Opinion
No. 1D21-3172.
04-19-2023
Ryan Todd LE BOSS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Kenneth Padowitz and Joshua Padowitz of Kenneth D. Padowitz, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellant. Ashley Moody , Attorney General, and Michael L. Schaub , Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Kenneth Padowitz and Joshua Padowitz of Kenneth D. Padowitz, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody , Attorney General, and Michael L. Schaub , Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Winokur, J.
Ryan Todd Le Boss appeals his convictions for manslaughter and leaving the scene of a crash involving death, which were imposed following a no-contest plea. Le Boss reserved his right to challenge the denial of a motion to suppress. The State argues that the issue was not dispositive and that the State did not stipulate to dispositiveness. We agree and affirm.
I
In 2020, Le Boss was driving with a passenger, Eileen Bocca. The parties were arguing when Le Boss pulled over and pushed Bocca out of the truck. Le Boss tried to drive away with the passenger door still open and while Bocca clung to the passenger-side of the truck. Eventually, Bocca lost her grip on the seatbelt, fell out of the vehicle, and was run over. Le Boss then drove off without rendering any aid, and Bocca died from her injuries.
During the initial investigation, law enforcement officers interviewed four eyewitnesses. They learned that the perpetrator operated a lifted, black pickup truck on Interstate-75; that the perpetrator looked to be a "white male in his 30's or 40's;" that the truck included a specialty license plate; and that the first letter on the license plate was an "L" and the second letter was shaped like a "B." All four eyewitnesses described how a woman hung on to the side of the truck as it continued to move along the shoulder. Two of the witnesses observed Bocca being run over by the truck, and all of the witnesses observed the truck drive off without stopping to check on her. One of the witnesses followed the truck for a few miles and observed the perpetrator toss a pink bra out of the vehicle. This witness was able to take pictures of the vehicle, which allowed the officers to see that the truck was lifted and was black, as well as the specialty license plate.
The officers also contacted Bocca's husband. He informed them that he was in the midst of a divorce proceeding with Bocca; that Bocca was in a romantic relationship with a man named "Ryan;" and that "Ryan" drove a "black jacked up" pickup truck. Bocca's husband also provided a phone number for "Ryan." With this information, the officers were able to match the phone number with the driver's license information for Le Boss and locate Le Boss' house in Columbia County. Their research also disclosed that Le Boss' truck was black, that he had a specialty license plate, and that his license plate number partially matched the eyewitness description. Bocca's husband also informed officers that, according to Bocca's son, Bocca left with "Ryan" on the day of the incident. By this point, Le Boss was undoubtedly the prime suspect.
When the officers arrived at Le Boss' house, they encountered a secluded property that was surrounded by a chain link fence with a padlocked gate. From outside of the fence, the officers were unable to ascertain whether anyone was home or whether there was a vehicle on the property. The officers entered the property and surrounded the house to secure the area. Upon noticing a black truck on the property, the officers did not go towards the truck, touch the truck, attempt to enter the truck, or document the truck in any way. Instead, they focused on securing the perimeter and locating Le Boss. Once the area was secure, an officer used the loudspeaker in his patrol car to contact Le Boss and direct him to exit the house. Le Boss eventually stepped outside. He initially waived his Miranda rights and told the officers about the dashboard camera in his truck. Because Le Boss refused to consent to a search of his truck, the officers obtained a search warrant based on information that they gathered prior to entering Le Boss' property and statements made by Le Boss to the officers before being arrested.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
The State charged Le Boss with second-degree murder, manslaughter, and leaving the scene of a crash involving death. Le Boss filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained during the search of his truck. Le Boss claimed that, without first obtaining a search warrant, the officers unlawfully cut the lock on the gate around his house, entered his property, and conducted a search of the premises. Le Boss argued that his truck was discovered and "effectively seized" from the curtilage of his home in violation of his constitutional rights. As a result, he claimed that any evidence discovered upon or within the truck should be excluded. Regarding video evidence from the dashboard camera, he argued that exclusion was necessary because the search warrant included an overly broad list of items sought to be searched. Le Boss also sought to exclude statements made to the officers as "fruit of an illegal arrest." At the hearing, Le Boss attempted to connect the illegal entry to the search of the truck by arguing that the officers could not have obtained a search warrant had they not illegally entered the property because, prior to the entry, the officers were unaware of the truck's whereabouts.
The State responded that the officers entered Le Boss' property without first obtaining a search warrant based on fear for officer safety and exigent circumstances. The officers were aware of prior instances of violent behavior from Le Boss and unsure of whether he was armed. In addition to concerns for officer safety, the eyewitness account of the perpetrator tossing an item of women's clothing out of the truck shortly after leaving the scene led the officers to believe that more evidence may be destroyed if they did not act quickly. In sum, the State claimed that the officers entered Le Boss' property for the sole purpose of effecting an arrest for which they had probable cause. The State argued that the evidence should not be excluded because the illegal entry did not result in anything more than the location and arrest of Le Boss. Instead, it was Le Boss' statements to the officers after he was arrested and the evidence that was uncovered prior to the officers' entry that formed the basis for the search warrant.
The trial court ultimately denied Le Boss' motion to suppress.
Pursuant to agreement with the State, Le Boss entered a plea of nolo contendere to manslaughter and leaving the scene of a crash involving death. Le Boss agreed to a sentence of fifteen years in prison, followed by fifteen years of probation, in exchange for the State's agreement to enter a nolle prosequi on the second-degree murder charge. The plea agreement included the following term: "[Le Boss] specifically reserves his right to appeal the court[`]s denial of his motion to suppress evidence."
