Opinion
7:23-cv-02478-BHH-JDA
06-27-2023
Latasha Boyd, Plaintiff, v. Spartanburg County, Spartanburg County Sheriff's Department, Sheriff Chuck Wright, Department of Social Services, Josie Jones, Spartanburg County Social Security Administration, Spartanburg County District Six, United States, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jacquelyn D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge
Latasha Boyd (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, files this action against the above-named Defendants. This matter is before the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the undersigned concludes that this action should be summarily dismissed without issuance and service of process.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint. [Doc. 1.] The allegations in the Complaint are nonsensical and difficult to decipher. For example, Plaintiff alleges as follows:
Slavery was never abolished, and racial equality is still a major problem. The 13th Amendment didn't abolish slavery, it just transformed it into a prison system. In 2015, 2 million people who are incarcerated in America are legally considered slaves under the constitution. Blacks are more enslaved today than in the 1800's. Incarceration rose to replace Jim Crow. Southern states quickly took advantage of the 13thamendment, slavery ambiguity arresting black people for minor
crimes and then being sold to private employers through the convict lease system. Most of the blacks are arrested off drug crimes. Blacks use drugs at the same rate as white people, yet they are incarcerated for drugs at 20 to 50 times the rate of whites. So that's why I fear for my life after they have staged my life and tried to criminalize me. The police are the main causes of misconduct. Plaintiff is alleging that law enforcement officers/the Spartanburg County sheriff office was responsible for initiating a wrongful prosecution conviction/ Prosecutorial Misconduct against me [in] violation of my constitutional rights . . .[ Id. at 2-3.] Plaintiff makes many other frivolous allegations like those above. For example, Plaintiff alleges as follows:
Example: Keenan Anderson and The Los Angeles Police Department. He was paranoid because of section 702 FISA abuse and CIA using MK Ultra, local officials did not understand what's happening. The same thing was happening to me. Then I realized they were building me up for something.
. . . Destroying knowledge of history creates chaos. Then just as Lenin couldn't have done it without Trotsky but they came riding in and saying “we're the answer and we will bring about peace and we'll get this under control.” But in the chaos, it normally takes a totalitarian dictatorial government to overcome the chaos that Marxist created to get control.
. . . They are a fishing expedition, using Judiciary and executive department of justice to abuse people, and abuses the system and use lies instead of truths. Using technology to spy on its citizens. They should protect America's freedom, but they are losing it. When you lose your freedom in America there will be no place else to go to have freedom. You're the one that must secure our freedom instead of targeting those who hold anti-authority views. Using abuse to silence our voices....[Id. at 12-13.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint. Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute, which authorizes the Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Further, this Court would possess the inherent authority to review a pro se complaint to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists and that a case is not frivolous, even if the complaint were not subject to the prescreening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307S08 (1989) (“Section 1915(d) . . . authorizes courts to dismiss a ‘frivolous or malicious' action, but there is little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision.”); Ross v. Baron, 493 Fed.Appx. 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[F]rivolous complaints are subject to dismissal pursuant to the inherent authority of the court, even when the filing fee has been paid . . . [and] because a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an obviously frivolous complaint, dismissal prior to service of process is permitted.” (citations omitted)). Accordingly, in addition to the screening requirements of § 1915(e)(2)(B), “[t]he present Complaint is subject to review pursuant to the inherent authority of this Court to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists and that the case is not frivolous.” Trawick v. Med. Univ. of S.C., No. 2:16-cv-730-DCN-MGB, 2016 WL 8650132, at *4 (D.S.C. June 28, 2016) (citation omitted).
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, her pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that, if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but the Court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for her, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove her case as an evidentiary matter, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Balt. City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint for relief must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). “And, although the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) are very liberal, more detail often is required than the bald statement by plaintiff that he has a valid claim of some type against defendant.” Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 326 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotations omitted). This is particularly true in a § 1983 action where “liability is personal, based upon each defendant's own constitutional violations.” Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001). “In order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.... Consequently, [defendants] must have had personal knowledge of and involvement in the alleged deprivation of [plaintiff]'s rights in order to be liable.” Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, it is unclear what causes of action Plaintiff intends to assert in her Complaint. While Plaintiff contends her constitutional rights have been violated, her rambling, incoherent allegations simply fail to identify any plausible causes of action. However, because Plaintiff appears to allege that her civil rights have been violated, the Court construes this action as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Here, Plaintiff's claims are subject to summary dismissal for the reasons below.
Defendants Entitled to Dismissal
First, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts against any of the named Defendants to state a claim for relief, and they are all entitled to dismissal. In a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must plead facts indicating that a defendant acted personally in the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights. See Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977). When a complaint contains no personal allegations against a defendant, that defendant is properly dismissed. See Reaves v. Richardson, No. 4:09-cv-820-TLW-SVH, 2011 WL 2119318, at *6 (D.S.C. Mar. 1, 2011) (“[W]ithout such personal involvement, there can be no liability under section 1983.”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 2112100 (D.S.C. May 27, 2011).
