Opinion
Civil Action No. 19-1385
03-05-2021
COREY BRACEY, Plaintiff, v. COREY VALENCIA, Corrections Officer I, MCLAREN MEDICAL LABORATORY, M.D. DENNIS W. SPENCER, Laboratory Director, WARD MEDICAL LABORATORY, M.D. WILLIAM G. FINN, Laboratory Director, GARCIA CLINICAL LABORATORY, M.D. LORENZ P. KIELHORN, Laboratory Director, CHRISTOPHER COLGAN, Corrections Officer I, and Lieutenant Morris, Defendants.
District Judge William S. Stickman, IV
Re: ECF Nos. 109 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Corey Bracey ("Bracey") brings this pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the alleged violation of his rights arising out of a physical altercation with corrections officers at the State Correctional Institution at Greene ("SCI - Greene"). ECF No. 107. Presently before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed on behalf of Corrections Officer I Corey Valencia, Corrections Officer I Christopher Colgan and Lieutenant Morris (collectively, the "DOC Defendants"), seeking dismissal of Bracey's civil conspiracy claims. ECF No. 109.
For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Court deny the Motion to Dismiss.
II. REPORT
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In Bracey's first Amended Complaint, he set forth a conspiracy claim against the DOC Defendants for allegedly fabricating incident reports to justify the excessive use of force. ECF No. 39 ¶¶ 36, 55. Because Bracey failed to allege more than conclusory allegations of concerted action, it was recommended that the Motion to Dismiss the conspiracy claim be granted. ECF No. 101. The Court adopted the recommendation and granted Bracey leave to file a Second Amended Complaint to correct the identified deficiencies. ECF No. 106.
Bracey timely filed a Second Amended Complaint, ECF No. 107, and alleges, in pertinent part, as follows:
36. In attempt to justify the excessive use of force Defendants Valencia, Colgan, and Morris all fabricated their incident reports that it was plaintiff who was resisting the escort that caused the escort to be taken to the ground to enable the officers to gain compliance.ECF No. 107 (syntax and spelling in original).
37. After the incident and debriefing procedure, Morris as the supervising commissioned officer ordered Colgan and Valencia to file their incident reports, as Morris would also have to file his report as he was directly involved in the use of force. This enabled Colgan, Valencia and Morris in concert to fabricate the legitimacy of the use of force in their reports as staff write their reports together and thereafter Morris reviewing and comparing their reports for uniformity of the details before submitting to higher authorities to be a part of the official record.
55. Defendants Valencia, Colgan, and Morris in concert used excessive force against Plaintiff causing internal head trauma and injuries in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. These defendants further acted in cahootz of fabricating their incident reports to justify excessive force in furtherance of a civil conspiracy.
The DOC Defendants have filed the pending Motion to Dismiss again challenging the sufficiency of Bracey's conspiracy allegations. ECF No. 109. In support, the DOC Defendants contend that the new allegations, specifically Paragraph 37, do not cure the conclusory nature of Bracey's conspiracy claim. ECF No. 110.
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Motion to Dismiss
In assessing the sufficiency of a complaint under a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint and all reasonable factual inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). The Court, however, need not accept bald assertions or inferences drawn by the plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. See Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that a complaint is properly dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) where it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," id. at 570, or where the factual content does not allow the court "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding that, under Twombly, "labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" do not suffice. Rather, the complaint "must allege facts suggestive of [the proscribed] conduct" and that are sufficient "to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s] of his claim."). Id. at 233, 234.
2. Pro Se Pleadings and Filings
Pro se pleadings and filings, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). If the court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or litigant's unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (A "petition prepared by a prisoner ... may be inartfully drawn and should ... be read 'with a measure of tolerance'"); Freeman v. Department of Corr., 949 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1991). Under our liberal pleading rules, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997) (overruled on other grounds); see also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard); Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990) (same).
Still, there are limits to the court's procedural flexibility — "pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim .... they cannot flout procedural rules — they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). Thus, because Bracey is a pro se litigant, this Court will consider the facts and make inferences where it is appropriate.
C. DISCUSSION
To establish a conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Bracey must show that "persons acting under color of state law 'reached an understanding' to deprive him of his constitutional rights." Jutrowski v. Township of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 294 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150-52 (1970)). "Such rights include, of course, those protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, such as the 'right to be heard in an impartial forum,' Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 161 (3d Cir. 2010), and the 'right of access to the courts,' Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). Those rights 'assure[ ] that no person will be denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning violations of ... constitutional rights' Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974)." Jutrowski 904 F.3d at 294. Thus,
[a]lthough deprivations of the right of access to the courts arise most often in the prison context, see, e.g., Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1036 (3d Cir. 1988), this right is also denied when law enforcement officers conspire to cover up constitutional violations, see, e.g., Colbert, 851 F.3d at 657-58 (holding that the plaintiff could allege under § 1983 that "the named officers participated in something akin to a 'conspiracy of silence among the officers' in which defendants refuse to disclose which of their number has injured the plaintiff"). A "conspiracy of silence" among officers is actionable as a § 1983 conspiracy because the coordinated officer conduct "impede[s] an individual's access to courts" and renders "hollow" a victim's right to redress in a court of law. Vasquez v. Hernandez, 60 F.3d 325, 328-29 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[W]hen police officers conceal or obscure important facts about a crime from its victims rendering hollow the right to seek redress, constitutional rights are undoubtedly abridged."); see also Swiggett v. Upper Merion Twp., No. 08-2604, 2008 WL 4916039, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2008) ("[C]ourts have found that concealing a constitutional violation, including use of excessive force, does not amount to a separate constitutional violation unless the victim of the concealment was deprived of his right of access to the courts.").
Id.
An "after-the-fact" conspiracy to cover up the use of force and prevent access to the courts can be shown through "material omissions in contemporaneous ... reports" and "conflicting accounts" of the events in question. Jutrowski, 904 F.3d at 296-97 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In the Second Amended Complaint, Bracey sets forth facts that, taken as true, establish a plausible claim for conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional rights. He alleges that each of the DOC Defendants sat together and prepared false incident reports, and that Defendant Morris reviewed the reports "for uniformity of the details" to justify the use of force. These allegations are sufficient at this early stage of the litigation to state a claim that the DOC Defendants "reached an understanding" to violate Bracey's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Thus, the DOC Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the conspiracy count should be denied. See also Gass v. Matthews, No. CV 18-2360, 2018 WL 6249710, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 29, 2018) (denying motion to dismiss conspiracy claim where plaintiff alleged defendant corrections officer filed a materially false report regarding the use of force and that others "reviewed, edited or approved of the report").
D. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Court deny the Motion to Dismiss filed on behalf of the DOC Defendants.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may respond to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Maureen P . Kelly
MAUREEN P. KELLY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Dated: March 5, 2021 cc: The Honorable William S. Stickman, IV
United States District Judge
All counsel of record by Notice of Electronic Filing
Corey Bracey
GS 4754
SCI-Phoenix
1200 Mokychic Road
Collegeville, Pa 19426