Opinion
A-13925
04-03-2024
ELIJAH EUGENE BOOS, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
David T. McGee, Attorney at Law, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Ann B. Black, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the District Court, Third Judicial District, Palmer, Trial Court No. 3PA-19-01588 CR Thomas V. Jamgochian, Judge.
David T. McGee, Attorney at Law, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Ann B. Black, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Harbison, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Elijah Eugene Boos was charged with two counts of fourth-degree assault: one against his girlfriend, Cynthia Lee, and the other against Lee's roommate, Leanna Crimmins, who intervened in the altercation between Boos and Lee. At a bench trial, Boos argued that he was acting in self-defense. The district court accepted Boos's claim of self-defense with respect to Lee, but rejected that claim with respect to Crimmins. The court therefore acquitted Boos of assaulting Lee and convicted him of assaulting Crimmins.
AS 11.41.230(a)(1) and AS 11.41.230(a)(3), respectively.
On appeal, Boos argues that it was inconsistent for the district court to accept Boos's claim of self-defense with respect to one assailant but reject it with respect to the other. "When a defendant is tried for two crimes and is convicted of one but acquitted of the other, the conviction must be reversed if the jury's verdicts are logically inconsistent with each other." But verdicts must be upheld unless they are "irreconcilably in conflict," meaning "necessarily" or "strictly inconsistent." Verdicts are not strictly inconsistent if the record "reveals a basis upon which the . . . verdict can rationally be explained."
Brown v. Anchorage, 915 P.2d 654, 660 (Alaska App. 1996) (citing DeSacia v. State, 469 P.2d 369, 378 (Alaska 1970)).
Davenport v. State, 543 P.2d 1204, 1207 (Alaska 1975) (quoting DeSacia, 469 P.2d at 373, 378); see also Wightman v. State, 2010 WL 2163144, at *1-2 (Alaska App. May 26, 2010) (unpublished) (finding inconsistent verdicts in a bench trial).
Davenport, 543 P.2d at 1208.
Boos asserts on appeal that he reasonably believed that Crimmins was acting in concert with Lee when Crimmins joined the fray. He further asserts that, given this belief, if the district court concluded that Boos was acting in self-defense with respect to Lee, the court was required to conclude that Boos was also acting in selfdefense with respect to Crimmins.
This argument, however, is premised on the assertion that Boos reasonably believed that Crimmins was acting in concert with Lee. The district court never made explicit findings on this issue, but it had reason to reject Boos's claim that he reasonably believed Crimmins was acting in concert with Lee. At trial, Boos was asked if he felt that "it was wrong for Ms. Crimmins to intervene in between [him] and Ms. Lee." Boos replied, "Absolutely not. If I stepped out and seen what she had seen, I probably would've done the same thing."
Under these circumstances, the district court could reasonably conclude that Boos did not believe that Crimmins was acting in concert with Lee's unlawful use of force and instead understood, or should have understood, that Crimmins reasonably misread the situation. Based on this conclusion, the court could further find that Boos did not believe that Crimmins was acting unlawfully, nor that it was necessary to use force against Crimmins in self-defense. Although the district court did not make explicit findings on these issues, the court asked the parties if they would like any additional findings at the end of trial, and both parties declined.
See AS 11.81.330(a) (establishing, subject to certain exceptions, that "[a] person is justified in using nondeadly force upon another when and to the extent the person reasonably believes it is necessary for self-defense against what the person reasonably believes to be the use of unlawful force by the other person").
Because there was a logical reason to accept Boos's claim of self-defense with respect to Lee and reject it with respect to Crimmins - i.e., because the record "reveals a basis upon which the . . . verdict can rationally be explained" - the verdicts in this case were not "irreconcilably in conflict."
Davenport, 543 P.2d at 1208.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.