Opinion
95-A-2008, 99-CV-0955E(Sc)
March 12, 2001
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, plaintiff, currently in the custody of the New York State Department of Correctional Services, claims that defendant violated his constitutional right to due process at an April 7, 1999 prison disciplinary hearing ("the April hearing") in which defendant acted as the presiding officer. Presently before this Court are the parties' competing motions for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, defendant's motion will be granted and plaintiff's motion will be denied as moot.
The gravamen of plaintiff's claim is that defendant, as the presiding officer at the April hearing, failed to decide such hearing in plaintiff's favor despite defendant's having twice viewed an allegedly exculpatory video-tape of the precipitating incident. After finding that plaintiff had been guilty of violating certain inmate rules, defendant sentenced plaintiff to, inter alia, twelve months of time in the Special Housing Unit and loss of packages privileges. This decision, however, was "reversed and expunged" on administrative appeal and, except for his loss of five days of packages privileges, plaintiff was never subjected to any kind of punishment arising out of the April hearing.
The standards for summary judgment are well-established. Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FRCvP 56(c). The "party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists" and that party's "burden will be satisfied if he can point to an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim." Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1995). In this regard, the nonmoving party "cannot defeat the motion by relying on the mere allegations in his pleading, or on conclusory statements, or on mere assertions that affidavits supporting the motion are not credible." Gottlieb v. County of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 1996).
Internal citations omitted.
"The Due Process Clause provides inmates with several protective procedures that they may expect at disciplinary hearings ***." Young v. Hoffman, 970 F.2d 1154, 1156 (2d Cir. 1992). Among these protections are an opportunity to appear at the hearing, the expectation that they may call witnesses — ibid. — and a requirement that the disposition thereof be supported by "a modicum of evidence." Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). Nevertheless, these protections "are not required unless `there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State.'" Young, at 1156 (quoting Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)). In the context of disciplinary confinement or a loss of privileges, due process considerations are implicated where "atypical or significant hardship sufficient to create a liberty interest" in avoiding such punishment is found to have been imposed. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995); Sims v. Artuz, 230 F.3d 14, 22 (2d Cir. 2000).
Other than the insignificant loss of five days of packages privileges, it is undisputed that plaintiff's conditions of confinement were unaffected by the outcome of the April hearing. To the extent plaintiff "suffered a denial of due process in connection with his disciplinary hearing," "[t]he administrative reversal constituted part of the due process protection he received, and it cured any procedural defect that may have occurred" during the April hearing. Young, at 1156. In other words, "he suffered no interference with a liberty interest and has no valid claim for relief." Ibid. Moreover, the undisputed evidence shows that plaintiff was granted the "procedural due process appropriate for the circumstances." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974). In this regard, plaintiff received copies of the "Misbehavior Reports" that formed the basis for the April hearing, was allowed to testify and call witnesses in his defense, and proffered to the presiding officer, the defendant herein, the video-tape of the incident in question. Relatedly and to the extent that plaintiff's claims of bias raise substantive due process concerns, he has failed to allege facts that would indicate bias on the part of defendant or that such bias caused defendant to "arbitrarily and adversely" predetermine the outcome of the April hearing. See Francis v. Coughlin, 891 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1989)("Since the touchstone of the right of due process is freedom from arbitrary governmental action, *** it is axiomatic that a prison disciplinary hearing in which the result is arbitrarily and adversely predetermined violates this right."). Plaintiff's "bare assertion of claims of bias and prejudgment, merely because they implicate issues involving the defendant's state of mind," are insufficient "to defeat a well-supported motion for summary judgment." Id. at 47. In short, plaintiff's claims are wholly insubstantial and cannot withstand defendant's motion for summary judgment.
It has also come to the undersigned's attention that, by motion filed February 14, 2001, plaintiff now desires to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff's premise for amending his Complaint is that he has "[r]ecently *** received copies of letters which [he] submitted to the Superintendent of the New York State Police" in April 1999 and which "prove that defendant Sarra intentionally and maliciously retaliated against [plaintiff] for attempting to criminally prosecute the Corrections Officers for fabricating the misbehavior report in question." Bozzuto Aff. ¶¶ 6-7; Plaintiff's Mem. of Law, dated February 9, 2001, at 1. This "newly discovered evidence," plaintiff argues, supports "numerous" First Amendment claims. Id. at 2-4.
In the same papers, plaintiff indicates that he also desires to withdraw his motion for summary judgment. However, this Court's granting of defendant's motion for summary judgment renders moot any consideration by the undersigned of such latter request.
Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that leave to amend a complaint "shall be freely given when justice so requires" and whether to grant such leave is a within the trial court's discretion. See Zahra v. Town of Southhold, 48 F.3d 674, 685 (2d Cir. 1995). Where such amendment would be futile, however, leave should be denied. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962). The undersigned's review of these papers results in this conclusion. Stated simply, plaintiff's self-described "newly discovered evidence" consists of nothing more than his representations to a third party in April 1999 regarding defendant's alleged bias. Inasmuch as these conclusory allegations of bias are not new, are wholly fanciful and only mirror that which the undersigned rejected above, allowing plaintiff to amend his Complaint to reflect such "newly discovered evidence" would be futile because plaintiff still presents no set of facts from or upon which the he would be entitled to relief.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted, that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied as moot, that plaintiff's motion to amend the Complaint is denied and that this case shall be closed.