmate Fee form. Specifically, he argues that she acted against Connecticut Regulations § 18-85a-3, which states that a pair of eyeglasses and an inmate-initiated medical visit each elicits a charge of three dollars. Further, he argues that this second fee was in contravention of department of correction administrative directive number 3.12, which states that an inmate shall be charged three dollars per prescription for eyeglasses. The plaintiff alleges that each of the additional defendants acted in excess of their statutory authority in upholding the two charges upon rendering decisions on the plaintiff's many grievances. The defendants, in the motion to dismiss, do not argue the issue of whether the defendants acted in excess of their authority, however, the court should consider it sua sponte, because the issue implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction. New Hartford v. Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority, supra, 291 Conn. at 518.
Whether the defendants acted in excess of their statutory authority depends on the interaction between the plaintiff and Boykins, as alleged in the complaint. Connecticut Regulations § 18-81-10a(b), which governs the administration of medication to inmates, states in relevant part that the administrator comply with other state and federal regulations. The allegations in the complaint do not show a sufficient factual basis to suggest that Boykins acted in contravention to this rule, nor to any rule cited by the plaintiff. Connecticut Regulations § 18-85a-3 states: " no inmate shall be denied medical care based on an inability to pay, " but the plaintiff has not argued that indigence was his reason for not signing the second fee form. The plaintiff also cites department of correction administrative directive number 3.12, which is largely duplicative of § 18-85a-3. The idea of an inmate refusing to sign the form for an eyeglass prescription is clearly contemplated by 3.12, which directs administrators, in that event, to make a notation to that effect, sign the form and forward it to the inmate trust fund office. The plaintiff has not alleged that Boykins failed to comply with this directive.
It is axiomatic that the trial court " must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light ... In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 645, 651, 974 A.2d 669 (2009). In the present case, however, the plaintiff appended additional official documents to his complaint, including a copy of the Inmate Fee Form of April 5, 2006 and copies of his many grievance forms. In that case, " if the complaint is supplemented by undisputed facts established by affidavits submitted in support of the motion to dismiss ... other types of undisputed evidence ... and/or public records of which judicial notice may be taken ... the trial court, in determining the jurisdictional issue, may consider these supplementary undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint ... Rather, those allegations are tempered by the light shed on them by the [supplementary undisputed facts] ... If affidavits and/or other evidence submitted in support of a defendant's motion to dismiss conclusively establish that jurisdiction is lacking, and the plaintiff fails to undermine this conclusion with counteraffidavits ... or other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the action without further proceedings." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 651-52. Therefore the court takes judicial notice of the fee forms and grievance forms and consider these additional documents to the extent that they may contradict the plaintiff's allegations.
Reading the additional documents that the plaintiff provided, they seem to indicate that the plaintiff was charged correctly, in contrast to the plaintiff's allegations. Count one states that the plaintiff signed one Inmate Fee Form on April 5, 2006, the day the plaintiff saw the optometrist, and was requested to sign another on May 12, 2006, when he attempted to pick up his prescription. A reading of § 18-85a-3 shows that an inmate is to be charged one, three-dollar fee for an inmate initiated medical visit and an additional three-dollar fee for a pair of eyeglasses. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff requested to see the health center's optometrist, and so the court can conclude that he should have been charged one three-dollar fee for the following visit. Paragraph twenty-eight of the complaint alleges, " [o]n April 5, 2006 ... Boykins had Brahm sign an Inmate Fees Form, authorizing a three-dollar deduction from his inmate account ..." but does not allege that this form was specifically intended to pay for the eyeglass prescription. The complaint continues, however, upon the premise that both fee forms were intended to pay for the prescription, which would be arguably duplicative, without alleging the plaintiff's basis for this premise. This argument is further weakened by the copy of the fee form dated April 5, 2006, which the plaintiff attached to the complaint, on which Boykins has written " Eye doctor" next to the line labeled " Sick Call" assessing a three-dollar charge. The court could therefore infer that the plaintiff was not wrongfully charged twice for his prescription, but rather correctly charged one three-dollar fee for the optometrist's visit and a separate three-dollar fee for the eyeglass prescription.
