Opinion
No. 05-14-01207-CR
01-20-2016
BRITTANY RAE BOOKER, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3 Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 003-83858-2014
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Francis, Evans, and Stoddart
Opinion by Justice Stoddart
A jury convicted Brittany Rae Booker of the misdemeanor offense of interference with public duties. Booker was arrested when she refused to comply with requests from a police officer who was working to resolve a bomb threat at a bank. In a single issue, Booker challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
BACKGROUND
Michael Smith, an officer with the Dallas Police Department (DPD), was working at the scene of a bank robbery where the perpetrator left behind a device that appeared to be a bomb. In preparation for DPD's bomb squad to execute a controlled detonation of the device, Smith established a perimeter around the bank that limited vehicular and pedestrian traffic.
The bomb squad requested the perimeter be expanded before it detonated the device, which included closing Frankford Road to traffic. While expanding the perimeter, DPD officers encountered Booker, who was on foot. They asked her to move away from the area and she initially complied. However, Smith saw Booker a few minutes later standing on a public sidewalk along Frankford Road in an area the officers were closing off. Smith approached Booker and told her DPD was about to detonate the potential bomb. He testified:
. . . I said, you need to move back. And she said, you're [sic] car is right there, why can't I be here? I said there is a bomb right there, we're about to explode it. Well, you're here, why can't I be here? Because if the shrapnel gets you, you know, I'm going to be blamed. And we go on for a little bit. . . . And I said, you know, if you're not going to move, I'm going to arrest you for interfering with the proceedings that's going on here with the investigation. And we went on for a little bit more.While Smith interacted with Booker, the bomb squad inquired by radio whether Smith had secured the expanded perimeter to which he responded, "negative," because of Booker's presence within the expanded perimeter.
In order to return to his original assignment and close the road, Smith asked another officer to arrest Booker. A third officer was then called to the scene and away from his patrol duties to assist with Booker's arrest, further delaying the detonation. Smith testified that Booker's refusal to evacuate the area after being told to do so caused an interruption, impediment, disruption, or interference. Another officer testified Booker's actions kept the police from being able to clear a parking lot.
Booker videotaped the entire encounter and the video was played for the jury.
LAW & ANALYSIS
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal offense for which the State has the burden of proof under the single sufficiency standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Acosta v. State, 429 S.W.3d 621, 624-25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Under this standard, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (footnotes omitted).
It is the factfinder's duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Id. We determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Id. When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict and therefore defer to that determination. Id. Direct and circumstantial evidence are treated equally: circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. Id.
As applicable here, a person commits the offense of Interference With Public Duties if the person acting ". . . with criminal negligence interrupts, disrupts, impedes, or otherwise interferes with: (1) a peace officer while the peace officer is performing a duty or exercising authority imposed or granted by law." TEX. PENAL CODE. ANN. § 38.15(a)(1). It is a defense to prosecution if the "interruption, disruption, impediment, or interference alleged consisted of speech only." Id. § 38.15(d). On appeal, Booker argues that because she was merely questioning Smith's commands, her conduct amounted to speech only and was not an offense under section 38.15.
Smith asked Booker to "move back" from where she was standing multiple times and explained to Booker that a potential bomb was about to be detonated. Booker refused. The area where Booker stood was within the expanded perimeter requested by the bomb squad. At the time of his encounter with Booker, Smith was supposed to be stopping traffic on Frankford Road. However, he could not execute that task because Booker would not follow his instructions. He testified Booker caused an interruption, impediment, disruption, or interference.
By her refusal to move, Booker impeded Smith's ability to stop traffic on Frankford Road, interfered with another officer's ability to clear a parking lot, and delayed the detonation. Only after Booker was arrested were the police able to secure the area, including closing Frankford Road, and the potential bomb was detonated.
Viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Booker's physical presence on the sidewalk that was inside of the perimeter and her refusal to move, rather than the words she spoke to Smith, impeded and interfered with Smith's duties. Her conduct amounted to more than speech alone, and the evidence is sufficient to support her conviction. We overrule her sole issue.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
/Craig Stoddart/
CRAIG STODDART
JUSTICE Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
141207F.U05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3, Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 003-83858-2014.
Opinion delivered by Justice Stoddart. Justices Francis and Evans participating.
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. Judgment entered this 20th day of January, 2016.