Opinion
FBTCV175032998
11-07-2017
Ethan Book v. Michael M. Garrett et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS
Richard E. Arnold, Judge.
The defendants have filed a motion to dismiss this action, arguing that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, the defendants state that the present action presents a non-justiciable controversy which the court lacks the power to resolve. The defendants have filed a memorandum of law in support of their motion and a reply to the plaintiff's objection. The plaintiff has filed his objection and his memorandum of law, as well as, a sur-reply. The court heard oral argument on July 31, 2017.
The plaintiff's complaint is dated May 12, 2017 and bears a return date of June 13, 2017. The plaintiff alleges, and the defendants admit, that the plaintiff is a member of the Bridgeport Republican Town Committee (" BRTC"). The defendant Garrett is the chairman of the BRTC. The plaintiff complains that since 2015, he has been requesting copies of documents from the BRTC, but has not received any response to his requests. Specifically, the plaintiff seeks copies of the minutes of monthly meetings, various financial statements and audit reports. He also seeks current listings of BRTC membership by District; current listings of all BRTC Committees. The plaintiff seeks a declaratory relief pursuant to General Statutes § 52-29, that the defendants' actions in refusing to grant the plaintiff's repeated requests for information has been improper, negligent, arbitrary, as well as, a breach of contract and a breach of a social contract. The plaintiff additionally seeks injunctive relief pursuant to General Statutes § 52-471, to enjoin and prohibit the defendants from refusing the plaintiff's requests for information.
General Statutes § 52-29 reads as follows:
General Statutes § 52-471 reads as follows:
" Jurisdiction of the subject-matter is the power [of the court] to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong . . . A court has subject matter jurisdiction if it has the authority to adjudicate a particular type of legal controversy . . . [O]nce the question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised, [it] must be disposed of no matter in what form it is presented . . . and the court must fully resolve it before proceeding further with the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Figueroa v. C& S Ball Bearing, 237 Conn. 1, 4, 675 A.2d 845 (1996). If it becomes apparent to the court that such jurisdiction is lacking, the case must be dismissed. State v. Anonymous, 240 Conn. 708, 718, 694 A.2d 766 (1997). A case that is non-justiciable must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Kleinman v. Marshall, 192 Conn. 479, 484, 472 A.2d 772 (1984).
The principles that underlie justiciability are well established. " Justiciability requires (1) that there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute . . . (2) that the interests of the parties be adverse . . . (3) that the matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated by judicial power . . . and (4) that the determination of the controversy will result in practical relief to the complainant." (Citations omitted.) Nielsen v. State, 236 Conn. 1, 6-7, 670 A.2d 1288 (1996).
" The [declaratory judgment] procedure has the distinct advantage of affording to the court in granting any relief consequential to its determination of rights the opportunity of tailoring that relief to the particular circumstances." Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 627, 376 A.2d 359 (1977). A declaratory judgment action is not, however, " a procedural panacea for use on all occasions, " but, rather, is limited to solving justiciable controversies. Liebeskind v. Waterbury, 142 Conn. 155, 158-59, 112 A.2d 208 (1955). Invoking the mechanism of declaratory relief under General Statute § 52-59 does not create jurisdiction where it otherwise would not exist . . ." Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Lone Star Industries, Inc. 290 Conn. 767, 813, 967 A.2d 1 (2009). " Implicit in [§ 52-29 and Practice Book § 17-55] is the notion that a declaratory judgment must rest on some cause of action that would be cognizable in a non-declaratory suit . . ." Wilson v. Kelley, 224 Conn. 110, 116, 617 A.2d 433 (1992) " To hold otherwise would convert our declaratory judgment statute and rules into a convenient route for procuring an advisory opinion on moot or abstract questions . . . and would mean that the declaratory judgment statute and rules created substantive rights that did not otherwise exist." Milford Power Co., LLC v. Alstom Power, Inc., 263 Conn. 616, 822 A.2d 196 (2003).
The defendants argue that the controversy in the present matter, which is whether the defendants can be compelled to accede to the demands of the plaintiff for copies of various BRTC documents, is not capable of being adjudicated by the court and is not justiciable. It is the defendants' position that internecine disputes within political parties have been regarded by Connecticut courts and courts in other states as being non-justiciable. See Alcorn ex rel. Dawson v. Gleason, 10 Conn.Supp. 210, 216 (1941); Carney v. Pilch, 30 Conn.Supp. 34, 35, 296 A.2d 687 (1972); State v. ex rel. Sturdevant v. Allen, 43 Neb. 651, 62 N.W. 35 (1895).
The defendants additionally argue that the By-Laws of the BRTC contain a dispute resolution procedure and forum. Article I, Section 13 provides in pertinent part, " any and all disputes regarding the procedure or rules of the Republican Party of Bridgeport shall be resolved by the Town Committee, whose determination thereof shall be binding and conclusive upon all parties interested in such dispute." Also, Article II, Section 1 provides in pertinent part, " The Town Chair . . . shall enforce the By-Laws or Rules of the Republican Party of Bridgeport." Thus, the forum and procedure for resolving the plaintiff's grievance is to present his grievance to a vote of the BRTC for resolution, and it will be the responsibility of the defendant Garrett, as the Town Chairman to enforce that decision.
The plaintiff argues that he is not dealing with the policies of a political party. Rather he is confronting a " powerful few within the party who utilize and abuse their positions to subvert the established party policies." The plaintiff argues that he has constitutionally protected rights and cites to cases relating to the candidate selection and nominating process wherein the state has a legitimate interest in protecting the overall integrity of the electoral process, and by preventing fraudulent and deceptive conduct which mars the nominating process. See Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 93 S.Ct. 1245, 36 L.Ed.2d 1 (1973). Regarding the dispute resolution procedures contained in Article I, Section 13 and Article II, Section 1 of the BRTC's By-Laws and rules, the plaintiff argues that the defendants have engaged in a pattern and practice to violate the letter and the spirit of By-Laws, and by their conduct are estopped from imposing these provisions of the By-Laws as a bar to judicial review of this action.
