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Bortman v. Lucander

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.
May 4, 2017
150 A.D.3d 417 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017)

Opinion

05-04-2017

Dawn BORTMAN, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Henry LUCANDER, Defendant–Appellant.

The Mintz Fraade Law Firm, PC, New York (Alan P. Fraade of counsel), for appellant.


The Mintz Fraade Law Firm, PC, New York (Alan P. Fraade of counsel), for appellant.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Alice Schlesinger, J.), entered June 4, 2014, which granted the petition to confirm a FINRA arbitration award, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

An arbitral award can only be challenged under the criteria set forth in CPLR 7511 (see Ingham v. Thompson, 113 A.D.3d 534, 980 N.Y.S.2d 385 [1st Dept.2014], lv. denied 22 N.Y.3d 866, 2014 WL 1362241 [2014] ). Respondent's procedural arguments that there was an agreement to arbitrate in New York and that the panel should have adjourned the hearing are not recognized grounds to bar confirmation (id.; CPLR 7510 ). In any event, they were waived by his participation in the arbitration, through his answer, selection of arbitrators, two motions to remove arbitrators, and two motions to dismiss (see Matter of Meisels v. Uhr, 79 N.Y.2d 526, 538, 583 N.Y.S.2d 951, 593 N.E.2d 1359 [1992] ).

Although an agreement can supersede FINRA's arbitration rules (see Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Golden Empire Sch. Fin. Auth., 764 F.3d 210, 215 [2d Cir.2014] ), the alleged agreement here was never placed into the record, and even accepting respondent's characterization, it still provided for arbitration, albeit in New York rather than Florida.

Similarly, respondent's argument with regard to the failure to adjourn is unavailing. Not only is it not a ground under CPLR 7511, but even under the Federal Arbitration Act, refusal to adjourn where a party has full notice and provides no excuse for not attending is not misconduct (see 9 USC 10 [a] [3]; ARW Expl. Corp. v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d 1455, 1464 [10th Cir.1995] ).

Respondent's arguments of arbitrator bias are cognizable; however, he failed to substantiate them. His allegations that one arbitrator was biased because he was once bankrupt, and another because he had once represented a claimant at a FINRA arbitration, are insufficient (see generally Matter of CPG Constr. & Dev. Corp. v. 415 Greenwich Fee Owner, LLC, 117 A.D.3d 623, 986 N.Y.S.2d 467 [1st Dept.2014] ).

Finally, we decline to consider respondent's argument based on standing, which is predicated on documents and factual allegations never presented to the FINRA arbitration panel, as a basis to deny confirmation.

SWEENY, J.P., GISCHE, KAHN, GESMER, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

Bortman v. Lucander

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.
May 4, 2017
150 A.D.3d 417 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017)
Case details for

Bortman v. Lucander

Case Details

Full title:Dawn BORTMAN, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Henry LUCANDER, Defendant–Appellant.

Court:Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.

Date published: May 4, 2017

Citations

150 A.D.3d 417 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017)
2017 N.Y. Slip Op. 3600
51 N.Y.S.3d 401

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