Opinion
No. 05-05-01018-CR
Opinion issued April 27, 2006. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5, Grayson County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 2000-2-311. Affirmed.
Before Justices WRIGHT, O'NEILL, and FRANCIS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Latonia Bowman appeals her conviction for theft by check. After appellant pleaded guilty, the trial court deferred a finding of guilt and placed appellant on community supervision for eighteen months. Thereafter, the trial court amended its conditions of supervision and extended the period of supervision by six months. The State later filed a motion to adjudicate guilt and after a hearing, the trial court granted the State's motion, adjudicated appellant guilty and assessed punishment at 180 days' confinement. In a single issue, appellant contends the trial court violated her due course of law protections under the Texas Constitution by extending the period of supervision without consent, notice, or a hearing. After reviewing the record, we conclude appellant has failed to preserve this complaint for our review. Thus, we overrule appellant's issue and affirm the trial court's judgment. Appellant was advised at the time she was placed on probation that the trial court could, at any time during the period of probation, alter or amend the terms and conditions of her community supervision. At the adjudication hearing, appellant argued that, because the State failed to show she agreed to the modification in writing, she was entitled to a hearing pursuant to section 10(e) of article 42.12 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. On appeal, however, appellant maintains the trial court violated her due course of law protections under the Texas Constitution by extending the period of supervision without consent, notice, or a hearing. Because appellant failed to raise her due course of law complaint in the trial court, she has failed to preserve that issue for our review. See Speth v. State, 6 S.W.3d 530, 534 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) (probation conditions not objected to are affirmatively accepted as terms of contract and by failing to object, defendant affirmatively waives any rights encroached upon by those terms); Briggs v. State, 789 S.W.2d 918, 924 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990) (due process/due course of law complaints waived by failing to object); Belt v. State, 127 S.W.3d 277, 282 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (appellant waived due process complaints about probation conditions by failing to object in trial court). We overrule appellant's sole issue. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Article 42.12, section 10(d) provides that a judge who has placed a defendant on community supervision may authorize the supervision officer or a magistrate to modify the conditions of community supervision for the limited purpose of transferring the defendant to different programs within the community supervision continuum of programs and sanctions. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 10(d) (Vernon Supp. 2005). In such a case, if the defendant does not agree to the modification in writing, the supervision officer or magistrate must refer the case to the trial judge for modification pursuant to article 42.12, section 22. Id. § 10(e).