It is foreseeable that the facts as alleged could have led to confusion on the plaintiff's part. In paragraph thirty-four of the complaint, he alleges that when the plaintiff refused to sign the second fee form Boykins responded " This is a new rule pursuant to the Administrative Directives." Further, in paragraph thirty-six, when the plaintiff confronted Boykins with a copy of Directive Number 3.12, he alleges that she stated, " [defendant Estrom] said that's the new rule, you have to pay." The implication is that the plaintiff understood the charge to be duplicative according to a new rule which contravened Directive Number 3.12. The response to the plaintiff's first grievance did not aid his confusion. The first grievance form the plaintiff attached to the complaint, dated May 15, 2006, states as a reason for denial, " [y]ou have been charged correctly. There is a $3.00 charge for each eyeglass prescription." This implies that the plaintiff attempted to fill multiple prescriptions. There is no proof, however, that a new directive or procedure replaced 3.12 nor that the plaintiff ordered multiple prescriptions. The fact that the plaintiff may have been misled by the defendants, stated reasons for the second charge does not serve to bring those actions outside the confines of their statutory authority, however, because the weight of the evidence of the fee form of April 5, 2006 coupled with a plain reading of 3.12 and § 18-85a-3 indicates that the defendants properly charged the plaintiff.
Therefore the court finds that sovereign immunity prevents the court from exerting subject matter jurisdiction over the defendants in their official capacity as state agents, and that the allegations of the complaint do not fall within one of the three exceptions to sovereign immunity. Thus, the court grants the motion to dismiss as to the state law claims brought against the defendants in their official capacities.
B. Statutory Immunity— Individual Capacity
I.
Each count of the complaint also names the defendants in their individual capacities, and the motion to dismiss argues that those actions are barred by statutory immunity. Whether the court must even reach the defendants, argument, however, depends on whether the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged claims against the defendants in their individual capacities. " If the plaintiff's complaint may reasonably be construed to bring claims against the defendants in their individual capacities, then sovereign immunity would not bar those claims." Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. at 307. " The fact that the state is not named as a defendant does not conclusively establish that the action is not within the principle which prohibits actions against the sovereign without its consent ... The vital test is to be found in the essential nature and effect of the proceeding ... [The Supreme Court] set forth four criteria to determine whether an action is in effect, one against the state and cannot be maintained without its consent: (1) a state official has been sued; (2) the suit concerns some matter in which that official represents the state; (3) the state is the real party against whom relief is sought; and (4) the judgment, though nominally against the official, will operate to control the activities of the state or subject it to liability." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 308. " If all four criteria are satisfied, the action is deemed to be against the state and, therefore, is barred." Kenny v. Weaving, 123 Conn.App. 211, 216, 1 A.3d 1083 (2010), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 929, 12 A.3d 569 (2011).
The defendants do not argue that the plaintiff incorrectly named them in their individual capacities, but the court should consider the issue as part of its sovereign immunity analysis. In Miller v.. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. at 310, the court held that it need not rely on the plaintiff's conclusory statement that his claims were brought against the defendants in their individual capacities. Similarly, this court does not rely on the plaintiff's conclusory claims against individual capacity, because the complaint fails to properly allege such claims. As to the first element of the test used in Miller, it is clear that each defendant is a state official based on the section of the complaint labeled " Parties, " in which the plaintiff names each defendant and states their employment position within UConn Health Center's Correctional Managed Health Care system. The second element is also met, because the defendants' interactions with the plaintiff only occurred during the course of the defendants' state employment. See Colombia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, supra, 293 Conn. at 342.
As to the third element, the state is said to be the real party against whom relief is sought if damages are " sought for injuries allegedly caused by the defendant[s] for performing or not performing acts that are part of [their] official duties." Kenney v. Weaving, supra, 123 Conn.App. at 216-17. This element is satisfied here, because the complaint alleges that the defendants acted either in administering the plaintiff's prescription during his incarceration or rendering decisions on the plaintiff's grievances, and both of which are part of the official duties of each employees' position.
