Opinion
A24A0842
01-19-2024
THASHA BOYD v. DISABLED AMERICAN VETERANS, et al.
The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:
Thasha Boyd sued Disabled American Veterans ("DAV") and its employee, Matthew Jahn, for defamation. The trial court initially dismissed the case, but this Court reversed and remanded, finding that the allegations of the complaint were sufficient to set forth a claim for defamation. Boyd v. Disabled American Veterans, 349 Ga.App. 351 (826 S.E.2d 181) (2019). After the close of discovery in the trial court, DAV and Jahn moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted that motion, and this Court affirmed the judgment in an unpublished opinion. Boyd v. Disabled American Veterans, Case No. A20A1883 (January 12, 2021). Following remittitur, Boyd filed three post-trial motions: (1) a motion to set aside the judgment under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) (2); (2) a motion to strike the defendants' pleadings and the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the grounds that they violated Georgia's anti-SLAPP statute, OCGA § 9-11-11.1; and (3) a motion to recuse the trial judge. The trial court denied all three motions in a single order, and Boyd then filed this direct appeal.
Boyd's claims were based on sexual harassment complaints Jahn filed against Boyd with her employer, the Department of Veterans Affairs.
In that same order, the trial court also denied the defendants' motion for attorney fees under OCGA § 9-15-14 (b).
Both Boyd's motion to set aside and motion to strike sought to challenge a final judgment that this Court affirmed in a previous appeal. "It is axiomatic that the same issue cannot be relitigated ad infinitum. The same is true of appeals of the same issue on the same grounds." Jordan v. State, 253 Ga.App. 510, (2) (559 S.E.2d 528) (2002) (punctuation omitted). See also PHF II Buckhead LLC v. Dinku, 315 Ga.App. 76, 78-79 (1) (726 S.E.2d 569) (2012) (a decision of this Court constitutes res judicata, and bars subsequent appeals from the same judgment). Accordingly, our previous decision affirming the grant of summary judgment bars Boyd from challenging that judgment by way of a motion to set aside or motion to strike. See Jackson v. State, 273 Ga. 320, 320 (540 S.E.2d 612) (2001) (a party "is not entitled to another bite at the apple by way of a second appeal"); Hook v. Bergen, 286 Ga.App. 258, 261 (1) (649 S.E.2d 313) (2007).
Furthermore, the fact that the case is no longer pending in the court below moots the issues raised by Boyd's motion to recuse the trial judge. See Richards v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 325 Ga.App. 722, 726 (5) (b) (754 S.E.2d 770) (2014) (for appellate purposes, a motion is moot if a ruling would have no practical effect on the case); OCGA § 5-6-48 (b) (3) (an appeal may be dismissed when the questions presented have become moot).
Because the issues Boyd seeks to raise are barred by res judicata and/or are moot, this appeal is hereby DISMISSED.