Opinion
Index 608750/2020
08-10-2021
MADISON BOOTH, on behalf of herself and all Others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. MOLLGY COLLEGE, Defendant.
Unpublished Opinion
Submitted: 8/2/2021
DECISION AND ORDER
HON. THOMAS RADEMAKER, J.S.C.
The following papers were read on this motion: Defendant's Notice of Motion, Affirmation, Affidavit, Memorandum Of Law and Exhibits (motion sequence 001).............................1
Defendant's Notice of Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, Affirmation, Affidavit, Memorandum of Law and Exhibits (motion sequence 002)........................................................ 2
Affirmation in Opposition and Memorandum of Law In Opposition and Exhibits (002)......................................................... 3
Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Reply.......................................... 4
The Defendant moves by Notice of Motion for an Order pursuant to CPLR Section 3211(a)(1) and CPLR Section 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint (motion sequence 001), and subsequently moved by Notice of Motion (motion sequence 0.02), to dismiss the Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and CPLR Section 3211(a)(7).
On November 19, 2020, the parties entered a Stipulation which permitted the Plaintiff to file and serve an Amended Complaint, and in Which the Defendant Was permitted to withdraw Motion Sequence 001 without prejudice to re-filing same. The Plaintiff filed its Amended complaint and the moving papers to dismiss same (motion sequence 002) were submitted within the parameters of the parties' stipulation.
The Defendant, however, did not formally Withdraw motion sequence 001, which the Court hereby DISMISSES as MOOT.
The Defendant is a private college that offers numerous major fields for undergraduate and graduate students. The College is located in Nassau County, New York. According to Plaintiff, yearly tuition at the college costs "$15,665 for undergraduate students" plus additional mandatory fees. These additional fees include a graduation application fee of about $220, class fees of various amounts, a student activities fee of $100, a technology fee of approximately $260, and various other fees. For the Spring 2020 semester, Plaintiff allegedly paid about $15,665 in tuition and $1,011 in Mandatory Fees.
Plaintiff contends that Defendant retained the full amount of tuition and fees, despite being able to provide students, like Plaintiff, with the in-person opportunities that Plaintiff bargained for, contracted for, and then paid for. Plaintiff claims the $15,665 and the additional student fees of more than $1, 0.00 were made in consideration for in-person and on-campus educational services. Plaintiff further contends that these promises can be found in Plaintiffs application materials, including marketing, advertisements, and other public representations. The Amended Complaint provides that the "College failed to off any refunds, provide any discounts, or apply any credit to Plaintiff and class members' other semesters," and the Plaintiff seeks a pro-rata refund of tuition and fees, on behalf of herself and a class of students who attended the College during the Spring 2020 semester.
Molly College's Spring 2020 semester began on January 13, 2020. The first positive COVID-19 case of Nassau County was announced on March 6. On March 7, 2020, Andrew Cuomo, Governor of New York, promulgated Executive Order No. 202, which declared a state of emergency in New York with respect to the COVID-19 virus. On or around March 10, 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Defendant cancelled all in-person education and transitioned to all online learning for the remainder of the semester and did not provide in-person and on-campus educational services.
On March 13, 2020, the President of the United States declared a National Emergency in connection with the global pandemic. (Pres, Proclamation No, 9994, 85 F.R. 15337 [March 13, 2020]), On March 16, 2020, Governor Cuomo further ordered "every school in the state of New York" to close by March 18, 2020 for a period of 2 Weeks. (N.Y. Exee Order No, 202.4 [Mar. 16, 2020]). On March 27, 2020, Governor Cuomo issued an executive order extending the closure of all schools in New York State through May 15, 2020. (N.Y. Exec. Order 202.18 [Apr. 16, 2020]), Further, it was ordered on May 7, 2020, through an executive order, that all New York State schools were to remain closed for the remainder of the school year. (N.Y. Exec. Order 202.28 [May 7, 2020]).
After suspending all in-person classes and closing its residence halls. Defendant issued pro-rated refunds for room and board costs for the remainder of the semester. Students who were to graduate in the Spring 2020, were refunded half of their graduation application fee. However, the Defendant did not refund fees for those services that it continued to provide to students remotely.
The Plaintiff filed claims against the Defendant for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion and theft of property, both in her individual capacity and on behalf of the members of a similarly situated class. The class that Plaintiff seeks to represent are “[a]ll persons who paid tuition and/or Mandatory Fees for a student to attend in-person class(es) during the semester affected by Covid-19 at Molloy College, including the Spring 2020 and Summer 2020 semesters, but had their classes and educational experience moved to only learnings."
Plaintiff alleges breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion and theft of property against the College, Plaintiff claims that she allegedly entered into a contract with the College for "in person educational services, experiences, opportunities and other related collegiate services," The Plaintiff further claims that when the College decided to Cancel in-person classes and only offer online instruction, the contract was allegedly breached.
The Defendant seeks dismissal of the Amended Complaint and contends that the Plaintiff, who attended her classes for the entirety of the Spring 2020 semester arid graduated from Malloy without interruption, had not been harmed by the disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The Defendant contends it had followed the federal and state government mandates tor school closure and essentially contends that the Plaintiff s claims, while sounding in breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion, are in essence claims of educational malpractice, a tort which is not recognized Under New York State Law.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a breach of contract claim need only allege: (1) the existence of an agreement; (2) adequate performance of that agreement by the plaintiff; (3) breach of the agreement by the defendant; and (4) resulting damages. (Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337, 348 [2d. Cir. 1996]), Specific to universities, an implied contract "is formed when a university accepts a student for enrollment.” (Papeline v. Albany Coll. of Pharmacy, 633 F.2d 81, 93 [2d Cir. 2011]). The implied contract between a collage and a student tasks the student with complying with the college's terms and completing its required courses, and in return the student is awarded a degree. (Id.) But also implicit in that contract is a requirement that the university "act in good faith in its dealing with its students." (Id.)
