Opinion
C.A. No. N19C-03-190 WCC
01-28-2020
SAMANTHA BOYER, Individually and as guardian of BLB, Plaintiffs, v. SHAWN GARVIN, SECRETARY OF THE DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL, AND THE DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL, Defendants.
Benjamin C. Wetzel, III, Esquire; Wetzel & Associates, P.A., 2201 W. 11th Street, Wilmington, Delaware 19805. Attorney for Plaintiff. Robert F. Phillips, Esquire; Deputy Attorney General, State of Delaware Department of Justice, 391 Lukens Drive, New Castle, Delaware 19720. Attorney for Defendant.
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - GRANTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Benjamin C. Wetzel, III, Esquire; Wetzel & Associates, P.A., 2201 W. 11th Street, Wilmington, Delaware 19805. Attorney for Plaintiff. Robert F. Phillips, Esquire; Deputy Attorney General, State of Delaware Department of Justice, 391 Lukens Drive, New Castle, Delaware 19720. Attorney for Defendant. CARPENTER, J.
Before the Court is Defendant Shawn Garvin, Secretary of the Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control ("Garvin"), and Defendant Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control's (jointly, "Defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons set forth in this Opinion, Defendants' Motion is GRANTED.
I. Facts & Procedural Background
Plaintiff Samantha Boyer ("Plaintiff"), individually and as guardian of BLB, initiated suit because her minor child sustained an injury while at Delaware Seashore State Park (the "property"), which is owned by the State of Delaware and managed by Defendant Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control. Plaintiff also brought suit against Shawn Garvin as Secretary of the Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control.
Compl. ¶¶ 1-2.
Plaintiff alleges that when the minor was "exiting the bathroom of the property, the door slammed shut on the minor's right index finger, amputating the distal portion." Plaintiff further contends that this injury was proximately caused by Defendants' negligence in that they "failed to maintain the door such that it did not have a working pneumatic door closer to slow its movement, in known windy conditions," "failed to inspect the door for such defects," and "failed to warn of the door's propensity to close quickly."
Id. ¶ 3.
Id. ¶ 4.
In response, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that they are exempt from liability based on sovereign immunity and, alternatively, the State Torts Claims Act ("STCA"). This is the Court's decision on Defendants' Motion.
Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. ¶¶ 3, 7.
II. Standard of Review
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 56, the Court must determine whether any genuine issues of material fact exist. The moving party bears the burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact, such that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view all factual inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Where it appears that there is a material fact in dispute or that further inquiry into the facts would be appropriate, summary judgment will not be granted.
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c); see also Wilm. Tru. Co. v. Aetna, 690 A.2d 914, 916 (Del. 1996).
See Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679 (Del. 1979).
See Alabi v. DHL Airways, Inc., 583 A.2d 1358, 1361 (Del. 1990).
See Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 470 (Del. Super. Ct. 1962), rev'd in part on procedural grounds and aff'd in part, 208 A.2d 495 (Del. 1965).
III. Discussion
Defendants argue that they have sovereign immunity from suit as a state agency and as a state employee sued in an official capacity, and since there has been no waiver of immunity, this is an "absolute bar" to all of Plaintiff's claims. Alternatively, they assert that if the Court finds that sovereign immunity is waived, Plaintiff's claims would be barred by the STCA. Defendants contend that as a state agency, they are exempt from liability under the STCA because all three required elements are present: the act or omission (1) involves the agency's discretion; (2) was done in the good faith belief that the public interest would be served; and (3) was done without gross or wanton negligence.
Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 7.
In response, Plaintiff asserts that the STCA only affords immunity to discretionary acts and the minor's injury was caused by the Defendants' negligent performance of ministerial acts. In support, Plaintiff cites to Greenfield v. Miles, a recent Delaware Supreme Court decision, which she argues implies that sovereign immunity applies only to discretionary acts and not to ministerial acts.
Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 3.
Greenfield as Next Friend for Ford v. Miles, 211 A.3d 1087 (Del. 2019).
Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 2.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity shields the State, as well as its agencies and public officials in their official capacity, from being sued without the State's consent and can only be waived by an act of the General Assembly. Pursuant to 18 Del. C. § 6511, sovereign immunity is waived when the claims against the State are "covered by the state insurance coverage program, whether by commercially procured insurance or by self-insurance." In the absence of any insurance coverage, the State "normally files an affidavit of the director of the State of Delaware Insurance Office so stating and sovereign immunity is established." If it is determined that the State has statutorily waived sovereign immunity, then the plaintiff has the burden to prove that the action is not barred by the STCA.
Parker v. Wireman, 2012 WL 1536934, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 30, 2012); see also J.L. v. Barnes, 33 A.3d 902, 913 (Del. Super. Ct. 2011) ("A fundamental premise of our systems of law and government is that the State, its agencies and its employees, acting in their official capacities, are immune from civil liability.").
Parker, 2012 WL 1536934, at *2.
Id. (indicating that where no waiver has occurred, "sovereign immunity exists and no further analysis is necessary").
See Mathangani v. Hevelow, 2016 WL 3587192, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. May 31, 2016).
Despite Plaintiff's contentions, whether the conduct at issue is considered ministerial or discretionary is of no consequence to the State's sovereign immunity. In Greenfield, the Delaware Supreme Court distinguished between discretionary and ministerial acts for the purposes of determining whether immunity existed for state employees under the STCA. Although Plaintiff cites to Greenfield to extend this distinction to sovereign immunity, the Greenfield Court neither discussed nor distinguished between discretionary or ministerial acts for purposes of sovereign immunity. Further, the Greenfield Court indicated that plaintiff's counsel acknowledged "that she believed that sovereign immunity precluded [the] claims made against" state employees in their official capacities." As such, Greenfield does not support the proposition that sovereign immunity is limited by the ministerial/discretionary distinction.
Greenfield as Next Friend for Ford, 211 A.3d at 1098.
See Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 2.
Greenfield as Next Friend for Ford, 211 A.3d at 1097, n. 45.
Accordingly, unless the State has waived sovereign immunity, the claims against Defendants are barred without further inquiry. Defendants submitted an affidavit of the Insurance Coverage Administrator of the State of Delaware affirming that the State has not purchased any insurance applicable to the facts alleged in the Complaint. Therefore, the Court finds there has been no waiver of sovereign immunity under 18 Del. C. § 6511. Because sovereign immunity has not been waived, it bars all of Plaintiff's claims against the Defendants and the Court need not consider the application of the STCA to this case. While this is an unfortunate result given the significant and traumatic injuries suffered by the Plaintiff's minor child, the remedy to address this concern in the future rests with the General Assembly and not the Court.
Lawhead Aff. ¶ 5. --------
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/_________
Judge William C. Carpenter, Jr.