As to the fourth element, that a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would control the activities of the state, the test is met if such a judgment would change or control the role of a state official; see Hultman v. Blumenthal, 67 Conn.App. at 613, 621, 787 A.2d 666, cert. denied, 259 Conn. 929, 793 A.2d 253 (2002) (a judgment would control the role of the attorney general's office in offering public information); but cannot be met where " the defendants ... acted solely in order to justify their own prior unjustified conduct, and not to carry out the government policy with which they were entrusted ..." Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134, 174, 749 A.2d 1147 (2000), overruled on other grounds by Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. at 325. Since each count of the complaint seeks injunctive relief, the defendants would be limited in carrying out the duties of their employment if a judgment were rendered in the plaintiff's favor. Specifically, such an injunction would prevent the defendant health administrators from charging an inmate a fee according to § 18-85a-3 for an inmate-initiated medical visit and charging separately for a prescription arising therefrom, as discussed in part A(iii), supra . Furthermore, the allegation that the defendants denied the grievances in order to justify prior unjustified conduct is predicated upon the allegation that the second charge was wrongful. These allegations are unsupported by a fair reading of the plaintiff's own complaint and the attached Inmate Fee Forms, as discussed in part A(iii), supra. Therefore, the fourth element is satisfied because a judgment in the plaintiff's favor would control state employees' role as health administrators and because the defendants were not acting solely to justify prior misconduct. Since all four elements are met, the test is satisfied in showing that the present action is really one alleging claims against the state, and not against the defendants in their individual capacities. The court therefore grants the motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds, and the court need not consider the defendants' statutory immunity argument.
ii.
If the court reached the parties' statutory immunity arguments, however, the results would be the same. General Statute § 4-165 provides in pertinent part: " (a) No state officer or employee shall be personally liable for damage or injury, not wanton, reckless or malicious, caused in the discharge of his or her duties or within the scope of his or her employment." There is no doubt that the defendants are state officers, but § 4-165 also requires the court to determine whether the defendants' actions were taken within the scope of their employment. " In order to determine if a state actor's conduct is caused in the discharge of his or her duties or within the granted statutory authority, it is necessary to examine the nature of the alleged conduct and its relationship to the duties incidental to the employment." Martin v. Brady, supra, 261 Conn. at 377. Our courts have found that conduct outside the scope of employment is shown when a defendant's " alleged actions were motivated by purely personal considerations entirely extraneous to his employer's interest." Antinerella v. Rioux, 229 Conn. 479, 499, 642 A.2d 699 (1994), overruled on other grounds by C.R. Klewin Northeast, LLC v. Flemming, supra, 284 Conn. at 259. If the actions were taken within the scope of the defendants' employment, the court must then determine whether the alleged conduct was wanton, reckless or malicious. Our Supreme Court has held that a claim sufficiently alleges wanton, reckless or malicious conduct if " the plaintiff [can] prove, on the part of the defendants, the existence of a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one's acts ... [Such conduct] is more than negligence, more than gross negligence ... [I]n order to infer it, there must be something more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them ... It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of the action ... [Such] conduct tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Martin v. Brady, supra, 261 Conn. at 379.
In the present case, the defendants' brief argument on statutory immunity concludes that the plaintiff has not alleged conduct which even remotely equates to wanton, reckless or malicious behavior. The plaintiff argues that the actions of the defendants were beyond the scope of their employment because they attempted to make him pay $6.00 and when he refused, withheld the plaintiff's prescription. Further, he argues that their conduct was wanton, reckless and malicious because the defendants who denied the plaintiff's grievances did so with the improper and self-serving purpose of justifying prior unjustified actions, citing Manifold v. Regaglia, 102 Conn.App. 315, 325, 926 A.2d 38 (2007) (" [W]anton, reckless and malicious conduct can include actions taken with the improper and self-serving purpose of justifying prior unjustified actions").
First, the court must consider whether the actions of the defendants were taken within the scope of their employment. Reading the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court must conclude that the defendants' actions are directly related to the duties of their employment, and thus, fall within that scope. Boykins is allegedly employed as the office assistant to whom the plaintiff gave his first signed Inmate Fee Form on April 5, 2006, and to whom the plaintiff reported to receive his prescription. The court must therefore infer that her duties included administering prescriptions and receiving signed Inmate Fee Forms. Her alleged conduct was an attempt to secure a second fee form, and thus was the same kind of action she regularly undertook in accordance with her duties. Therefore, even if the court could hold that her attempt to collect a second fee form was wrongful, it could not be considered outside the scope of her employment. Regarding the other defendants, the allegations against them arise from their denial of the plaintiff's grievances. The plaintiff has not alleged that these defendants were not permitted to render decisions on inmate grievances, only that the choice made was an attempt to justify Boykins' unjust action.