Having reviewed the respective submissions of the parties to this action leads the court to conclude that the BRTC has been somewhat loosely administered in the past several years. It is also apparent that this has resulted in what has now become a factional dispute between the plaintiff and the BRTC which is the local party organization and its Chairman, the defendant Garrett. However, " over questions of political party policies or organization, . . . the courts, in the absence of express statute, have no jurisdiction." Alcorn ex rel. Dawson v. Gleason, supra, 10 Conn.Supp. 215-16. " Such questions should be determined by the regularly constituted party authorities rather than by the courts." Id.; Smith v. McQueen, 232 Ala. 90, 166 So. 788; Sims v. Daniels, 57 Kan. 552, 46 P. 952; Davis v. Hambrick, 109 Ky. 276, 58 S.W. 779, 22 Ky. L. Rptr. 815; State ex rel. Nebraska Republican State Central Committee v. Wait, 92 Neb. 313, 138 N.W. 159; Marcum v. Ballot Commissioners, 42 W.Va. 263, 26 S.E. 281.
" The rule appears to be that in factional controversies within a political party where there is no controlling statute or clear legal right involved, the court will not assume jurisdiction, but will leave the matter for determination by the proper tribunals of the party itself . . ." Alcorn ex rel. Dawson v. Gleason, supra, 10 Conn.Supp. 215-16; Smith v. McQueen, supra; Allen v. Burrow, 69 Kan. 812, 77 P. 555; Davis v. Hambrick, supra; Stephenson v. Election Commissioners, 118 Mich. 396, 76 N.W. 914; State ex rel. Nebraska Republican State Central Committee v. Wait, supra . " In the absence of a statute conferring jurisdiction, courts will not undertake to settle and determine substantial controversies between rival political committees or factions of such a committee, the right in which is dependent upon party rules, usages and customs." (Citations omitted.) Alcorn ex rel. Dawson v. Gleason, supra, 10 Conn.Supp. 215-16. " Political parties are voluntary associations for political purposes. They establish their own rules." Id., 217. " The court will not determine the factional dispute within the party organization. There is no machinery provided by our law, whether judicial or otherwise, to make a settlement, or at least a timely settlement." Flanagan v. Hynes, 75 Conn. 584, 589, 54 A. 737.
" The reluctance of courts to decide between rival factions of political organizations is proverbial." Independent Party of CT v. Dietter, Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Waterbury, No. CV125016387S, (Sept. 28, 2012, Taylor, Mark, J.) The Connecticut Supreme Court has therefore cautioned that " [p]olitical parties generally are free to conduct their internal affairs free from judicial supervision . . . This common law principle of judicial restraint, rooted in the constitutionally protected right of free association, serves the public interest by allowing the political process to operate without undue interference." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Nielsen v. Kezer, 232 Conn. 65, 78-79, 652 A.2d 1013 (1995). See also Carney v. Pilch, supra, 30 Conn.Supp. 35 (" Political parties are voluntary associations for political purposes. They establish their own rules. The rule appears to be that in factional controversies within a political party, where there is no controlling statute or clear legal right involved, the court will not assume jurisdiction but will leave the matter for determination by the proper tribunals of the party itself . . ."). This is a non-justiciable controversy and the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff can point to no statute this court believes could confer jurisdiction.
The rights of the plaintiff are dependent on the local party rules which are set forth in the By-Laws and rules of the BRTC, notably, Article I, Section 13. Article I, Section 13 provides that any and all disputes regarding the procedures or rules of the BRTC are to be resolved by the Town Committee, as a body, and that the determinations of the members of the Town Committee is binding and conclusive upon the interested parties. The proper forum and procedure for resolving the plaintiff's grievance to present it to the BRTC, and thereafter, it will be the Town Chairman's responsibility to enforce the BRTC's decision. The plaintiff argues that he attempted to raise this controversy at a meeting of the BRTC on May 17, 2017, but the meeting was adjourned before any action could be taken. The court finds that the plaintiff has yet to comply with the provisions of Article I, Section 13 and Article II, Section 1 of the BRTC's By-Laws and therefore has not yet exhausted his administrative remedies. Carney v. Pilch, supra, 30 Conn.Supp. 34. Accordingly for all of the reasons set forth herein, the motion to dismiss is granted.
At the same time the plaintiff argues that no meaningful vote could be taken because of his claim that many of the members of the BRTC were not lawfully appointed and approved by the full membership of the BRTC. The court cannot consider this argument, as the validity of membership on the BRTC by any such member is not at issue and would, in fact, be a collateral issue.
(a) The Superior Court in any action or proceeding may declare rights and other legal relations on request for such a declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. The declaration shall have the force of a final judgment. (b) The judges of the Superior Court may make such orders and rules as they may deem necessary or advisable to carry into effect the provisions of this section.
§ 52-471. Granting of injunction (a) Any judge of any court of equitable jurisdiction may, on motion, grant and enforce a writ of injunction, according to the course of proceedings in equity, in any action for equitable relief when the relief is properly demandable, returnable to any court, when the court is not in session. Upon granting of the writ, the writ shall be of force until the sitting of the court and its further order thereon unless sooner lawfully dissolved. (b) No injunction may be issued unless the facts stated in the application therefor are verified by the oath of the plaintiff or of some competent witness.