However, "[t]he application of contract principles to the student-university relationship does not provide judicial recourse for every disgruntled student. "(Faiz v. Colgate Univ., 64 F.Supp.3d 336, 359 [N.D.N.Y. 2014]). Instead, "only specific promises, .. in a school's bulletins, circulars, and handbooks, which are material to the student's relationship with the school" are enforceable." (Keefe v. N.Y, Law School, 71 A.D.3d 569, 897 N.Y.S.2d 94, 95 [Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2010]). In other words, "[g]eneral policy statements and broad and unspecified procedures and guidelines will not suffice." (Doe v. Syracuse Univ., 440 F.Supp.3d 158, 175 [N, D.N, Y. 2020]).
Proving an unjust enrichment claim under New York law requires a plaintiff to prove: "(1) that the defendant benefitted; (2) at the plaintiff s expense; and (3) that equity and good conscience require restitution." (Beth Israel Med. Ctr. y. Horizon Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N. J., Inc., 448 F.3d 573, 586 [2d Cir. 2006]). Unjust enrichment is a quasi-contractual theory of recovery that exists in the absence of an affirmative agreement. (Id. at 586-87).
By extension, the existence of an enforceable, written contract will typically preclude a recovery for a quasi-contractual Claim, including for unjust enrichment (EUA Cogenex Corp. v, N. Rockland Cent. Sch. Dist., 124 F.Supp.2d 861, 873-74 [S.D.N.Y. 2000]). In Other words, an unjust enrichment claim is "not available where it simply duplicates, or replaces, a conventional contract or tort claim." (Goldemberg v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Cos., Inc., 8 F.Supp.3d 467, 483 [S.D.N.Y. 2014]).
However, if the subject-matter of an unjust enrichment claim "is not covered by a valid, enforceable contractual obligation, “that claim is not duplicative and need not be dismissed based solely on the existence of a breach of contract claim. (See, e.g., Spirit Locker, Inc. v. EVO Direct, LLC, 696 F.Supp.2d 296, 305 [E.D.N.Y. 2010]) In the case St bar, the Plaintiff contends the Defendant's alleged suggestions of value for its in-person programming makes it an injustice for the Defendants to retain portions of the Plaintiffs' tuition, housing, and other costs.
New York law defines conversion as "the unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over goods belonging to an other to the exclusion of the owner's rights," (Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut Ins. Co., 460 F.3d 400, 403-04 [2d Cir. 2006]). To prove that claim out, a plaintiff must allege: "(1) the property subject to conversion is a specific identifiable thing; (2) plaintiff had ownership, possession, or control over the property before its conversion; and (3) defendant exercised an unauthorized dominion over the thing in question, to the alteration of its condition or to the exclusion of the plaintiffs rights." (Moses v. Martin, 360 F.Supp.2d 533, 541 [S.D.N.Y. 2004]).
However, conversion cannot enforce a simple obligation to pay money (see Ehrlich v. Howe, 848 F.Supp. 482, 492 [S.D.N.Y.1994]) unless the money is in the form of a "specific, identifiable fund" subject to "an obligation to return or otherwise treat in a particular manner." (Mfrs. Hanover Tr. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 160 A.D.2d 113 [1st Dep't 1990). Additionally, "[a] conversion claim may only succeed if the party alleges a wrong that is distinct from any contractual obligations," (Command Cinema Corp. v. VCA Labs, Inc., 464 P. Supp. 2d 191, 199 [S.D.N.Y. 2006]).
Ultimately, on a motion to dismiss brought under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the Court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (Leon y Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 87-88 [1994] [citations omitted]). Ambiguous allegations must be resolved in the plaintiffs favor (see JF Capital Advisors, LLC v Lightstone Group, LLC, 25 N.Y.3d 759, 764 [2015]), "The motion must be denied if from the pleadings' four comers factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law" (511 West 232nd Owners Corp, v Jennifer Realty Co., 98 N.Y.2d 144, 152[2002] [internal citations omitted]), "Whether a plaintiff can ultimately establish its allegations is not part of the calculus in determining a motion to dismiss" (Cortlandt St, Recovery Corp. v Bonderman, 31 N.Y.3d 30, 38 [2018]), but a pleading consisting of "bare legal conclusions" is insufficient (Leder v Spiegel, 31 A.D.3d 266, 267, [1st Dept 2006], affd 9 N.Y.3d 836 [2007], cert denied sub nom Spiegel v Rowland, 552 U.S. 1257 [2008]) and "the court is not required to accept tactual allegations that are plainly contradicted by the documentary evidence or legal conclusions that are unsupportable based upon the undisputed facts" (Robinson v Robinson, 303 A.D.2d 234 [1st Dept 2003]; Vargas v Citi Parking, 2021 NY Slip Op 31210[U], *3-4 [Sup Ct, NY County 2021])
Accepting the allegations as presented by the Plaintiff in her Amended Complaint as truthful, and upon careful review of the papers and exhibits provided by the parties herein, the Court find that the Amended Complaint raises questions of fact and accordingly, the Defendant's motion to dismiss is DENIED, and it is
ORDERED, that the Defendant is to file its Answer within 30 days of service of notice of entry of this Decision and Order.
The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.