At the change of plea hearing, Le Boss confirmed that he intended to reserve his right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. There was no discussion at the hearing whether the motion to suppress was dispositive of the case, and Le Boss never sought the trial court's position on this issue. While the prosecutor signed the plea agreement in which Le Boss indicated that he was reserving his right to appeal, the record does not show any agreement that the issue was dispositive of the prosecution.
II
A defendant may not appeal a judgment or sentence following a guilty or no-contest plea "without expressly reserving the right to appeal a legally dispositive issue." § 924.051(4), Fla. Stat.; see also Leonard v. State, 760 So.2d 114, 118 (Fla. 2000) (construing section 924.051(4) as codifying the limitations on what may be appealed following a plea). Stated another way, "[a] defendant may only appeal an issue after a guilty plea if the issue is expressly reserved and dispositive." Massey v. State, 324 So.3d 40 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (emphasis added). "Dispositive" means that "the defendant will not face further prosecution if he or she prevails on appeal." Churchill v. State, 219 So.3d 14, 18 (2017).
While section 924.051(4) provides this sole method for an appeal following a guilty or no-contest plea, Rule 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii) permits other types of appeals following guilty or no-contest pleas that are not relevant here.
The purpose of the dispositiveness requirement bears mentioning:
The requirement that an issue appealed following a guilty plea be dispositive is no mere procedural hurdle placed before defendants to limit review. Instead, it is necessary to effectuate the overriding rule that a guilty plea ends proceedings in the trial court. The dispositiveness requirement ensures that, regardless of whether the defendant wins or loses on appeal, the proceedings in the trial court ended with the plea and resulting judgment.
Hicks v. State, 277 So.3d 153, 167 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (Winokur, J., concurring).
An issue is treated as dispositive for purposes of section 924.051(4) if the State stipulates that the issue is dispositive. Id. at 17 (holding that "the district courts have jurisdiction to review the merits of a conditional no contest plea when the State stipulates that an issue reserved for appeal is dispositive of the case"). "In such circumstances, there is no need for the trial court nor the appellate court to determine whether a particular issue will end the case [that is, is dispositive] because the stipulation of dispositiveness establishes that the State cannot or will not continue with its prosecution if the defendant prevails on appeal." Id.
Thus, when the State stipulates to dispositiveness, it is not merely agreeing that a defendant's victory on appeal will exclude evidence to be used at trial; in fact, it is agreeing that a defendant's victory on appeal ends the prosecution, regardless of whether the appealed issue was actually dispositive. The State gives up its ability to prosecute a crime—a crime for which it has already secured a plea—when it stipulates to dispositiveness. For this reason, a stipulation of dispositiveness should be clear: it cannot simply be presumed from the fact that the State has entered into a plea agreement, even when the agreement mentions that the defendant wishes to reserve an issue for appeal.
In this case, nothing in the record shows that the State stipulated that the issue raised in the suppression motion was dispositive of the prosecution; in fact, dispositiveness was never mentioned at all. The agreement the prosecutor signed does not indicate that the issue was dispositive, and we will not infer such stipulation from the agreement itself. Accordingly, we are not bound by Churchill to accept the appealed issue as dispositive.
Without a State stipulation to dispositiveness, Le Boss cannot prevail in this appeal unless the reserved issue was actually dispositive of the case, which we now address. § 924.051(4), Fla. Stat.; see also Holden v. State, 90 So.3d 902, 903 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (holding that the lack of a State stipulation of dispositiveness "defer[s] the determination to this court"). "An issue is dispositive only when it is clear that there will be no trial, regardless of the outcome of the appeal." Williams v. State, 134 So.3d 975, 976 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012); Hicks v. State, 277 So.3d 153, 155 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019); see also Vaughn v. State, 711 So.2d 64, 66 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) ("[T]he correct legal test of dispositiveness is whether the state would have been able to proceed to trial without the evidence."). A motion to suppress is generally considered dispositive if the evidence that is the subject of the motion is necessary to obtain a conviction. See Morgan v. State, 486 So.2d 1356, 1357 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) ("A typical example of dispositiveness is where the trial court has entered a pretrial order denying a motion to suppress drugs in a drug case. Such a ruling is dispositive if the state has no other evidence with which it can proceed to trial against the defendant."); Tiller v. State, 330 So.2d 792, 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) ("The record at the time of the tender of the plea of nolo contendere should show clearly that the state's case against the accused cannot succeed without use of the evidence sought to be suppressed.").
Here, suppression of the evidence that was the subject of the motion would not have completely frustrated the State's case as it already had ample evidence against Le Boss before the warrantless entry. For instance, there were several eyewitnesses who saw a lifted, black truck with a specialty license plate run over Bocca and then drive away. Bocca died as a result of those injuries. Bocca's husband provided the officers with a name and phone number for her boyfriend, "Ryan." He also informed them that Bocca's boyfriend drove a lifted, black truck and that Bocca left with the boyfriend earlier that day. With this information, the officers were able to determine the identity of Bocca's boyfriend, Ryan Todd Le Boss, and that Le Boss drove a black truck that had a specialty license plate. The license plate number partially matched the information provided by an eyewitness.
With this evidence, we find that the State would have been able to proceed to trial, even if the trial court had granted the motion to suppress, on any of the counts with which it charged Le Boss. As a result, the order denying the motion to suppress was not dispositive of the case against Le Boss. And because Le Boss did not reserve a dispositive issue, section 924.051(4) forecloses any relief on appeal.
AFFIRMED.
Osterhaus and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.