Additionally, the court cannot infer that the defendants' actions were for personal considerations entirely extraneous to the state's interest. The state, Boykins' employer, stood to benefit by three dollars for an additional form, but there are no allegations that Boykins, or indeed any of the other defendants, would receive a personal benefit, even if the plaintiff agreed to submit an additional three-dollar fee. Because the defendant's actions were directly related to the duties of their employment and could not be construed to have been motivated by personal considerations, the actions of all the defendants must have been within the scope of their employment.
The court also finds that the complaint fails to sufficiently plead allegations that could be considered wanton, reckless or malicious. Although the plaintiff cites Manifold v. Regaglia, supra, 102 Conn.App. at 325, for the position that actions taken to justify prior unjust actions could be considered wanton, in Manifold the court went on to emphasize that " a plaintiff must produce facts from which a reasonable person could infer that the defendants acted with the requisite mental state of recklessness and malice." Id. There, the court found that the plaintiff had not shown sufficient intent to defeat a claim of statutory immunity. Here, the court should reach a similar conclusion, because the complaint does not allege that Boykins sought a second fee form from the plaintiff with any particular mental state. While the plaintiff does allege that the defendants denied his grievances for the purpose of justifying Boykins' wrongful conduct, this is a conclusory statement for which the plaintiff offers no factual support. Without allegations of a wanton, reckless or malicious mental state, the plaintiff cannot overcome the defendants' claim of statutory immunity. The court should therefore find that § 4-165 serves to prevent the court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over the defendants and that the motion to dismiss the state law claims alleged against the defendants in their individual capacity should be granted on the ground of statutory immunity.
C. Federal Sovereign Immunity— Official Capacity
Having concluded that the plaintiff's state law claims against the defendants in their official capacity should be barred by sovereign immunity and his state law claims against the defendants in their individual capacity should be barred by statutory immunity, the court now turns to whether sovereign immunity could bar the plaintiff's federal claim under the eighth amendment against the defendants in their official capacity. The plaintiff asserts his constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants interfered with his medical treatment by acting with deliberate indifference towards his medical needs. Section 1983 provides in relevant part: " [e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding in redress." Our Supreme Court has adopted the requirements of the federal system for bringing an action under § 1983, namely that " a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." Tuchman v.. State, supra, 89 Conn.App. at 762, citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988).
" The United States Supreme Court has asserted that [f]ederal law is enforceable in state courts ... because the Constitution and laws passed pursuant to it are as much laws in the States as laws passed by the state legislature ... [Thus, ] [state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over claims brought under § 1983 ... Nevertheless, [conduct by persons acting under color of state law which is wrongful under ... § 1983 ... cannot be immunized by state law. A construction of the federal statute which permitted a state immunity defense to have controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory promise; and the supremacy clause of the Constitution insures that the proper construction may be enforced ... The elements of, and the defenses to, a federal cause of action are defined by federal law." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sullins v. Rodriguez, 281 Conn. 128, 133, 913 A.2d 415 (2007). " The Supreme Court has taken the view that Congress did not intend to defeat traditional notions of sovereign immunity by enacting § 1983"; id., at 140; so it has applied federal sovereign immunity rules, which state: " [a] state, as an entity having immunity under the eleventh amendment to the United States constitution, is not a ‘ person’ within the meaning of § 1983 in either federal court or state court ... This rule also extends to state officers sued in their official capacities." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. at 311. " State officials are, however, ‘ persons' within the meaning of § 1983 and may be personally liable when sued as individuals for actions taken in their official capacity, and, thus, under color of law." Sullins v. Rodriguez, supra, 281 Conn. at 141. Since the defendants are state officers, they are protected by the same immunity afforded to the state under federal law, and thus cannot be sued in their official capacities. Thus, the defendants' motion to dismiss should be granted as to count one of the complaint, alleging a constitutional claim under § 1983 against the defendants in their official capacities. However, the court must still consider the allegations of count one against the defendants in their individual capacities.