Thus, in the absence of substantive allegations of personal wrongdoing against the named Defendants in this case, the Court is unable to liberally construe a plausible claim arising from the Complaint against them. See Weller, 901 F.2d at 389 n.2 (finding dismissal proper where there were no allegations to support a claim against the named defendants); Gibson v. Foster, No. 5:17-cv-01333-JMC-KDW, 2017 WL 7355301, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 7, 2017) (finding summary dismissal proper where “the Complaint contains no allegations of wrongdoing by th[e] Defendant”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 690060 (D.S.C. Feb. 1, 2018). “Where a complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the complaint is silent as to the defendant except for his name appearing in the caption, the complaint is properly dismissed.” Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974); see also Newkirk v. Circuit Court of City of Hampton, No. 3:14-cv-372-HEH, 2014 WL 4072212, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 2014). Accordingly, Defendants are all entitled to summary dismissal because Plaintiff has not alleged their personal involvement in any alleged deprivation of her rights.
Further, it is well settled that only “persons” may act under color of state law, and, therefore, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a “person.” See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001). The Spartanburg County Sheriff's Department, the Department of Social Services, the Spartanburg County Social Security Administration, and Spartanburg County District Six all appear to be departments, facilities, or buildings and, as such, are not subject to suit because they cannot be sued as a “person” in a § 1983 lawsuit. Id. (finding the medical department of a prison is not a person pursuant to § 1983); see also Maddox v. Cnty. of Spartanburg, S.C., No. 7:13-cv-01260-GRA, 2013 WL 3894840, at *3 (D.S.C. July 24, 2013) (dismissing Spartanburg County Sheriff's Department and Spartanburg County Fire Department); Stroman v. York Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 0:18-cv-1632-JMC-PJG, 2019 WL 498387, at *4 (D.S.C. Feb. 8, 2019) (“[Plaintiff's] § 1983 claim fails as a matter of law because the York County Department of Social Services is not a ‘person' amenable to suit.”). Accordingly, these Defendants are entitled to summary dismissal from this § 1983 action.
Spartanburg County is also entitled to summary dismissal. Municipalities and other local governmental units cannot be sued on a respondeat superior theory for the unconstitutional acts of their employees. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). However, local governing bodies, including counties, are “persons” that can be sued directly under § 1983 when alleged unconstitutional action executes governmental policy or custom. Id. To establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the county's policies caused the constitutional violation. McMillian v. Monroe Cnty., 520 U.S. 781, 784 (1997). A municipality is responsible only when the execution of its policy or custom-made by its lawmakers or individuals whose acts “may fairly be said to represent official policy”-inflicts injury. Id. (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694); Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1385 (4th Cir. 1987). When the alleged constitutional deprivation is not an official act of a municipality, relief under § 1983 must be sought against the officer in his individual capacity. Hughes v. Blankenship, 672 F.2d 403, 405-06 (4th Cir. 1982). Here, Plaintiff's claims against Spartanburg County-and any other municipal Defendant-are subject to summary dismissal because she has not identified any governmental policy or custom to demonstrate municipal liability.
Plaintiff's Claims are Subject to Dismissal
Additionally, the Complaint as a whole is subject to summary dismissal because it is frivolous and fails to allege facts to support a plausible claim for relief. Liberally construed, the Complaint appears to assert that Defendants have engaged in a pattern of abuse and harassment by using technology to control Plaintiff to deprive her rights.
As noted, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 permits an indigent litigant to proceed in forma pauperis, which allows the litigant to commence a federal court action without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. See Staley v. Witherspoon, No. 9:07-cv-195-PMD-GCK, 2007 WL 1988272, at *1 (D.S.C. July 3, 2007). However, the statute provides limitations to such actions by permitting the Court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” or is “frivolous or malicious.” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)). A complaint is deemed frivolous when it is “clearly baseless” and includes allegations that are “fanciful,” “fantastic,” or “delusional.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 327-28 (1989)).
In reviewing for frivolousness or malice, the Court looks to see whether the Complaint raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios. Harley v. United States, 349 F.Supp.2d 980, 981 (M.D. N.C. 2004). Although the Court must accept all well-pled allegations and review the Complaint in a light most favorable to plaintiff, Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993), it is well-settled that the Court has the authority to dismiss claims that are obviously “fantastic” or “delusional,” Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994).