D. Qualified Immunity
" Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Morgan v. Bubar, 115 Conn.App. 603, 625, 975 A.2d 59 (2009). " Qualified immunity is more than a simple defense— it is an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation ... an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Loria v. Gorman, 306 F.3d 1271, 1281 (2d Cir.2002). Like statutory immunity, therefore, qualified immunity bars officials from being sued in their individual capacities. While the defendants raised statutory immunity as grounds for their motion to dismiss, however, they did not raise the issue of qualified immunity. Since qualified immunity challenges the court's subject matter jurisdiction, though, the court may consider the matter sua sponte. See New Hartford v. Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority, supra, 291 Conn. at 518.
" [A] qualified immunity defense is established if (a) the defendants' action did not violate clearly established law, or (b) it was objectively reasonable for the defendants to believe that his action did not violate such law." Ladd v. Thibault, 402 Fed.Appx. 618, 619 (2d Cir.2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 1697, 179 L.Ed.2d 631 (79 U.S.L.W. 3538, March 21, 2011). " The threshold inquiry a court must undertake in a qualified immunity analysis is whether [the] plaintiff's allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation." Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002). " In making this determination in the context of prison conditions, we must ascertain whether the officials involved acted with ‘ deliberate indifference’ to the inmates' health or safety. We may infer the existence of this subjective state of mind from the fact that the risk of harm is obvious." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 737-38.
To determine whether the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, the court must determine whether their actions violated clearly established law, and must therefore first analyze the established law regarding the eighth amendment. " To be cruel and unusual punishment, conduct that does not purport to be punishment at all must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety ... It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, whether that conduct occurs in connection with establishing conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs, or restoring official control over a tumultuous cellblock." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-99, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991). " These cases mandate inquiry into a prison official's state of mind when it is claimed that the official has inflicted cruel and unusual punishment." Id., at 299. Thus, even if the court finds that the plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated, the defendants " may nevertheless be shielded from liability for civil damages if their actions did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Hope v. Pelzer, supra, 536 U.S. 739.
As previously noted, the defendants have not argued that they are protected by qualified immunity. The plaintiff has correctly argued that his § 1983 claim against the defendants in their individual capacities cannot be dismissed on grounds of state sovereign immunity or statutory immunity. He also argues that the defendants' failure to provide his prescription eyeglasses after he refused to sign an Inmate Fee Form constituted deliberate indifference to his serious medical need, and cites Koehl v. Dalsheim, 85 F.3d 86, 88 (2d Cir.1996), for the position that deprivation of an inmate's eyeglasses could constitute a serious medical need. He finally argues that all of the defendants knew or should have known of his extremely poor eyesight.
Having characterized his claim as one of deliberate indifference to serious medical need, the plaintiff has narrowed the issue for the court's analysis. " In order to establish an [e]ighth [a]mendment claim arising out of inadequate medical care, a prisoner must prove deliberate indifference to [his] serious medical needs ... The standard of deliberate indifference includes both subjective and objective components. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, sufficiently serious." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Faraday v. Commissioner of Correction, 288 Conn. 326, 338, 952 A.2d 764 (2008). " With respect to the objective component of the deliberate indifference standard, the term ‘ sufficiently serious' has been described as ‘ a condition of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain.’ " Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir.1996). " Second, the [defendants] must act with a sufficiently culpable state of mind ... An official acts with the requisite deliberate indifference when that official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference ... Thus, an official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not does not violate the eighth amendment." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Faraday v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 288 Conn. at 338-39.
First, the court must consider whether the deprivation of the plaintiff's new eyeglasses was sufficiently serious. In Koehl v. Dalsheim, supra, 85 F.3d 89, the court held that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's serious medical need where his glasses were confiscated and subsequently lost. The case is distinguishable from the present one, however, because in Koehl the plaintiff suffered from double-vision and loss of depth perception caused by past head-trauma, which required special prismatic glasses, the long-term deprivation of which caused the plaintiff to lose sight entirely in his left eye. Id., at 88. The present plaintiff alleges that he suffers from nearsightedness and astigmatism, and, unlike the plaintiff in Koehl, has not alleged that the deprivation led to degeneration of this condition or extreme pain. In fact, the only allegations of specific harm contained within the plaintiff's eighth amendment claim, including blurred vision and headaches, are alleged to have taken place while the plaintiff awaited his optometrist appointment, not after and due to the defendants' actions. Further, the complaint alleges that the plaintiff needed new glasses because, " at some point the right hinge of his eyeglasses was broken causing them to set on his face at an improper angle." Although this was probably inconvenient, the plaintiff has not alleged that the defendants' failure to provide new glasses left him totally without glasses, only with glasses with a damaged hinge. Therefore, the allegations of the present case are dissimilar enough to the ruling in Koehl that the court should find that the defendants acts are not sufficiently serious to constitute deliberate indifference.
Although the determination that the allegations do not arise to the level of a sufficiently serious deprivation is dispositive of the issue of whether the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, an analysis of the second, objective component of the deliberate indifference standard would yield the same result. While the plaintiff alleges that the defendants were aware or should have been aware of his poor eyesight, the deliberate indifference standard requires actual knowledge and an act in disregard of that knowledge. It cannot be inferred from the allegations that any of the defendants had actual knowledge of the extent of the plaintiff's lack of visual acuity, nor that any of the defendants' actions were taken in disregard of that knowledge. Of the plaintiff's six grievances, only the first one, dated May 15, 2006, states that his eyesight is extremely poor and requests health services be given to him immediately. The defendants to whom this grievance was addressed, Catherine Durato, denied the grievance because it did not meet the standard of health care emergency that the plaintiff claimed, and because the plaintiff had been charged correctly. There are no allegations from which the court could infer that Durato actually drew the inference that her denial of the grievance would place the plaintiff in greater medical danger.
The only other defendant whom the court might infer had actual knowledge of the plaintiff's vision problems is Boykins, who had the task of delivering the glasses in return for a completed fee form. Again, however, the problem arises that the court cannot infer that she acted in knowing disregard of the claimed vision problems. While the plaintiff correctly cites that Administrative Directive Number 3.12 states that a health care administrator should sign the Inmate Fee Form and forward it to the Inmate Trust Fund Office in the event that an inmate refuses to sign it himself, the plaintiff has not alleged that Boykins failed to do this. The fact that 3.12 provides an administrative mechanism when an inmate refuses to sign a fee form for his glasses is indicative that following that procedure must not constitute deliberate indifference.
Finally, count one of the complaint alleges that Administrative Directive Number 3.12(5)(D) states that " An inmate shall not be charged if ... (3) the inmate is undergoing scheduled follow-up medical treatment for chronic disease ..." The complaint further alleges that the defendants were aware of this rule and so should not have required an additional charge. However, the plaintiff fails to argue how 3.12(5)(D)(3) is applicable in his case. A plain reading of the language of that subsection leads the court to conclude that it is inapplicable: picking up prescription glasses is not follow-up treatment, there is no evidence that the plaintiff's pick-up was scheduled, but rather that he would be contacted when his prescription arrived and although the plaintiff's vision problems may be chronic, the plaintiff himself states that the cause is not disease, but rather the result of his premature birth. Therefore, even if the defendants had knowledge of the plaintiff's medical necessity, the complaint makes no allegations that their actions in denying the plaintiff the prescription after he refused to sign a second form or in denying the plaintiff's grievances were done in contrivance of the established laws governing eighth amendment protections or in reckless disregard of his medical necessity. Thus, qualified immunity protects the defendants from suit brought against them in their individual capacity under § 1983, and the court grants the motion to dismiss that claim accordingly.
CONCLUSION
The court grants the motion to dismiss as to the federal and state law claims brought against the defendants in their official capacity because sovereign immunity prevents the court from exerting subject matter jurisdiction over the action. The motion to dismiss should be granted as to the state law claims brought against the defendants in their individual capacity on the ground of statutory immunity and as to the federal claim brought against the defendants in their individual capacity on the ground of qualified immunity for the same reason.