Here, the Complaint contains assertions that are barely comprehensible and manifestly delusional. Presuming that Plaintiff has set forth her statements sincerely, as assertions of fact, they cannot be given credibility. For example, the Complaint asserts that Defendants violated Plaintiff's rights by harassing and abusing her and using a mind control program on her. [See generally, Doc. 1.] The Court finds that Plaintiff's allegations clearly fall within the statute's definition of frivolity. McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting examples of frivolous claims include those whose factual allegations are “so nutty,” “delusional,” or “wholly fanciful” as to be simply “unbelievable.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Plaintiff's conclusory assertions fail to show any arguable basis in fact or law and Plaintiff fails to present allegations to support a claim for relief that is plausible. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325 (“A suit is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.”); see also Brock v. Angelone, 105 F.3d 952, 953-54 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding a prisoner's claim, that he was being poisoned or experimented upon via an ingredient in pancake syrup served at his prison, was fanciful or delusional, and dismissing the appeal as frivolous with sanctions); Neal v. Duke Energy, No. 6:11-cv-1420-HFF-KFM, 2011 WL 5083181, at *4 (D.S.C. June 30, 2011), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 5082193 (D.S.C. Oct. 26, 2011) (dismissing action upon finding plaintiff's factual allegations were frivolous, fanciful, and delusional where plaintiff claimed defendants clandestinely placed a GPS device in her car while it was in the shop for repairs and that she was being stalked by the defendants, noting the allegations were “made without any viable factual supporting allegations and appears to be the product of paranoid fantasy”); Feurtado v. McNair, No. 3:05-cv-1933-SB, 2006 WL 1663792, at *2 (D.S.C. Jun. 15, 2006) (noting that frivolousness encompasses inarguable legal conclusions and fanciful factual allegations), aff'd, 227 Fed.Appx. 303 (4th Cir. 2007). In sum, “Plaintiff's filings are so outlandish and unmoored from reality that the Court finds this entire action to be frivolous.” Anderson v. Dye, No. 5:21-cv-00168-MR, 2022 WL 1213619, at *3 (W.D. N.C. Apr. 25, 2022).
This Action is Duplicative
Additionally, this action should be dismissed as a duplicative action because Plaintiff has already filed several prior actions in this Court making similar frivolous claims to those she raises here. See, e.g., case numbers 7:19-cv-0376; 7:19-cv-0867; 7:19-cv-1077; 7:20-cv-0178, 7:20-cv-0829, 7:21-cv-1133, and 7:22-cv-1633, 7:23-cv-2182. Most of those cases were summarily dismissed. Here, Plaintiff again makes similar allegations concerning Defendants' abuse, harassment, and attempts to engage in mind control, as she did in her prior actions. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff's claims in the instant Complaint are substantially duplicative of the other action she previously filed in this Court. “Because district courts are not required to entertain duplicative or redundant lawsuits, they may dismiss such suits as frivolous pursuant to [section] 1915(e). Generally, a lawsuit is duplicative of another one if the parties, issues and available relief do not significantly differ between the two.” Cottle v. Bell, No. 00-6367, 2000 WL 1144623, at *1 (4th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Given the similarities between the allegations in the prior actions and those in the present action, Plaintiff's claims in this action should be dismissed as duplicative. See, e.g., Harrison v. South Carolina, 126 Fed.Appx. 100, 101 (4th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); see also Shaw v. Byars, No. 9-12-cv-2830-RBH, 2012 WL 6138325, at *2 (D.S.C. Dec. 11, 2012) (dismissing action as duplicative).
The Court takes judicial notice of Plaintiff's other cases filed in this Court, in which Plaintiff makes nearly identical claims as those raised in the instant case. See Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
In light of all the foregoing, this case should be dismissed as frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and for failure to state a claim under which relief may be granted pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss this action pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B) without issuance and service of process.
See Michau v. Charleston Cnty., 434 F.3d 725, 728 (4th Cir. 2006) (affirming the district court's dismissal of two complaints pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B), even though the plaintiff was not a prisoner, because the plaintiff was proceeding in forma pauperis).
The undersigned finds that, in light of all of the foregoing, Plaintiff cannot cure the deficiencies in her Complaint and that allowing Plaintiff to amend her pleadings therefore would be futile. This is so because, on the face of the Complaint, Plaintiff's allegations are frivolous. Further, this is at least the fifth action filed by Plaintiff making nearly identical frivolous claims. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the District Court decline to give Plaintiff an opportunity to amend. See Workman v. Kernell, No. 6:18-cv-00355-RBH-KFM, 2018 WL 4826535, at *2 n.7 (D.S.C. Oct. 2, 2018); Young v. Santos, No. GLR-16-cv-1321, 2018 WL 1583557, at *6 (D. Md. Apr. 2, 2018); McSwain v. Jobs, No. 1:13-cv-00890, 2014 WL 12672619, at *1 (M.D. N.C. Jan. 6, 2014) (“[G]iven the preposterous and frivolous nature of [the plaintiff's] complaint, it would be a waste of limited judicial resources to give him an opportunity to amend.”).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Suite 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).